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This paper is intended to fill the need for a compre-
hensive study of the nature and development not only of
United States Antarctic policy itself but also of the in-
ternal arrangements for the formulation and execution of
that policy. It is not designed to represent a complete
history of American activities in the Antarctic regions.
The principal purposes of this study are (1) to determine
whether past and present Antarctic policies and the govern-
mental arrangements for their formulation and conduct have
served the best interests of the United States and (2) to
determine the manner in which these policies and arrange-
ments might be relevant to other issues and geographic
areas. It is hoped, in addition, that this study will
facilitate an assessment of the political future of the
Antarctic regions themselves. Inasmuch as the Antarctic
did not become a subject of significant and continuing con-
cern to governments and policy-makers in general until the
early 1 9 ' s
,
when claims to national sovereignty w e r e first
asserted over Antarctic territory and sustained Antarctic
operations first became technologically feasible, the study
focuses attention primarily on developments in the twentieth
cen tury
.
I wish to acknowledge a debt, of gratitude to the many
members of the faculty and staff of the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy who have assisted me at all stages in
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the preparation of this paper, and particularly to Profes-
sors Robert B. Stewart and Ruhl J, Ba.rtlett for their valu-
able counsel. I also wish to express my appreciation to
Ambassadors Hugh S . Cunning and Paul C. Daniels, both of
whom have been intimately connected with Antarctic politi-
cal affairs and have been kind enough to share their know-
ledge and experience with me. Finally, I am especially
grateful to Dr. Henry M. Dater, the Staff Historian of the
United States Naval Support Force, Antarctica, and to Dr.
Herman Friis, the Director of the Center for Polar Archives
of the United States National Archives, for their assistance
in obtaining source material. I alone am responsible, how-
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The continent of Antarctica is without doubt the most
inhospitable area on the surface of the earth. It consists
almost entirely of a high plateau covered by an ice sheet
which, in places, readies a thickness of more than a mile.
This vast accumulation of land ice leads to temperatures much
lower than those recorded in comparable northern latitudes;
and the intense cold leads, in turn, to the existence of a
permanent high pressure area around the South Pole, causing
the great blizzards which regularly sweep the continent.
Despite the hostility of the Antarctic environment, however,
individuals and nations have possessed important interests
in the region for a period of almost two centuries.
The first incentive for large-scale national involvement
in the Antarctic was presented not by the barren continent
itself but by the Antarctic seas, which are the world's most
prolific in marine life. As the Antarctic ice pack freezes
each winter, the surrounding water increases in salinity, be-
comes denser, and sinks to the bottom. Bottom water, rich in
nutrients, is then forced upward. As a result of thir cycle,
the sub- An tarct ic waters offer ideal conditions for the exis-
tence of marine organisms in great quantities; and these
E. IV. Hunter Christie, The Antarctic Problem (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1951), pp. 16-18; and U. S., Congress, House
of Representatives, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, International Geophysical Year, The Arctic and Antarc -
tica
,
8 5tK ~ CongT] 2nd Tess., House Rept. No, 1348, Serial No.






organisms provide food for vast numbers of fish, which, in
turn, are able to support large populations of valuable
marine mammals, such as seals and whales.
The Antarctic sealing industry was born as a result of
a voyage by the celebrated British navigator, Captain James
A. Cook, to the waters of the North Pacific in 1776. While
conducting surveys of the Alaskan coast, Cook's men had the
opportunity to trade with the natives for seal furs; and upon
Cook's later arrival in China, these furs were found to be
especially valuable to the Chinese. The news spread quickly,
and mariners of all nations began to organize sealing expedi-
tions in great numbers. The known stocks of seals in the
North Atlantic had already become seriously depleted by the
late eighteenth century, however, and sealers from North At-
lantic nations were forced to range far afield. British and
American sealers concentrated their efforts in the breeding
grounds of the Antarctic, or southern, fur seal (Arctoceph a 1 us
australis ) on the sub- Ant arcti c islands near to South America
and soon dominated the sealing industry in that part of the
world. In contrast, the sealing grounds of the North Pacific
were not exploited to any significant degree until the forma-
^Robert Morgan, World Sea Fisheries (London: Pitman,
1955), p. 280; and J ohn Lyman , "Antarctic a : An t a r c t i c Ocean,"
Encyclop aedi a B rit annica (1966 e d . ) , Vol, 2, p. 5.

tion of the Russian-American Fur Company in 1799.*
For a period of approximately 40 years, Antarctic
sealing offered vast opportunities for economic gain. One
American sealing captain, Edmund Fanning of Stonington, Con-
neticut, reported a net profit from one voyage in 1796 of
$52,300 on an initial investment of $7,867, By the early
1820's, however, the greed and efficiency of the sealers had
resulted in the depletion of stocks of Antarctic fur seals
to the point where sealing operations in the region were no
longer profitable. The species recovered somewhat during
the next 50 years, and the Antarctic sealing industry was
revived on a relatively small scale in 1871. By 1900, this
revival had resulted in the complete extinction of the Antarc-
tic fur seal everywhere but in the Falkland Islands, where
the seals were protected by the British Government, The
Falkland seals have only recently begun to repopulate the sub-
Antarctic islands which were once the centers of the sealing
industry. New breeding grounds were discovered in the South
Shetland, South Orkney, and South Sandwich Islands in the late
3 Philip I. Mitterling, America in the Antarctic to 1 8J




5 H. W, Hunter Christie, The Antarctic Problem (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1951), pp. 123-125. See also "Fur Seals in
the South Shetland Islands," The Polar Record, Vol. 11 (Jan-
uary, 1963), p. 473; and M. W. HoldgateJ "Fur Seals in the




1950' s, but it will be many decades before they again assume
commercial importance."
The principal commercial activity conducted in Antarctic
waters in 1969 is whaling. The most valuable product of this
industry is the oil obtained by rendering the blubber, or
fat, of the whale and used in the manufacture of foodstuffs,
soap, and lubricants. Whale meat is consumed in Japan, but
all attempts to develop markets for this product in other
countries have met with failure.' World stocks of whales
are rapidly diminishing, however, and the only nations en-
gaged in Antarctic whaling at present are J a]) an and the Soviet
Union. Attempts at regulation of the whaling industry, such
as those involved in the Whaling Convention of 1946 a n d b
y
the International Whaling Commission, have been unsuccessful
in obtaining the controls necessary' to prevent the whale's
eventual extinction. Unless the world's whaling nations are
able to reach an agreement in the near future on severe lim-
itations to the size of annual catches, the whale seems des-
6" Fur Seals in the South Shetland Islands," The Polar
Record , Vol. 11 (January, 1963), pp. 473-474; "Fur Seals
Breeding in the South Orkney Islands," The Polar Record
,
Vol. 10 (January, 1961), pp. 408-409; and M. W . Hoi dgate ,
"F : ur Seals in the South Sandwich Islands," The Polar Record,
Vol. 11 (January, 1963), pp. 474-475.
'Robert Morgan, World Sea Fisheries (London: Pitman,
1955), p. 2 80.
8 S. G. Brown, "A Review of Antarctic Whaling," The
Polar Record, Vol. 11 (May, 1963), pp. 555-566.

tined to follow the path of the Antarctic fur seal.
Except in regard to whaling, the Antarctic fisheries
have remained unexploited due to the lack of suitable markets
for fish in the populated continents near to the Antarctic
regions. 9 Despite the fact that millions of people in Africa
and South America suffer from protein deficiencies and gener-
al malnutrition, the demand for fish in these areas has alway:
been relatively low. F.ating habits, while affected signifi-
cantly by levels of education and per capita income, have
deep psychological and cultural roots; and the creation of a
demand for a type of food to which people are unaccustomed
is a difficult process requiring changes in basic human at-
titudes. The Antarctic fisheries will probably assume
major economic importance in the future, however, as a re-
sult of both the increasing v;orld demand for food in general
and the growing use of fish protein concentrate as a 'forti-
fier* for traditional foods.
The existence of significant economic interests in the
Continent itself must await advances in technology. Antarc-
tica is known to contain large quantities of copper and low-
grade coal, and geologists have also found evidence of depos-
its of gold, silver, iron, manganese, and uranium. The high
^Morgan, World Sea Fisheries, p. 24.
10 Alan D. Berg. "Malnutrition and National Development,
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46 (October, 1967), p. 134.

costs that would be involved in extracting and marketing
these resources preclude, however, their becoming commercial-
ly important in the foreseeable future. *
Conditions in Antarctica also preclude the establishment
of any industry involving animals dependent on the land for
their food supplies. Indeed, the largest such animal indig-
enous to Antarctica is a wingless chronomid fly (Belgica ant-
arctica), which breeds in the brackish coastal waters of the
1 2Palmer Peninsula. Not even on the sub -Ant arc tic islands
are there conditions favorable to large-scale animal husband-
ry, for the non-existence of indigenous herbivorous mammals
has led to the evolution of grasses highly sensitive to graz-
ing. Small herds of sheep, cattle, and reindeer introduced
by whalers have managed to exist on some of these islands,
however, and there has been some thinking on the possibility
of introducing some species of Arctic fur-bearing animals. 13
In summary, the land areas of the Antarctic can be expect
ed to offer little economic advantage for some time. It is
Hwalter G. Sullivan, Assault on the Unknown (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1961), p . 336; and E . W . H un t e r C h r i s t i e , The
Antarctic Problem (London: Allen and Unwin, 1951), pp. 22-23.
12J. L. Gressctt and R. E. Leech, "Insect Habitats in
'Antarctica," The Polar Record, Vol . 10 (May, 1961), p. 503.
13 M. W. Holdgatc and N. M. Mace, "The Influence of Man
on the Floras and Faunas of Southern Islands," The Polar,
Record, Vol. 10 (May, 1961), pp. 476-484.

highly probable, however, that technological advances coupled
with the depletion of resources in other areas of the world
will at some future date cause the mineral resources of Ant-
arctica to becojne exploitable on bases competitive with those
of other regions; and the hope of future wealth is, in itself,
an important factor leading nations to maintain an interest
in Antarctic affairs.
In the absence of immediate opportunities for direct
economic gain, the greatest tangible factor behind Antarctic
operations at present is scientific investigation. The impor-
tance of Antarctica to science was amply stated in 1958 by
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the Unit-
ed States House of Representatives in a report prepared with













































t is a large part of our planet--some 6
e miles in area- -and a largely unknown
it is the largest repository of ice in
ntaining 86 percent of all the world's
t is the world's most efficient cold-air
more so than the Arctic. It also con-
e or hub of the atmospheric circulation
rn Hemisphere
.
its melting ice creates vast amounts of
hich sink to the bottom of the ocean and,
tic Bottom Current moves across the equa-
to the Northern Hemisphere.
t enables study to be made of the aurora
comparisons with the aurora bore a lis.
14Howard J. Taubenfield, "A Treaty for Antarctica," Ijnter-
national Conciliation, No. 531 (January, 1961), p. 263.

8Sixth, it contains the South Magnetic Poles
and affords the opportunity for extensive geomag-
netic studies.
Seventh, it presents a stable platform for
the study of the thermal and electrical properties
of the atmosphere cut off from sunlight for many
months, for the study of ionospheric phenomena af-
fecting radio propagation, and for the study of
concentrations of cosmic radiation.
Eighth, it offers a stable platform for the




Southern Hemispheric nations are particularly concerned
with Antarctic meteorology, since most of their weather orig>
inates on that continent; and the extensive meteorological
studies conducted in Antarctica during the 1960's have al-
ready caused a marked improvement in weather forcasting in
the Southern Hemisphere . *"
In addition to possessing interests related to opportu-
nities for and expectations of economic and scientific gain
in the Antarctic, the nations of the world have demonstrated
varying degrees of concern with the strategic implications
of the region. In 1969, however, the logistic and techni-
cal problems that would be involved in the establishment
of major military bases in the Antarctic could be surmounted
only by the Great Powers; and these nations, with their bal-
1S U. S., Congress, House of Representatives, Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, International Geophys ical
Year, The Arctic and Antarctica, 85th Cong., 2nd sess., House
Rept. No. 1TT8, Serial No. 12072 (Washington : United States
Government Printing Office, 1958), vv . 20-21.
1
6
1 b id .
, p . 61.

lis tic. missiles and nuclear submarines, neither have a real
need for such bases nor have shown any interest in allocating
the immense funds that would be necessary for their construc-
tion. 17
At the present time (1969), there are 12 nations with
extensive interests in the Antarctic: the United Kingdom,
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, France, Norway, Belgium,
Japan, Argentina, Chile, the Soviet Union, and the United
States. Despite the varying interests possessed by these
nations in the Antarctic and despite the conflicts that ex-
isted among them with regard to other areas and other issues,
they reached agreement in 19S9 on a treaty which attempted
to insure that national activities in the region would be
solely of a peaceful and cooperative nature.
It would have appeared unlikely, perhaps, that such an
agreement would have been possible. Antarctica was not. a new
area of concern to the nations involved but one in which
attitudes, interests, and policies had hardened over a long
period of time. Serious international disputes had arisen
over questions relating to the region on many previous occa-
sions, and such disputes had twice resulted in the use of
armed force. Re that as it may, however, the Antarctic Trea-
ty has been successful up to the present and may well become
the model for future peaceful solutions to the problems of
IV i'auben f i e Id
,
"A Treaty for Antarctica," pp. 261-262,
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other areas. An understanding of the de ve lopments in Antarc-
tica which culminated in such a significant agreement could
therefore be of considerable importance to the world, in
general.
The successful conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty was
achieved largely through the efforts of the United States
Government, a government which has , moreover, spent some
$350,000,000 from 1954 to 1969 to engage in Antarctic
operations on a scale unprecedented in the history of any
nation. It is also of importance, therefore, to discuss
and evaluate the nature and development, of the United States
policies which resulted in both the Antarctic Treaty and such
a massive United States commitment in Antarctica itself. A
study of these policies is directly relevant not only to the
future of the Antarctic regions r.nd the role of the United
States in that future but also to the prospects for peaceful
international cooperation in other areas of the world.
The history of United States activities in the Antarc-
tic is almost as old as the history of the republic itself.
American sealers and whalers were active in Antarctic waters
from the late eighteenth century. Little is known of their
early discoveries, however, since the pressures of competi-
tion led them to keep most of their operations secret. *°
' 8 U. S., Department of Slate, J>^i_^d_^^-^e^ Policy and
Into r n a
t
ional C o op e r a
t
ion i n An t a re tic a ( I a s h i n g t o n : U n i t e
d
States Government: 'Print ing OFfTcT, 1964), p. 1.
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The first recorded penetration of the Antarctic regions by
Americans occurred in 1790, when Captain Daniel Greene of
New Haven, Connecticut, led a sealing expedition to South
Georgia. Thirty years later, another American sealing
captain, Nathaniel Palmer of Stonington, Connecticut, may
have been the first to discover the Antarctic continent. On
November 17, 1820, Palmer logged the sighting of a strait
believed to be the Orleans Channel, one side of which is bor-
dered by the mainland of Antarctica, 20 Substantial evidence
indicates, however, that the coast of Antarctica had been
sighted earlier in 1820 by the British surveyor, Edward
O 1
Bransficld. In addition, the Soviet Union claims that the
Russian navigator, Fabian von Bellingshausen, sighted the con
tinent before the others during his exploring expedition of
1819-1821, There is evidence that Bellingshausen may have
done so, but without having realized at the time that he had
actually sighted land rather than a seaborne ice formation.
With the depletion of known stocks of Antarctic fur
22
Paul Siple, "Antarctica: Exploration and Discovery,
Eji^jcljDpj^cdia^ Britannica (1966 ed.), Vol. 2, p. 7.
^Walter G. Sullivan, Quest for a Continent (New York:





America in the Antarctic
,
p. 41.
2 2 Terence Armstrong, "Four Eye-Witness Accounts of
Bellingshausen's Antarctic Voyage of 1819-21," The Polar
Record, Vol. 6 (January, 1951), 'pp. 85-87.
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seals in the early lS20's, various persons connected with
the sealing industry petitioned the United States Congress
to grant funds for an official expedition to search the Ant-
arctic for new breeding grounds. Other American maritime in-
terests also desired that an official expedition be sent to
the Antarctic for the purpose of exploring and surveying the
uncharted waters of the region. Congress acted favorably on
the requests in May, 1836, appropriating the sum of $300,000
for use by the Secretary of the Navy in connection with an
expedition which would explore the Antarctic regions and
certain areas of the Pacific Ocean.*'
The United States Exploring Expedition, consisting of
five ships under the command of Lieutenant Charles Wilkes,
United States Navy, sailed from Norfolk, Virginia, on
August 19, 1838. It was under orders to proceed first to
Tierra del Fuego and then attempt to penetrate as far to the
south as permitted by the condition of the Antarctic ice pack
On March 3, 1839, the expedition reached Hope Island off the
northern tip of the Palmer Peninsula, where it found further
progress through the ice impossible, Wilkes 1 vessels then
departed from the Antarctic, and separated to conduct surveys
of various South Pacific islands, which included Samoa, New
Caledonia, the Fijis, and the New Hebrides. 24







The ships reunited in Sydney, Australia, in November,
1839, and the members of the expedition made preparations
for a return to the Antarctic during the upcoming austral
summer. The expedition left Sydney on December 25 and sailed
south t sighting the Antarctic mainland at an approximate
longitude of 140° East on January 30, 1840. The vessels then
cruised westward along the coast and reached a longitude of
97 c Last before a shortage of drinking water forced them to
2 5
return to Australia.
The exploits of the Wilkes Expedition led to an increase
of American interest in the Antarctic, and the hydrographic
data collected by the expedition served to lessen some of
the dangers connected with Antarctic voyages. There is no
evidence of Wilkes having discovered new sealing grounds,
but American whalers began to visit the Antarctic in ever-
increasing numbers and soon dominated the whaling industry
in that region. In spite of the losses suffered by their
fleets during the Civil War, American whalers retained this
position of dominance until the 1880' s, when both overfishing
and the increasing use of mineral oils for purposes of lubri-
cation began to cause a decline in the whaling industry it-
self, 26
With the decline of Antarctic whaling and the post-Civil
2$Mi tterling, America in the Antarctic t pp. 137-146.
26 Sip]e, "Antarctica: Exploration and Discovery," p. 8,
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War emphasis on internal development, the attention of the
United Stater, turned away from the Antarctic regions. By
the beginning of the twentieth century, therefore, the United
States Government had neither developed an Antarctic policy
nor, for that matter, had recognized a need for such a policy.
Indeed, for a period of some 110 years, there had been little
in Antarctica of concern to governments in general. Antarc-
tic operations had been conducted primarily by private enter-
prise, and no nation had attempted to gain exclusive control
over any part of the region. This situation did not endure
long into the twentieth century, however, for governments




THE ERA OF PASSIVITY: 1904-1933
In the first decade of the twentieth century, the Ant-
arctic whaling industry began to recover rapidly from its
state of decline. The invention and development in the late
nineteenth century of the harpoon cannon, explosive harpoon,
and steam-powered whale catcher had served to create an in-
terest in the smaller and swifter whales which had previously
been relatively difficult and uneconomical to catch; and such
species, like the blue and fin whales, were known to exist in
great numbers in the seas adjacent to Antarctica. The tech-
nological advancements that allowed these species to be hunt-
ed on an economical basis first reached the Antarctic in
1904, when the Norwegian whaling captain, C. A. Larson, led
a three-ship fleet to South Georgia.* Larsen constructed a
shore station and processing plant at Grytviken Harbor, South
Georgia, in 1905, and the immediate success of this enter-
prise led to the establishment of additional whaling stations
on South Georgia and in the South Shetland Islands.
The tax and licensing revenues obtainable from such
shore-based whaling companies provided a significant incentive
for the assertion of national claims in the Antarctic regions,
and on July 21, 1908, the United Kingdom issued Letters
*S. G. Brown, "A Review of Antarctic Whaling," The_Polar
Record
,
Vol. 11 (May, 1963), pp. 557-558.
2 E. W. Hunter Christie, The Antarctic Problem (London:





Patent proclaiming the existence- of British sovereignty over
the following territories:
. . .
South Georgia, the South Orkneys, the
South Shetlands, and the Sandwich Islands, and the
territory known as Graham's Land, situated in the
South Atlantic Ocean to the south of the fiftieth
parallel of south latitude, and lying between the
2 0th and the 80th degrees of west longitude . . . . 3
The Letters Patent further stated that the above terri-
tories would become dependencies of the British Colony of
the Falkland Islands and be administered by the Falkland Gov-
ernor and Executive Council. The United Kingdom based its
right to take such action on its long history of discoveries,
exploration, and occupation in the Antarctic--a history which
dated from Captain James Cook's circumnavigation of the Ant-
arctic ice pack during his exploring expedition of 1772-1775.
Even before the time of Cook, however, it had been the cus-
tom of nations to consider that a valid claim to sovereignty
over previously unclaimed territory must be based on the con-
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p. 7 6
'United Kingdom, "British Letters Patent Appointing the
nor of the Colony of the Falkland Islands to be Governor
uth Georgia, the South Orkneys, the South Shetlands, the
ich Islands, and Graham's Land, and Providing for the
nroent Thereof as Dependencies of the Colony . --Westminster
,
21, 1908," British and F< reign State Papers, 1907-1 908
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A 11)5 d,
,
pp. 76-7 7 .
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area in question. This customary view had been sustained
by the decisions of various mediators and arbitral commissions
during the nineteenth century and remains valid at the present
t ime
.
Even though British settlements were then in existence
only on South Georgia and on Deception Island in the South
Shctlands, the actions taken by British officials pursuant
to the Letters Patent were not immediately protested by other
nations. British magistrates and customs officers began to
exercise jurisdiction throughout the region claimed, and the
whaling companies based in that region applied for British
licenses and paid taxes to the British Government. Some
international concern was expressed, however, over the word-
Gustav Smedal, Acquisition of Sovereignty over Polajr
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ing of the Letters Patent. The British claim was apparently
interpreted by Argentina and Chile as involving all the ter-
ritory south of SO South within the me rid inns cited, thus
including part of the South American mainland. ° Such an
interpretation appears to have no basis; the Letters Patent
were specific in listing the areas claimed, failing only to
delimit the "territory known as Graham's Land" on the Antarc-
tic Continent, The meridians cited served only to give the
general location of the British -claimed territories.
^
In any event, the United Kingdom promulgated additional
Letters Patent in 1917. These Letters Patent were designed
both to dispel any doubts regarding the limits of the Brit-
ish claim in the Antarctic and to extend that claim, and they
declared the existence of British sovereignty over "all is-
lands and territories whatsoever" between 20° West and 50°
West, south of 50° South, and between 50° West and 85° West,
"Christie, Antarctic Problem, p. 24 3.
9 This criticism of the Letters Patent continues up to
the present. See, for example, Argentine Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Worship, Juan A. Bramuglia, to British Ambassador
to Argentina, Sir Reginald A. Leeper, January 28, 1948, in
"Antarctic Claims-- Recent Diplomatic Exchanges between Great
Britain, Argentina, and Chile," The Polar Record, Vol. 5
(January-July, 1948), pp. 2 33-236. ' Re f e rfTnjTTo the Letters
Patent of 1 90S, Bramugl ia stated that "it regarded Patagonia
as belonging to the British."

19
south of 58° South. 10
This practice of claiming pie-shaped areas extending
to the Pole is termed the 'sector principle' and was first
proposed by a Canadian senator in 1907 for use in the Arctic
regions. According to the principle as originally stated,
any nation extending into a polar region has a right to sov-
ereignty over all the territory vv' i t h i n the spherical trian-
gle drawn between the eastern and western extremities of
that nation and the pole in question. In practice, alleged
limits of coastal exploration were also used by the United
Kingdom and subsequent claimants either to define or extend
national sectors in the Antarctic. The sector principle has
since been utilized by all Antarctic claimants but Norway-
it being disadvantageous to the latter's Arctic interests.
The principle has never been the subject of adjudication,
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claims in the Antarctic continued to cause no international
reactions, either in the form of protests by nations which
might consider the British actions as an infringement upon
their own rights in the region or in the form of national
claims to other Antarctic territories. Perhaps emboldened
by this lack of opposition, the United Kingdom proceeded to
extend its claims further. On July 30, 1923, a British
Order-in-Council was issued, declaring that British sover-
eignty existed over the Antarctic sector within 160° East,
150° West, and 60° South. This sector was named the Ross
Dependency and placed under the administrative authority of
New Zeal and .
*
Thus, within a period of 15 years the United Kingdom
had proclaimed the existence of its sovereignty over one-
third of the Antarctic Continent and many sub- Antarcti c is-
lands and archipelagos; and even though the British claims
included regions which had been discovered and explored by
American citizens, there appears to be no evidence that any
organ of the United States Government was even considering
the matter. The implications of the British actions did
not remain unnoticed by all the governments of the world,
however, for nine months after the British assertion of
12 British Order-in-Council of July 30, 1923, in U. S.,
Naval War College, "Declarations concerning Antarctic Ter-
ritories," International Law Documents , 1948-49 (Washington
Un i t e d St at e'F~~G o"veYnncnt.~T rT nti n g 6 f i' 3 c e ," 1 95 ") , p . 2 35.
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sovereignty over the 'Ross Dependency," the Antarctic claims
race gained another participant-- the Republic of France. On
March 27, 1924, a French Presidential Decree reserved for
French citizens the mining, hunting, and fishing rights in
the Cro7et Archipelago and "Adelic or Wilkes Land" and the
territorial waters thereof. *^ The following November, an-
other French Presidential Decree placed the above territo-
ries, in addition to Saint Paul and Amsterdam Islands and
the Kerguelen Archipelago, under the administrative authority
of the Governor General of Madagascar.
France had been one of the first nations active in Ant-
arctic waters. In the late eighteenth century Bouvct Island
and the Kerguelen and Crozet Archipelagos were discovered by
the Frenchmen whose names they respectively bear, and in 1840
a French expedition under J. S. C. Dumont D'urville sighted
the Antarctic Continent at an approximate latitude of 140°
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the same region. Dumont D'urville did not explore as far
to the west as Wilkes, but he landed on a sub- Ant arctic
island and claimed both it and the adjacent Antarctic coast
for France, naming the continental territory for his wife,
Adelie. '
France made no delimitation of the precise extent of
Adelie Land in 1924, a report of the French Minister of Colo-
nies indicating that France's primary interest was in the
exploitation of the resources of the adjacent seas. This
report further stated that France had not previously asserted
its sovereignty in the Antarctic because of ignorance of the
region's value and that, in addition, France had not deemed
it necessary "to confirm by the establishment of an effective
authority the rights of sovereignty which France had long ago
aco^iired" over the territories discovered by its navigators.^
Soon after the assertion of the French claims, the United
States made its first official statement on the Antarctic
claims situation. This statement, was not occasioned by the
actions of the two claimants, however, but by Norway. On
February 25, 1924, the Norwegian Minister to the United States,
Helmer II. Bryn, had sent a note to Secretary of State Hughes,
commenting on an article which had recently appeared in The
"Walter G . Sullivan, Quest for a Continent (New York:
McGraw-Hill, c. 3957), p. 29.
16 Report of French Minister of Colonies, November 2],
1924, in Naval War College, Documents , 1948-49, pp. 228-229.
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Rochester (New York) Herald . According to the article in
question, the Norwegian explorer, Roald Amundsen, had agreed
that the United States might claim any land he might discov-
er on his forthcoming Arctic expedition; and the Norwegian
Minister informed the Secretary of State that Amundsen denied
having made such an agreement and that "all the land that
Mr. Amundsen may discover will, of course, be taken in the
name of His Majesty, the King of Norway."*'
In his reply to Minister Bryn of April 2, 1924, Secretary
Hughes stated what has become known as the Hughes Doctrine
on the Polar Regions:
Today, if an explorer is able to ascertain the
existence of lands still unknown to civilization, his
act of so-called discovery, coupled with a formal
taking of possession, would have no significance,
save as he m i g h t herald the advent of the settler;
and where for climatic or other reasons actual set-
tlement would be an impossibility, as in the case
of the polar regions, such conduct on his part would
afford frail support for a reasonable claim of sov-
i <?
erei gnty . J °
Six weeks later, Secretary Hughes stated the relevance
of his doctrine to Antarctica in a reply to a note from an
*
'Norwegian Minister to Secretary of State, February 25,
1924, in U. S., Department of State, "Correspondence between
Norwegian Minister and United States Secretary of State re-
garding Polar Claims," Foreign Relations of the United States ,
1924 (Washington: Un i ted "StVte's Co ve rnmc-ift"~l > rin t .1 nj 51 lice,
19 39) , Vol. 2
,
p. SIS.
1 8 S c c r e t a r y of S t a t e to No rw e g i an Minister, April 2 , 19 2 4 ,




•inquiring citizen, who had suggested that the United States
base a claim to sovereignty in the Antarctic upon the rights
allegedly acquired by the official Wilkes Expedition. Hughes
admitted that whalers of British and other nationalities
anchored along the coast of the Palmer Peninsula during the
summer, but he added:
So far as this Department is informed the ex-
ploration of parts of the Antarctic Continent
. . .
has not been followed by permanent settlement upon
any part of the Continent.^
Hughes' statements did not constitute a policy but rath-
er expressed a belief in the inability of other nations to
fulfill what the State Department interpreted as the contem-
porary requirements for the acquisition of sovereignty over
polar areas. Moreover, there is considerable doubt as to the
validity of this interpretation. Not permanent settlement
£er se but rather effective occupation, coupled with sons ex-
ercise of national jurisdiction, had been required as a basis
for a valid territorial claim in the custom of nations. The
actual extent of the occupation and administration that had
been required in previous cases had varied in relation to the
strength of the claims of other nations to the sane territory
In the absence of significant competition, nations had based
19Secretary of State to A. W. Prescott, Pile No.




successful territorial claims on a minimum of concrete activ-
ities. 20 This view was subsequently sustained by the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice, which stated in 1933:
It is impossible to read the records in cases
as to territorial sovereignty without observing that
the tribunal has been satisfied with very little in
the way of the exercise of sovereign rights, provid-
ed the other State could not make out a superior
claim 21
It therefore appears that at least a portion of the Brit-
ish claim to Antarctica might well have been successfully
defended in accordance with the standards of international
law at the time of Hughes; and if the exercise by other na-
tions of sovereign rights in the Antarctic was not believed
to be in the best interests of the United States, the State
Department should have taken or recommended, as the case may
be, action toward either establishing the bases for a superior
United States claim or obtaining some alternative to nation-
al claims themselves. At this point, however, there is no
evidence of any attempt on the part of the State Department
to formulate specific policies with regard to the Antarctic
or even to ascertain the nature of any United States interests
20sce, for example, Award in the Case of the Cravairola
Boundary, September 23, 1874, in John Basset Moore, History
and Digest of the Interna tional Arb it ratio to Which th e
United States "Has Be en a Party ('6"vols 77 Washington : Govern
men t P r intingOffice , 1 898 ) , Vol. 2 , pp . 2027-2049.
21 Permanent Court of International Justice, Legal S'iatiis
of Eastern Greenland, Judgment of April 5, 1933 , ""'Series A? B
,
No. 5 3!, p. 46.
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that might be involved in the region, Hughes offered no
alternative to the developing regime of separate national
claims and gave the implication that if nations were able
to establish settlements in the Antarctic in accordance with
his criteria, the United States would recognize their claims--
all without having decided whether such claims would be ad-
vantageous to United States interests or, again, what those
interests might be. Finally, Hughes did not take into con-
sideration the possibility of technological advances which
could facilitate the fulfillment of even his criteria of per-
manent settlement.
With regard to the above proposal for the establishment
of a United States claim in the Antarctic, the State Depart-
ment assumed the position that an act of Congress "assertative
in the domestic sense" would be necessary before the Depart-
ment could declare that the United States "possessed a right
to sovereignty" in the region. 22 The State Department under
Hughes was apparently consistent in a belief that Congress
rather than the executive had the power to acquire territory
even though the Department under previous administrations
had declared on several occasions that the United States
claimed jurisdiction over certain Pacific and Caribbean islands
by virtue of their having been reserved for various purposes
22 Secretary of State to A. W. Prescott, Pile No.





25by executive order. ° The expressed reluctance of the State
Department to declare that the United States either did or
did not possess a 'right to sovereignty' in the Antarctic is
another matter entirely, however, and can only be interpreted
as an attempt by the Department to absolve itself from respon
sibility in matters concerning a region to which it had con-
sistently paid little attention.
With regard to other unclaimed areas of the world, tin;
State Department under Hughes had not awaited congressional
action before declaring that the United States possessed
•rights to sovereignty' and had even, on occasion, initiated
action toward the formal extension of United States jurisdic-
tion. Indeed, on May 22, 1924, Secretary Hughes sent a let-
ter to President Coolidge, in which he enumerated the rights
that the United States possessed over Swain's Island, an
atoll in the Pacific Ocean, and recommended the submission
to Congress of a joint resolution formally extending United
23with regard to Wake and Midway Islands, sec Acting
Secretary of State David J. Hill to Perry, Mason and Company,
April 18, 1900, in John Bassett Moore, A Digest of Intern.a«-
tional law (8 vols., Washington: United States Government
Printing Office, 1906), Vol. 1, p. 555. With regard to
Navassa Island, see Opinion of the Solicitor of the State
Department, October 25, 1917, in Green II . JUickworth , .Digest
oMnternationa]^ Law (8 vols., Washington: United States
G o vernment Printing f fi ce , 194 0), Vol. 1 , p. 514.
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States sovereignty over that, island. 24 Thus, regardless of
which branch of the United States Government was believed
by the State Department to have the power to actually acquire
territory, the Department was not generally reluctant to
express opinions on the nature of rights possessed by the
United States over such territory. Moreover, even though
the Department might not have wished to comment at that time
on the nature of such rights in the Antarctic, the role of
the Department in the conduct of foreign relations did give
it the responsibility to concern itself with studies, plans,
and policies regarding regions in which the United States
possessed long histories of involvement. In the case of Ant-
arctica, however, there is no evidence of any action whatso-
ever being taken by the State Department in the early 1920' s.
The only organ of the United States Government to at-
tempt at this time to ascertain the nature of American in-
terests in the Antarctic claims situation was the Navy De-
partment, which, in contrast to the State Department, believ-
ed that sovereignty accrued from mere discovery and that the
United States therefore possessed sovereignty over the ter-
ritory which had first been sighted by the Wilkes Expedition.
As a result of the French claim to a portion of this terri-
24Secretary of State to President, May 22 , 1924, in Green
H. Hackworth, pi ge s t of International Law (8 vols., Washing-
ton: United States Government Printing Office, 1940), Vol. 1,
pp. 4 82-4 85.
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tory, the Navy's General Board conducted a brief study on
the Antarctic and concluded that the Navy Department was
"generally interested in the sovereignty of outlying areas
on which American sovereignty has been established, particu-
larly in view of the possibility of the discovery of fuel
and other mineral deposits." 25 The study contained no rec-
ommendations for action in response to the French claim,
however, and the Navy Department showed no further interest
in the matter.
The United States Government's apparent lack of concern
over the Antarctic claims situation was duo primarily to the
fact that these claims did not constitute a direct and imme-
diate threat to American interests. The only American expe-
ditions to visit the Antarctic since 1840 had been engaged
in the exploitation of Antarctic sea life, and none of these
expeditions had constructed permanent facilities in the re-
gion. Moreover, even though the Navy Department had recog-
nized an interest in the future exploitation of Antarctic
minerals, the possibility of conducting sustained operations
of any nature on the Antarctic Continent itself appeared
extremely remote in the early 1920' s. The absence of im-
mediate incentives for involvement in Antarctic affairs,
25 U. S., Navy, General Board, Sovereignty o_f Croze t Is
1 a n d s and Wilke s L a n d
,
S t ud y N o . 414-3, S e r i a 1 N o . 1 .;' 2 5
,
December 9, 1924 /"Archives of the U. S. Naval History Divi




however, does not absolve the United States Government from
criticism for its failure to demonstrate any significant
concern with the nature of the United States rights and in-
terests in the Antarctic during that period and for its
failure to consider steps tov;ard protecting such rights
and interests as were believed to exist.
Situations developed in the late 1920* s, however, which
caused the United States to become more concerned with Ant-
arctic matters. Although even then the United States did not
develop a coherent policy in regard to Antarctica, it began
to react more vigorously to the Antarctic policies of other
nations. The principal factors leading to this increase in
concern were the following: (]) Richard E. Byrd and his Ant-
arctic expedition, (2) the British Imperial Conference of
1926 and subsequent diplomatic developments, (3) the contro-
versy over the use of the sector principle by claimants of
Arctic territories, and (4) the heightening of the Antarctic
claims race by the addition of two more participants-- Argen-
tina and Norway.
A large amount of the credit for the development of an
active American concern with Antarctica is deserved by one
American--Richard Evelyn Byrd. Byrd had been trained as a
naval aviator during World War I and had later become inter-
ested in long-range flying. He received experience in polar
aviation in 1925 as the commander of the naval aviation unit
assigned to the MacMillan Arctic Expedition and, as a result
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of this experience, conceived the idea of conducting explor-
atory flights in Antarctica. Unable to secure financial sup-
port for an Antarctic expedition from the United States Gov-
ernment, Byrd was forced to seek private backing.. Since his
proposed program included extensive scientific research, he
succeeded in obtaining some financial assistance from the
National Geographic Society. His principal support, however,
came from businessmen and particularly from John D. Rockefel-
ler and Eds el Ford, who were his personal friends. In all,
Byrd's 1928 expedition cost approximately $800, 000. 26
Byrd intended to depart from the United States in August,
1928, and make Dunedin, New Zealand, his last port of call
before arriving in Antarctica. To save space on the expedi-
tion's vessels, Byrd wished to ship certain supplies ahead to
Dunedin and load them there; and he requested the assistance
of the State Department in obtaining the permission of New
Zealand authorities to admit his supplies free of duty and to
7 7
store them for reshipraent. The State Department agreed to
cooperate and was successful in obtaining the customs exemp-
26 Sullivan, Quest, pp. 79-80.
27 Byrd to Secretary of State, File No. 31 Byrd South
Polar Expedition/25, July 5, 1928, U. S. National Archives,
D e p t . of State.
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lions desired. 2 8 After his arrival in Dune din, however,
Byrd informed Secretary Kellogg that the New Zealand Govern-
ment was withholding its assistance because it had not been
notified by the State Department that the expedition was "ac-
credited" by the United States Government. -' It was apparent
in this case that the New Zealand Government was fishing for
some sort of official statement that could be used as proof
of an implied United States recognition of New Zealand author-
ity over certain areas of the Antarctic, and the State Depart-
ment carefully avoided making such a statement. Secretary
Kellogg simply instructed the American Consul in Wellington
to inform the New Zealand Government that the Byrd Expedition
was entirely of a scientific nature and that the United States
hoped that. New Zealand might find it possible to assist the
expedition in accomplishing its purposes. With the subse-
quent efforts of the American Consulate in his behalf, Byrd
be pan to receive the degree of cooperation desired from New
28 Assistant Secretary of State, William R. Castle, Jr.,
to Consul General in Wellington, Will L. Lowrie, File No. 031
Byrd South Polar Expedition/27, July 11, 192S, U. S. National
Archives, Dept. of State; and Consul -in-Charge in Wellington,
Bernard Gottlieb, to Secretary of State, File No. 031 Byrd
South Polar Expedi tion/ 30 , August 24, 1928, Ibid.
29 Byrd to Secretary of State, File Nol 31 Byrd South
Polar Expedition/36, undated telegram (received November 12,
19 2 8), Ibid.
30secretary of State to Consul-in-Charge in Wellington,
File No, 31 Byrd South Polar Expedition/37, telegram. Novem-




The activities planned by the Byrd Expedition also led
to an attempt by the United Kingdom to achieve United States
recognition of its Antarctic claims. Immediately prior to
Byrd's departure from New Zealand, the British Government
sent a note to the State Department, offering the expedition
the use of British facilities in Ant arct ica--which facilities
were in fact non-existent . 32 Enclosed with the British note
was a copy of the Summar y of Proceedings of the Imperial Con-
ference of 1926. This conference had been led by Australian
insistence to consider the question of British policy in the
Antarctic regions and had decided that a British "title" to
various unclaimed Antarctic 'lands 1 already existed by virtue
of discovery. 3 The Conference failed to indicate the pre-
cise extent of these lands and was perhaps referring to coast'
al territories only; but since all previous British Antarctic
claims had been extended to the Pole in accordance with the
sector principle, the Imperial Conference can be considered
to have extended the sphere of British interest to virtually
3J New Zealand Minister of Internal Affairs to American
Consul General in Wellington, File No. 031 Byrd South Polar
Expedition/45, November 26, 1928, U. S. National Archives,
Dcpt. of State.
32 British Ambassador to Secretary of State, File No. 31
Byrd South Polar Expedition/ 38 , November 17, 1928, I b i d
Summary of Proceedings of the Imperial Conference,
1926, in Naval War College, Documents, 1948-49, p. 237.
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the entire Antarctic Continent. Moreover, Wilkes Land was
one of the 'lands' concerned and was expressly noted as "the
area which lies to the west of Adelie Land and which on its
discovery by the Australian Antarctic. Expedition in 1912 was
denominated Wilkes Land." 34 The British thus indicated ac-
quiescence in the French claim to Adelie Land, although Aus-
tralia was somewhat opposed to this action. 5
The acceptance by the United States Government of the
offer of the use of British facilities could have been con-
sidered by an international tribunal as a tacit recognition
of British acts of occupation in the Antarctic, and the State
Department therefore took no action regarding the offer. The
British note itself, however, constituted the first official
notice of British Antarctic claims received by the United
States Government; and Under Secretary of State J. Reuben
Clark drafted a strongly-worded reply. Clark's draft was not
immediately approved, and Secretary Kellogg soon left office,
as did Clark himself on June 19, 1929. Secretary Stimson
delayed any reply to the British note until the following
November, when he simply acknowledged its receipt and stated
34summary of Proceedings, of the Imperial Conference,
1926, in Naval. War College, Documents, 1948-49
,
p. 237.
35 David Hunter Miller, '.'National Flights in the Antarctic,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 5 (April, 1927), p. 508.
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that he had read its contents. " It is important to consider
the Clark draft, however, for this and other memoranda afford
an insight into the serious thought that the State Department
under Kellogg was beginning to give to the Antarctic claims
situation .
In his draft, Clark stated that the United States would
not deny to any nation rights or titles gained in accordance
with international law through discovery but that the United
States would not admit that such rights and titles could be
perfected by either temporary occupation or unimplemented
37declarations, decrees, or laws. This recognition of the
existence of some rights in Antarctica accruing from discovery
was intended by the State Department to leave open the possi-
bility of a United States claim to a "preferential right" to
occupy areas discovered by American citizens. ^°
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raft by Under Secretary of State of Reply to British
' s Note of November ]7, 1928, undated, in Memorandum
A. O'Neill, Assistant to the Under Secretary of State,
. 800.014 Antarctic/4, February 28, 1929, U. S. Nation-
ivcs
f Dept. of State.
TE--Clark's draft apparently does not exist as a sepa-
cument in the United States National Archives but is
in full in the above memorandum, which also contains
s by O'Neill herself. References to Clark's statements
i n d i c a ted.
38Memorandum by Anna A. O'Neill, Assistant to the Under
Secretary of State, File No. 800.014 Antarctic/4, February 28,
1929, U. S, National Archives, Dept. of State.
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question of the relevance of the Monroe Doctrine to Antarc-
tica. In this regard, Clark noted that various Antarctic
territories claimed by the U n i t e d Kingdom were located in
the Western Hemisphere and continued:
I need but suggest that the people of the United
States have always entertained definite views con-
cerning the acquisition of sovereign rights in the
unclaimed and unsettled lands of this Hemisphere."
It is to be noted that the Monroe Doctrine was not cited
by name, although the allusion to it was obvious. There was
some difference of opinion within the State Department re-
garding its applicability to Antarctica. Although there is
no evidence to indicate that President Monroe considered his
statements to apply to Antarctica when he spoke of the Ameri-
can Continents, he did state that the United States should
consider any attempt by Fiuropean Powers "to extend their sys-
tem to any portion of this Hemisphere" as dangerous to its
"peace and safety. "^" Regardless of President Monroe's
•^Draft by Under Secretary of State of Reply to British
Embassy's Note of November 17, 1928, undated, in Memorandum
by Anna A, O'Neill, Assistant to the Under Secretary of State,
Pile No. 800.014 Antarctic/4, February 28, 1929, U. S. Nation-
al Archives, D e p t . of State.
N0TP- - CI ark ' s well-known Memorandum on the Monroe Doc-
trine was submitted on December 17, 1928, while the British
note regarding Antarctica was under consideration by the
State Department.
4°The Monroe Doctrine: Message of President Monroe to
Congress, December 2, 1823, in Ruhl J. Bartlett, ed., The
Record of American Diplom acy (New York: Knopf, 1964),
pp. l ST- 1"B 3. 1 nHTcs mine.
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original intentions, however, the United States has never
invoked the Monroe Doctrine in a case involving Antarctica.
Clark concluded his draft with a statement to the effect
that the United States did not recognize any means of acquir-
ing sovereignty over territory other than those well estab-
lished in the practice of nations. In all, Clark's draft
embodied the basic principles of the Hughes Doctrine but in-
dicated a greater concern over American rights in Antarctica
than had been demonstrated by the State Department under
Hughes
.
The State Department continued to show no interest, how-
ever, in the formal assertion of United States Antarctic
claims. On October 28, 1928, Byrd's personal representative
had written Secretary Kellogg, requesting information on the
Department's attitude toward Byrd's claiming for the United
States any unclaimed land he might discover. A reply was
made on December 5 by Under Secretary Clark, who simply ac-
knowledged the receipt of the letter and expressed the Depart
41 Draft by Under Secretary of State of Reply to British
Embassy's Note of November 17, 3 928, undated, in Memorandum
by Anna A. O'Neill, Assistant to the Under Secretary of State,
File No. 800.014 Antarctic/4, February 28, 1929, U, S. Nation-
al Archives, Dept. of State.
42 Byrd's Personal Representative to Secretary of State,
October 10, 1928, in U. S., Department of State, "Antarctic
Expedition of Commander Richard E. Byrd," Forei gn Relations
of the United States ,1928 [Washington: United States Govern-
ment Printing Of fice
, 1943) , Vol. 2, p. 1002.
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merit's reluctance to comment on the matter. ^
In late December, 1928, Byrd arrived in Antarctica and
es tabl 1 shed his expedition at the Bay of Whales in New Zear
and's Ross Dependency. Byrd's base, named Little America,
was the most complex yet constructed in Antarctica; and the
expedition's shore party of 4 2 men became the largest group
to winter-over in Antarctica up to that time. In addition,
the expedition had brought three ski-equipped airplanes; and
on January 17, 1929, Byrd made the first of his historic ex-
ploratory flights, '4
By the end of the first operating season, Byrd and other
members of his expedition had sighted a minimum of 20,000
square miles of previously unknown territory. Byrd, in ad-
dition, had claimed the region east of 150° West for the
United States, naming it Marie Byrd Land for his wife.^5
During the Antarctic winter of 1929, the expedition remained
at Little America and made preparations for the second season
of explorations. The primary objective of the expedition
was achieved late in the following spring, when Bernt Balchen,
Harold June, Ashley Mr.Kinley, and Byrd himself became the
^iljider Secretary of State to Byrd's Personal Representa^
tive, December 5, 1928, in Foreign Relat ions, 1928, Vol. 2,
p. 10 04.
4 4 Sullivan, Quest, pp. 80-81.
4s United States Navy Press Release, File No. 80U.014 Ant-




first men to fly over the South Pole. 4 " Byrd returned to
the United States in early ]930 and received a hero's wel-
come. He was promoted from commander to rear admiral on the
Navy's retired list, and all the members of the expedition
were awarded medals for their "heroic and undaunted services"
4 Rby a joint resolution of Congress.
Byrd's greatest achievement was his introduction of
twentieth- century technology into Antarctica. His base, un-
like those of previous Antarctic expeditions, had been
equipped with electric lights and telephones and had remained
in almost constant radio contact with the outside world. He
had also demonstrated the feasibility of air operations in
Antarctica, having been able to explore and photograph more
territory in an hour than could have been covered by dog
team over a period of months. The Byrd Expedition had also
achieved the effect of virtually forcing the United States to
become involved in Antarctic politics and diplomacy, inasmuch
46 Paul Siple, 90° South (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,
c. 195 9), pp. 44-46".
47
U. S., Statutes at large , Vol. 46 (1930), p. 1633.
"Act Providing for the Advancement of Commander Richard E.
Byrd, United States Navy, Retired, to the Grade of Rear Ad-
miral on the Retired List of- the Navy."
48u. S., Statutes at Large, Vol* 46 (1930), p. 379. "Act
Authorizing the Presentation of Medals to the Officers and
Men of the Byrd Antarctic Expedition."
A OrSullivan, Quest, pp. 80-8!

4as the existence in Antarctica of an American expedition,
albeit an unofficial one, had presented the State Department
with problems it simply could not ignore. Although no offi-
cial action was taken in regard to Byrd's unofficial claims
activity, it did appear that the State Department was begin-
ning to give serious thought to American rights in Antarctica
This increase in official American interest in Antarctica,
however, was not due entirely to the activi tics of the Ryrd
Expedition, for there were additional factors leading the
United States Government to become more concerned with Ant-
arctic affairs during the period from 1926 to 1930.
The first of these additional factors was the use of
the sector principle in the Arctic regions by the Soviet
Union. In November, 1916, Russia had informed the United
States of its claims to sovereignty over several islands
in the Arctic Ocean; and these claims had been based en the
fact of the islands' location between Siberia and the North
Pole.* Ten years later, in April, 19 26, the Soviet Union
asserted a formal claim to all territory, discovered or
undiscovered, located to the north of the Soviet Union
between 32° 4" 35" Hast and 168° 49' 30" West. 51
50 Russian Ambassador in Washington to Secretary of State,
November 13, 1916, in Hackworth, Digest, Vol. 1, p. 461.
* * Memorandum of Conversations between Under Secretary
of State and N o rw e g i a n Minister i n W a s h i n g. t o v. , J un e 4 a n r1
June 12, 1926, in Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 461.
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Although the United States State Department had not re-
acted to the use of the sector principle in Antarctica in
1917, the Department demonstrated extreme concern over its
use in the Arctic, where the United States possessed signif-
icant direct, interests. In fact, one of the primary reasons
for Under Secretary Clark's emphasis on traditional principles
of international law in his draft reply to the United Kingdom
had been the desire of the State Department to safeguard the
United States against any use whatsoever of the sector prin-
ciple, particularly since an acceptance of the principle in
Antarctica would weaken the case of the United States against
S?it in the North. This was one of several instances in
which the actions of the United States in regard to Antarc-
tica were directly related to that nation's important inter-
ests in the Arctic.
The Navy Department was also concerned over the use of
the sector principle in the Arctic and conducted a study on
the matter. The study concluded that the sector principle
had no justification in the custom of nations and was nothing
more than an arbitrary manner of dividing large expanses of
territory among several nations. •* The results of this study
^Memorandum by Anna A. O'Neill, Assistant to the Under
Secretary of State, File No. 800.03 4 Antarctic/4, February 28,
192.9, U, S. National Archives, Dept. of State,
5 3
Secretary of the Navy to Secretary of State, September 23,
1929, in Hackworth, Digest, Vol. 1, p. 404.
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were submitted to the State Department on September 23, 1929,
and subsequently formed an important basis of United States
policies v.'ith regard to both polar regions.
Also of concern to the United States Government during
this period was the assertion of Antarctic claims by two more
nations-- Argentina and Norway. Argentine interest in the
Antarctic dated from December, 1901, when the privately- fi-
nanced Swedish South Polar Expedition, under the leadership
of Dr. Otto Nordensk jold , arrived at the port of Buenos Aires
en route to Antarctica. To facilitate its own scientific
work, the expedition made arrangements with the Argentine
Government for the coordination of observations with a sta-
tion manned by Argentine scientists on Staten Island, located
off the eastern tip of Tierra del Fuego, The Argentine Gov-
ernment, in addition, assigned a naval lieutenant to serve
with the Swedish expedition as an assistant scientist.
The Swedish expedition's vessel, Antarctic, became
crushed in the Antarctic ice pack while attempting to reach
the shore parties the following year; and when the ship had
not returned to Buenos Aires by March, 1903, it became appar-
ent that some misfortune had befallen the expedition. As a
nation near to Antarctica, Argentina felt compelled to attempt
the rescue, especially since one of its citizens was involved.
As soon as the winter ice had broken up enough to make an
approach to Antarctica feasible, an Argentine gunboat, the
A. P., A. Uruguay
, steamed south; and this voyage constituted
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the first visit of an Argentine ship to Antarctic waters.
Rescue was effected on November 8, 1903; and the Uruguay's
feat— particularly commendable since the gunboat had not been
designed for polar operations and had no special protection
against the ice«-was acclaimed in Argentina and throughout
the world. 54
Also in 1903, the Scottish National Research Expedition
returned to Buenos Aires after having wintered-over on Laurie
Island in the South Orkneys; and the leader of this expedition,
Dr. William Bruce, proposed that the Argentine Government
establish a permanent meteorological observatory on Laurie
Island. The Argentine Meteorological Service strongly backed
the proposal, and an agreement was reached whereby Argentina
would staff and maintain the observatory in return for the
Scots' initial assistance in training and transportation.
Argentina then took formal possession of the South Orkneys
by executive decree and has maintained the observatory con-
tinuously since 19 04.^5
Except with regard to the station on Laurie Island, Ar-
gentine concern with the Antarctic appeared to lessen after
1904. Although the British claims of 1907 and 1918 included
.the. South Orkneys and other Antarctic territories of interest
to Argentina, the Argentine Government took no immediate
55





steps to extend its own official claims and made no protest
to the United Kingdom. A proposal by the Argentine Meteoro-
logical Service to establish another sub- An tarct ic observa-
tory was disapproved by the Argentine Government, and a 1925
British proposal of joint scientific operations in Antarctica
received no serious consideration in Buenos Aires.
The first assertion of Argentine Antarctic claims beyond
that to the South Orkneys came in 1927, v/hen the Argentine
Government declared in a note to the Universal Postal Union
that Argentina refused to recognize the validity of British
postage stamps on mail from either the South Orkneys or South
Georgia. This note also included the first announcement of
an Argentine claim to a portion of the Antarctic Continent:
Argentine territorial jurisdiction extends de
jure and de facto to the continental area, to the
territorial sea and the islands situated along the
maritime coast, to a part of the Islrnd of Tierra del
Fuego, to the Archipelagos of Los Estados, Ano Nuevo,
South Georgia, and South Orkneys, and to polar ter-
ritories which have not been delimited. 5
Though regimes would change and various political phi-
losophies would gain and lose pre-eminence in Argentina it-
self, Argentine Antarctic policy would remain constant over
5 6 Christie, Antarctic Problem, p. 267.
^Director of Argentine Posts and Telegraphs to Director
of Universal Postal Union, September 14, 1927, in Naval War
College, Do c urn ents
,
1 S 4 S - 4 9
, p . 218.
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the next 32 years in a vain and continuing attempt to achieve
full sovereignty over the Antarctic regions closest to Argen-
tine shores. This policy would be proclaimed in the highest
councils of international organizations and carried to the
brink of war with the United Kingdom, and the United States
would eventually find itself in the middle of the resulting
intercontinental controversy.
Argentina based, and continues to base, its Antarctic
claims in part upon rights allegedly obtained through the
bulls of Pope Alexander VI, which divided the unclaimed ter-
ritories of the world between Spain and Portugal in 1495,
specifically including the Antarctic regions. Argentina
maintains that it succeeded to these rights in 1810 in accord
ance with the principle of uti posseditis juris, which pro-
poses that all the former colonial holdings of Spain and Por-
tugal in the Western Hemisphere have been occupied de jure
by Latin American states since their independence.^^
Argentina also supports its Antarctic claims on geograph
ic bases. The Falkland and South Shetland Islands, South
Georgia, and the Palmer Peninsula constitute an extension of
the Andes Mountains; and the South American and Antarctic
5°See, for example, Papal Bull Inter Coetejra, March 4,
1493, in Arturo Enrique Sampay, I. a Sober: <; Argentina sobre
la_ J^n ta rtida (Bue n o s A i res : L a
b
ore m u s
,
1 9 S (J)
,
p. 1 '1 .
5"J. Daniel, "Conflict of Sovereignties in the Antarctic,
Yearbook of Wor 1 d _ Af fairs , Vol. 3 (1949), p . 263.
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Continents are thus joined by an ' Antillean Loop,' These
territories are therefore a part of the South American con-
tinental shelf, and Argentina claims rights to t lie m on this
basis. Furthermore, Argentina considers that its proximity
to Antarctica and the sub- An tarctic islands affords it rights
in the region.
The above arguments appear to be of doubtful validity,
but the exact state of international law regarding Antarctic
claims is still subject to speculation. No two nations have
ever agreed to submit, an Antarctic question to adjudication;
and as long as this remains the case, Argentina and other
claimants can be expected to continue to base their claims
on a wide variety of criteria. The value of arguments not
related to occupation and administration, however, appears
highly dubious.
It is also to be noted that some of the Argentine argu-
ments are mutually contradictory. For example, acceptance
of the papal line of demarcation would place the Argentine-
claimed islands which lie to the east of the line under Bra-
zilian sovereignty. In addition, the recognition of rights
accruing from propinquity would strengthen Argentina's claim
against the United Kingdom but weaken that against Chile,
which is located nearer to Antarctica and asserted a chal-
lenge to a portion of the Argentine claim in 1940.
60 Christie, Antarctic Problem, pp. 263-264.
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In any event, the British Government gave no serious
attention to the statements embodied in the Argentine note
to the Universal Postal Union, considering them just another
manifestation of the Falkland Islands dispute, which had been
in existence for almost a century.
The dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom
over the Falkland, or Malvinas, Islands dates from the Brit-
ish occupation of these islands in 1833 and, except for its
juridical relationship to the Antarctic claims positions of
both nations, is beyond the scope of this study. The jurid-
ical relationship is based on several factors. First, pos-
session of the Falklands can be used to define or extend
sector claims in the Antarctic. Second, as another link in
the • Antillean Loop,' the Falklands are important to the Ar-=
gentine claim to rights in the Antarctic based on geological
affinity and the continental shelf. Finally, if the Falklands
should be recognized as Argentine, Argentina might have a
strong case against the validity of British acts of occupa-
tion and administration carried out in what the British
termed dependencies of the Falkland Islands. As one Argen-
tine writer states, "There is no problem in admitting that
the Antarctic lands are Falkland Islands' Dependencies, since
the Ma.lvinic Archipelago is Argentine."" 2
°^Christie, Antarctic Problem, p. 246.
° 2 J u an C a r 1 o s M oreno, N ue s t r a s Mai v i n a s ; L a An t a r t i d
a








The second nation to assert Antarctic claims in the late
1920' s was Norway. Norwegians had dominated the Antarctic
whaling industry since 1892 and had been responsible for the
innovations which had led to the modernization of that indus-
try in the early 19 00' s. Norwegian explorers had also been
active in the Antarctic, and in 1911 one of these explorers,
Roald Amundsen, became the first man to reach the South Pole.
A circular area around the pole was claimed for Norway by
Amundsen, but this claim has never been asserted by the Nor-
wegian Government. On January 23, 1928, the first official
Norwegian claim in the Antarctic, to Bouvet Island in the
South Atlantic Ocean, was promulgated by royal decree."-*
Some eleven months later, the Norwegian Government informed
the United States of its claim,*' and no objections to the
Norwegian action were raised within the United States Govern-
ment.
The Norwegian Government also began to fear that the
United States might abandon the Hughes Doctrine and assert
a claim to Antarctic territory of interest to Norway on the
basis of Byrd's flights alone and in April, 1929, made an
-
-"^Norwegi an- Roy? 1- Decree of January 23, 1928, in Naval
War College, Documents, 1948-49
,
p. 2 38.
Norwegian Minister in Washington, Halvard H. Bach-ke, to
Secretary of State, December 12, 1928, in U. S., Department
of State, "Assertion by Norway to Sovereignty over Bouvet Is-
land and Other Specified Regions in the Antarctic," Forei}
Relations of the United States, 1929, Vol. 3, p. 716.
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oblique request to the United States for information on its
Antarctic policy. The United States acknowledged the com-
munication from Norway but made no comment on the matter of
Antarctic claims,' 6
Although the United States Government was becoming more
involved in Antarctic affairs, it had still made no signifi-
cant attempt to formulate a coherent Antarctic policy. The
Antarctic diplomacy conducted by the United States during
the late 1920' s was tactical at best, consisting of reactions
to specific problems as they occurred. Moreover, there was
no office or 'desk' within the State Department with the over-
all responsibility for dealing with situations concerning
Antarctica. Whenever such a situation did arise, there was
invariably a great deal of activity and memoranda within the
State Department as it attempted to discover what, if any,
American interests were involved in the case at hand. Since
information on Antarctica was virtually non-existent within
the United States Government, the State Department invariably
took no action. Interest in Antarctica then declined until
the occurrence of a new event, which seemed to require some
action on the part of the United States, at which point the
"^Norwegian Minister in Washington, Halvard H. Bachke, to
Secretary of Slate, Auril IS, 1929, in Foreign Relations,
lj)j29, Vol. 3, pp. 7J7-718.
66 Foreign Relations, 1929, Vol. 3, pp. 718-719.

50
entire cycle- was repeated. Dissatisfaction with this state
of affairs, however, was growing among the American public
and within the United States Congress.
United States public interest in Antarctica had increased
significantly with the exploits of the Byrd Expedition and
the efforts of Admiral Byrd himself toward promoting such in-
terest. This, coupled with a growing concern over the inac-
tivity of the State Department regarding what many believed
to be important national interests, led Senator Millard
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In a speech accompanying the introduction of his reso-
lution, Senator Ty dings stated that the United States should
act immediately to secure the results of Byrd's work. Me
discussed the British Antarctic claims and, while he believed
that the United Kingdom was entitled to the lands discovered
by its nationals, he maintained that the Monroe Doctrine was
applicable to Antarctic territories located in the Western
Hemisphere. Finally, Tydings discussed what he considered
to be the strategic and economic potential of Antarctica and
criticized the State Department for its lack of an Antarctic
policy. 68
The Tydings Resolution was immediately tabled and re-
ceived no further consideration. If the resolution had
passed, however, it would h a v e had no force o t. h e r t h a n as a
n
expression of the wishes of the Senate. While it is debat-
able whether the power to acquire territory for the United
States is possessed by Congress or by the executive, the
Senate alone does not have the power either to acquire ter-
ritory or to "authorize and direct" the President to do so.
Three weeks after its introduction, the Tydings Resolu-
tion began to cause reactions within the State Department.
The Department's Geographer, Samuel W . Bo^s, prepared a
memorandum emphasizing the urgent need for serious consider-
6 8u. S., Congressional Record , 71st Cong., 1st sess.,
Vol. 72, p t . 11 Quly 1 , 19 30)
, pp . 12179-12180.

52
ation of the United States position in Antarctica and indi-
cating the lack of such consideration up to that date. Boggs
believed that the Tydings Resolution might be passed during
the next session of Congress and that it was therefore imper-
ative that the State Department formulate a specific policy
with regard to American claims in the Antarctic. In addition,
Boggs stated that he had received knowledge the previous May
that several whaling companies were being formed in New York
and that the question of shore stations would probably arise.
This latter information had been sent, to the State Department
by the Director of the American Geographic Society, Dr. Isaiah
Bowman, who had also offered to supply the Department, upon
request, with information on United States rights in the
Antarctic. Boggs pointed out that, this information had not
yet been requested from Dr. Bowman.""
Boggs further maintained that the State Department would
be in no position to formulate an Antarctic policy until it
had taken the following steps: (1) conducted a study to de-
termine which nations were entitled to claim which areas of
Antarctica, (2) determined, with regard to international law
and the Hughes Doctrine, the extent of the effective occupa-
tion required in the polar regions, (3) determined the domes-
69
"Memorandum by State Department Geographer, File No.




tic procedures necessary for the acquisition of Antarctic
territory by the United .States, and (4) ascertained the atti-
tude of the United States with regard to the use of the sec-
tor principle in Antarctica. Boggs added that he knew of no
reason for the United Stales' not asserting Byrd's unofficial
claims, especial])' since these claims did not conflict with
7those of any other nation.
Boggs concluded his memorandum with the recommendation
that the United States should either assert an Antarctic
claim or promote some sort of international arrangement,
stating with regard to the latter that "there have been sug-
gestions tli at the policy of land-grabbing should no longer
be applied to the Antarctic."?!
The Boggs Memorandum appears to be the first comprehen-
sive statement on the Antarctic political situation prepared^
by a n official of the United States State Department. The
basic nature of t h e steps recommended by Boggs as necessary
to the formation of policy again serves to indicate the lack
of attention given to Antarctica by the United States Govern-
ment up to that time. Inasmuch as Geographer Boggs had taken
an interest in the affairs of the Antarctic and was the only
7 Me mo rand urn by State Department Geographer, F : i 1 e No.
800.014 Antarctic/28, July 22, 1930, U, S. National Archives,
D e p t . of State ..




State Department official whose position involved contact
with the region on a relatively permanent basis, he became
the dc facto Antarctic 'Desk Officer 1 and was consulted on
virtually all questions relating to the Antarctic that faced
the United States Government during the next 10 years.
On August 11, 1930, Boggs embodied his ideas in a mem-
orandum to Acting Secretary of State Wilbur J. Carr. Boggs
reiterated the need for an Antarctic policy before Congress
convened in September, stressing his belief that there was
little reason to expect much objection to the Tydings Reso-
72lution. On September 5, Boggs was authorized to begin work
on the necessary studies; and it appeared as if a major step
in the formulation of an Antarctic policy had been taken.
The State Department scarcely considered the completion of
these studies to be a high-priority project, however, as was
indicated by Boggs' immediate superior in the following mem-
orandum :
. . . I have asked Mr. Boggs to take hold of
the subject and do as much work on it as he can. 1
think that by dividing the work and using the library
staff as much as possible this can be done without
additional personnel,"
7 ?
^Geographer to Acting Secretory of State, File No.
800.014 Antarctic/32, August 11, 1930, U. S. National Archives,
Dept. of State.
"Historical Adviser to Under Secretary of State, File
No. 800.014 Antarctic/33, September 5, 1930, U. S. National
Archives, Dept. of State.

5 5
It was soon discovered, however, that congressional in-
terest in Antarctica had been overestimated by Boggs and was
insufficient to secure any further action on the Tydings Res-
olution. In accordance with the above-mentioned cycle of
State Department activity regarding Antarctica, Boggs ceased
work on his study. Three years passed before the United
States Government renewed its concern with Antarctic affairs,
and, as in the past, this concern was due to the pressure of
external events.

THE ERA OF CONCERN: 19 53-1943
Even though the Imperial Conference of 1926 h.?d declared
the existence of British titles to Wilkes Land and other un-
claimed Antarctic territories, the United Kingdom had taken
no immediate action toward formally extending British claims
beyond those to the Ross and Falkland Islands Dependencies.
On February 7, 1933, however, the following British Order-in-
Council was promulgated:
That part of His Majesty's dominions in the Ant-
arctic Seas which comprises all the islands and ter-
ritories other than Adelie Land which are situated
sou tli of the 60tTh~ "cTegree of South Latitude and lying
between the 160th degree of East Longitude and the
45th degree of East Longitude is hereby placed under
the authority of the Commonwealth of Australia.
This action by the United Kingdom caused much greater
concern in the United States than had any previous territorial
claim in Antarctica-- for the region defined in the order-in-
council included Wilkes Land in its entirety. It appears that
the formal British claim to this territory, which had consis-
tently been one of the Antarctic areas of greatest interest
to the United States, caused the State Department to realize
that if it did not act more decisively to protect American
rights in Antarctica, the United States might soon be faced
^British Order- in -Counci 1 of February 7, 1933, in U. S.,
Naval War College, "Declarations Concerning Antarctic Terri-
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with the fait accompli of the Continent's division among
other powers. In addition, the specific exclusion of Adelie
Land from the British claim indicated that, such powers could
be moving toward the formation of a common front of Antarctic
claimants
.
The new British claim was brought to the attention of
the State Department on May 17, 1953, when the Norwegian
Minister in Washington delivered a copy of the British Order-
in-Council and stated that his government was considering
the matter and would appreciate any information on the atti-
tude of the United States. The Assistant Chief of the State
Department's Division of Western European Affairs, J. D. Hick-
erson, then asked Geographer Boggs to determine whether the
British claim conflicted with any claims that the United
States might assert.
With this revival of concern over American rights in
the Antarctic, Boggs completed the study that he had com-
menced three years before and sent it to Hick erson. On the
basis of Boggs' work, Hickerson believed that the United
States was in a position to assert a claim to Wilkes Land,
^Memorandum by Hickerson of Conversation with Norwegian
Minister "ilal variTH . Bachke, File No. 847.014/9, May 19, 1933,
U. S. National Archives, Dcpt. of State.
^Hickerson to Boggs, undated, attached to Ibid.
4 Boggs to Hickerson, File No. 800.014 An tare tic/ 57 1/4,
September 21, 1933, U. S< National Archives, Dept. of State.
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and he suggested to Under Secretary William Phillips that a
reservation of United States rights in the region be commu-
nicated to the British Government. Hi eke rs on also recom-
mended to the Under Secretary that a study be conducted with
a view toward formulating a policy with regard to territorial
claims in the polar regions. Hickerson admitted that the
British claim to Wilkes Land was the only problem demanding
immediate attention but expressed the belief that the study
should involve the entire Antarctic claims situation.' No
immediate action was taken on nny of Hickerson' s recommenda-
tions, but it became apparent during the next few months
that the State Department had begun to shift to a more active
policy regarding the protection of American interests in
the An tarcti c
.
Of considerable importance to this shift in policy were
the activities of Admiral Byrd and the close friendship that
existed between Byrd and the recently-inaugurated President,
Franklin D. Roosevelt. In 1953, Byrd was engaged in active
preparations for a second expedition to Marie Byrd hand; and
although the Depression caused him to encounter greater
difficulties in raising funds than he had faced in 1928, he
was again successful in obtaining the necessary money and
5Hickerson to Under Secretary of State, File No. 800.014




equipment, with much of the latter on loan from various
private institutions and government agencies. 1 On Septem-
ber 7, 1933, the President sent Byrd the following 'bon
voyage' letter, which indicated both the extent of their
friendship and the high level of interest and knowledge re-
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,
5 vols., New York: Random House, 1958), pp. 354-555.
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tion had "the full support of the United States Government"
and that Byrd could "call on the Government in case of need
o
or emergency."
Byrd arrived in Antarctica in January, 1934, and again
established his expedition at Little America in Nov; Zealand's
Ross Dependency. As had been the case five years earlier,
New Zealand was concerned that Byrd's activities might be
used by the United States as bases for challenging its Ant-
arctic claim; and this concern was communicated to the United
States Government on January 29, 1934, in a strongly-worded
note signed by the British Ambassador in Washington. It was
stated in the note that the New Zealand Government was under
the impression that the Byrd Expedition was being conducted
under official auspices, inasmuch as a postmaster had been
commissioned to operate a United States Post Office at Little
America and special United States postage stamps had been
issued for use at the American base. The United States was
informed that the New Zealand Government recognized the ne-
cessity for making allowances for the lack of regular postal
facilities in the Ross Dependency but would regard the pro-
vision of these facilities without permission from the "sov-
ereign power" as "infringing the British sovereignty and New
Zealand administrative rights in the dependency as well as
^President to Byrd, September 7, 1933, in Rosenman, ed.,




the laws there in force."^
The United States was further informed that the New Zea-
land Government understood that Byrd was operating a wireless
station and flying aircraft in the area without having re-
quested permission for these activities. The previous offer
to grant such permission was still valid, but the New Zealand
Government "would have preferred prior application. 1 Fi-
nally, the hope was expressed that the United States Govern-
ment would keep the above points in mind with regard to any
future Antarctic expeditions under official auspices.
The United States replied to the British Ambassador's
note on February 7, in a note signed by an Assistant. Secre-
tary of State :
I desire to assure you that any facilities
given to the expedition t>y the New Zealand authori-
ties are greatly appreciated. It docs not seem
necessary at this time to enter into a discussion
of the interesting questions which are set forth in
your note. However, 1 reserve all rights which the
United States or its citizens may have with respect
to this matter. J A
^British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Ronald Lindsay,
to Secretary of State, January 29, 1934, in Green H. Hack-
worth, Digest of International Law (8 vols., Washington:




, Vol. 1, pp. 456-457.
^Assistant Secretary of State R< Walton Moore to British
A rab as s a d o r i n W a s h i n g ton, February 24, 1954, in H ac k w o r t "a ,
Digest, Vol. 1, p. 457.
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The reservation of United States right? in the above
note constituted a milestone in United States Antarctic di-
plomacy and appears to be the result of the concern with
Antarctica that had been increasing within the State Depart-
ment since the promulgation of the British claim to Wilkes
Land. This was the first time that the United States had
communicated the existence of American rights in Antarctica
to a foreign power--a marked change over the simple acknow-
ledgments of receipt that had characterized past, correspon-
dence. From this point, virtually all replies to communica-
tions regarding Antarctic claims from other governments in-
cluded similar reservations of United States rights in the
region of Antarctica concerned.
Nine months later, Secretary of State Hull attempted to
alleviate the fears of the New Zealand Government by sending
an 'informal note' to the British Ambassador, in which he
stated that the only activity of the United States Government
relative to the Byrd Expedition had been the provision of
postal services. *2 j n ^
,
s reply, the British Ambassador in-
dicated that New Zealand had retreated somewhat from its
earlier position, It was now stated that the Government of
New Zealand had no objection to the United States postal ser-
vices in the Ross Dependency but. would have protested if the
1 2 Secretary of State to British Ambassador m Washington,
November 14, 19 34, in Hackworth, Dip. est, Vol. 1, p. 457.

63
provision of these services had "appeared to then to be de-
signed as an assertion of United States sovereignty over any
part of the Ross Dependency or as a challenge to British sov-
ereignty therein." 1 ^ The United States replied to this note
with another reservation of American rights in the area. ^
While the Byrd Expedition was engaged in exploring the
eastern region of the unclaimed sector lying between 80" West
and 150° West, another American, Lincoln Ellsworth, was con-
ducting flight operations to the west. In 1925, Ellsworth
had accompanied Roald Amundsen in the latter' s unsuccessful
attempt to reach the North Pole by air; and eight years later,
Ellsworth made his first attempt to fly across the Antarctic
Continent. Establishing his privately- financed expedition
at the Bay of Whales, he made his first test flight on Jan-
uary 11, 1934. A few days afterward, however, his plane be-
came damaged in a storm, and lie was forced to take it to New
Zealand for repairs. Ellsworth left the Bay of Whales just-
four days before Byrd's arrival, 15
Ellsworth returned to Antarctica in the next austral
summer but was unable to obtain proper flying conditions.
^British Ambassador in Washington to Secretary of State,
December 27, 1934, in Hackworth, Digest, Vol, 1, p. 458.
14-Secretary of State to Britisli Ambassador in Washington,
ry 7, 19 35, in Ibid., Vo
Sullivan, Quest, p. 101.




In October, 19 35, he arrived in Antarctica a third time and
decided to make his attempt from Dundee Island, off the
northern tip of the Palmer Peninsula. Ellsworth took off
on November 11 and headed down the Peninsula, dropping an
American flap when he crossed 80° West, the limit of the
British clajm. Forced to land temporarily by bad weather,
he raised another American flap and claimed the territory
between 80° West and 120° West for the United States. This
sector lay between Marie Byrd Land and the Falkland Island
Dependencies, and Ellsworth's act thereby extended unofficial
United States claims to include the entire region between the
British and New Zealand sectors. " Continuing h i s flight,
Ellsworth finally ran out of fuel some 12 miles from the Bay
of Whales, which he managed to reach after 12 days on foot.
He attempted to cross the continent again during the 1937-
19 38 season, but he was again unsuccessful.
Meanwhile, the Second Byrd Expedition was achieving
remarkable successes in its program of explorations and sci-
entific studies, which included the establishment of the first
scientific station in the interior of the continent. Byrd
returned to the United States in 1935; and, as had occurred
in 19 30, the publicity accompanying his Expedition had caused
an increase in public awareness of the Antarctic, In addition,
16 Sullivan, Quest, pp . 101-104,
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the work of the Second Byrd Expedition had generated a
greater interest in Antarctic research within the scientific,
community and had demonstrated to policy makers and strate-
gists the feasibility of sustained operations on the Antarc-
tic Continent . *
'
The United States continued to maintain the diplomatic
position regarding Antarctica that it had adopted in 1934;
and to the numerous inquiries received from citizens con-
cerned with American claims in the Antarctic, the State De-
partment replied that although it was not. in a position to
comment on the matter of Antarctic claims, it had neverthe-
less communicated formal reservations of American rights in
Antarctica to foreign governments. Regardless of the posi-
tion taken by the State Department in its communications,
the United States Government had still made no efforts toward
determining the exact nature of American interests in Antarc-
tica or toward formulating a coherent policy to protect those
interests if they in fact existed. Within three years after
the return of the Second Byrd Expediton, however, various
factors caused official interest in the Antarctic to increase
^Charles E. Dewing and Laura E. Kelsay, compilers,
"Records of the United States Antarctic Service," Prelimini
Inventories of the United States National Archives, No. 90
TT9T5T7 p. 1 ,
—
*°See, for example, Assistant. Secretary of State R« Wal-
ton Moore to Miss Florence Holland, File No. 600.014 Antarc-





to the point where President. Roosevelt requested that such
efforts be made
.
The first such factor was the growing concern of the
United States War and Navy Departments over the strategic,
implications of polar aviation, the feasibility of which had
been demonstrated by Iiyrd and other explorers in both the
Arctic and Antarctica.^ The second factor was related to
conditions in the whaling industry. In 1931, after it had
become apparent that stocks of whales were rapidly diminish-
ing, the Convention for the Regulation of Whaling had been
signed in Geneva. This agreement had failed to secure the
necessary controls, however, and another whaling conference
was called by the United Kingdom, to meet in London in early
1937. This caused the State Department to become involved
with the problems of Antarctic whaling in general and the
question of whaling stations on the Antarctic Continent.
The resulting International Agreement for the Regulation of
Whaling was signed on June 6, 1937, but was only to remain
in force for one year; and the State Department therefore
found it necessary to maintain a continuing interest in the
l^Much valuable information concerning this period of
United States involvement with the Antarctic was gained
through conversations with Ambassador Hugh S. Cumraing, former





This increased military and political involvement v;ith
the polar regions had the effect of indicating a need for
coherent United States policies with regard to both the
Arctic and Antarctica, and in the spring of 1938 President
Roosevelt directed the State Department to conduct a study
on the manner in which the United States might protect such
territorial rights as it possessed in these regions. Hugh
S. dimming, then an officer in the State Department's Office
of European Affairs, was placed in charge of the project.
Even before Cumming's study was completed, however, there
were indications that the United States had decided to pursue
a more active policy in the matter of Antarctic claims.
Lincoln Ellsworth was planning to make a fourth attempt
to cross Antarctica by air during the 1938-1939 season; and
in June, 1938, Ellsworth's brother-in-law, Joseph Ulmer, in-
formed the State Department that Ellsworth was interested in
claiming Antarctic territory for the United States. Ulmer
™Shigeru Odp, International Control of Sen Resources
(Leyden, the Net he r 1 ai : d s : A. W. Sythoff, 1963), pp . 7 8 - 7 9
.
NOTE-~The International Agreement for the Regulation
of Whaling was subsequently extended by the Eon don Protocol
of June 24, 19 38. By the end of 1939, Antarctic whaling
operations "had been virtually suspended by the war. Ibid.,
p.. 79.
2
^ Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles to President,
File No. 800.014 Antarctic/129A, January 6, 1939, U. S.
N a t ion a 1 A r c h i v e s
,
D e pt . cf St. a t e .
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also indicated that Ellsworth would probably be willing to
base his plans fox' exploration on any suggestions from the
Department regarding which regions of Antarctica the United
States would be most interested in claiming. At that time,
Ulmer vas informed that the Department could not make sugges-
tions of that nature to a private cxpedit i on . 22 jwo months
later, however, while the Ellsworth Expedition was en route
to Capetown, Secretary Hull sent the following instructions
to the American Consul in that city:
Upon the arrival of Mr, Ellsworth in Capetown
you are requested to inform him, in strict confidence,
that it seems appropriate for him to assert
-
cTaTms
in the naine of the United States as an American cit-
izen, to all territory he may explore, photograph,
or map w li i c h has hitherto been un d i s c o v e re d a n d un-
explored, regardless of whe ther or not it 1 i e r- in a
sector or sphere of Jn^l uerTce already claH-ed by
an o t h e r c o u n t r y . 2 •">
~
Secretary Hull then listed specific procedures, such as
dropping notes and proclamations by parachute, that Ellsworth
might use to make such claims and further instructed the
American Consul to insure that the Department's interest in
the matter of Antarctic claims be kept confidential.
?2secretary of State to Consul at Capetown, James 0.
Denby, August 30, 1938, in U. S., Department of State, "Asser
tion by Lincoln Ellsworth of Claim to Territory in Antarctica
for the United States," Foreign Relations of the United
States
,
19 3 8 ( W a s h i n g t o n 7 Una ted S t a t e i G a v e r n m e n t Printing
Office , 1955) , Vol. 1
, p . 972.
23 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 972. Italics mine.
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After receiving Hull's suggestions, Ellsworth requested
a copy of the original message to the American Consul in
Capetown and more specific guidance in his proposed claims
activity. These requests were relayed to Washington by the
American Consul, and they both were refused by Secretary Hull.
The State Department was unwilling to risk the possibility
of the instructions' being seen, by foreign nationals and was
reluctant to suggest that Ellsworth claim specific Antarctic
territories. The American Consul was authorized, however, to
impart to Ellsworth under the heading of "general guidance"
the following information, which was apparently the very
information that Ellsworth was seeking:
The extent of American activities in Wilkes
Land, Palmer or Graham Land, Marie Byrd Land and
Heard Island, and other areas in the Antarctic are
of course well known to Ellsworth. The United States
has never recognized the "sector principle" nor has
it formally recognized any claims in the Antarctic
asserted by other Governments . 24
Ellsworth reached Antarctica too late in the season to
attempt the transcontinental flight, but on January 11, 1939,
he flew some 250 mi]es inland from the coast of the Australian
claim. As he crossed latitude 70° South, Ellsworth dropped
a copper cylinder, in which he had placed an American flag
and a statement claiming for the United States the territory
24secretary of State to Consul at Capetown, October 22,
1938, in Foreign Relations, 1938, Vol. 1, p. 974.
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within ISO miles of his flight path, between latitudes 70°
South and 72° South. This region, directly to the west of
Wilkes hand, comprises approximately 77,000 square miles and
has become known as the American Highland. Since all claims
based on the sector principle extend from the coast to the
Pole, Ellsworth's claim to a hinterland area thus served to
lessen the possibility of the principle's becoming accepted
as the standard practice of nations. Ellsworth reported his
claims activities, along with his failure to reach Heard Is-
land due to unfavorable weather conditions, to the Anferican
Consul General in Sydney, Australia, who sent the information
i
to Washington. 25
It was apparent that the United States Government had
decided to take action toward strengthening the American
position in the Antarctic; but. even though Hull's suggestions
to Ellsworth indicated that the assertion of United States
claims was being considered, the exact nature and goals of
policy had not yet been determined, and it was not desired
that relations with the claimant nations be complicated until
such time as the United States did decide upon a specific
Antarctic policy.
While _the State Department was engaged in its policy
study, there occurred new events which made the protection
2 ^Consul General at Sydney, Thomas M. Wilson, to Secre-
tary of State, February ?2, 193'.), in Foreign Relations
,
)9^S,
Vole 1, p. 975.
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of American interests in Antarctica appear even more vital
than before. On March 5, 1938, France had proposed to the
United Kingdom that reciprocal rights of free passage over
French and British Commonwealth territories in the Antarctic
be granted to each other's aircraft.*-" To facilitate such
an agreement, France finally delimited its claim to Adelie
Land, by means of a Presidential Decree which proclaimed the
existence of French sovereignty over the islands and terri-
tories located between 136° East and 142° Fast, south of
60° South. 27
The French proposal was accepted by the Governments of
the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand; and the air-
2 R
craft agreement entered into force on October 25. With
the current American interest in polar aviation, the United
States informed the Contracting Powers that it reserved all
its rights with respect to matters involving aviation in the
Antarctic and to the questions of territorial sovereignty
2° League of Nations, "Exchange of Notes Between His
Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, in the Common-
wealth of Australia and in New Zealand and the Government
of the French Republic Constituting an Agreement Regarding
the Free Right of Passage to Aircraft over British and
French Territories in the Antarctic. Paris, October 25th,
1938," Lejague of Nation? Treaty Series, Vol. 192 (1938),
pp. 324 -32 5.
~
2'French Presidential Decree of April 1, 1938, in Naval
War College, Documents, 1948-49, pp. 230-231.
^""Exchange of Notes . . . October 25th, 1938," League
of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 192, p. 325.
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2 9implicit in such matters.
Also during the latter half of 1938, there occurred an-
other external event, which greatly increased the probability
that the United States would soon become committed to active
measures in defense of its rights in the Antarctic. This
event was the penetration of Antarctica by the German Reich.
Germany had not been active in the Antarctic since the
early years of the twentieth century before World War I, but
the Nazi Government had become interested in Antarctic whal-
ing as a possible solution to the German shortage of animal
fats. A German whaling fleet was organized in 3 9 56 and
planning was commenced on an exploring expedition to Antarc-
tica. The mission of the latter would be to continue the
scientific, work of the pre-war German expeditions and to
establish bases for German Antarctic claims in order to in-
sure a continued German participation in Antarctic whaling
in spite of the claims of other powers."
The German Antarctic. Expedition departed from Hamburg
aboard the catapult ship Schwabenland on December 22, 1938.31
29Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles to Charge in
the United Kingdom, H. V. Johnson, January 6, 1939, in U. S.,
I! e
.
EL§ ?J~ m ent of St a t e , "Rese r y at i q n o f R i g h t s of t he United
States with respect to Claims of Other Nations to Sovereignty
in the Antarctic," Foreign Relations of the United States
,
.19 39 (Washingti on : United States Government Printing Office,
1936) , Vol . 2, p. 1.
30
31
S u 1 1 i v a n , Q u e s t , p . 12 4.
The New York Times, December 2 3, 1938, p. 39.
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At that time there were only tv;o areas of the Antarctic: Con-
tinent which had not been formally claimed. These bordered
the British Falkland Islands Dependencies on the west and
east respectively; the first had been claimed unofficially
for the United States by Byrd and Ellsworth, and the second,
now called. Queen Maud Land, had been partially explored by
Norwegians. The Germans chose to operate in the latter,
intending to conduct an extensive program of aerial explora-
tion and mapping during the first season and to return in
greater force the following year.
The German explorations were conducted by the Schwabe n-
1 an d ' s two seaplanes. To establish bases for a future German
assertion of rights in the region, markers were dropped every
fifteen to twenty miles and four landings were made near the
coast, at which points members of the expedition raised
swastikas and claimed the territory for Germany. ^2
Hitler was greatly pleased with th e results of the ex-
pedition, but the German Government made no efforts toward
formally asserting Antarctic claims. In the absence of such
formal assertion, claims made by members of expeditions,
regardless of whether or not the expeditions themselves are
.under official auspices, have little value in the custom of
nations other than as bases for future official action. For
a nation's sovereignty to be considered to exist over certain
32 Sullivan, Quest, pp. 125-127.
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territory, the nation concerned must first indicate its desire
and intention to act as sovereign and engage in some exer-
cise of sovereign rights in that territory. Like the
United States, Germany never took such action; and, in any
event, World War II soon caused the German Government to
cancel its plans for further Antarctic exploration.
As a result of the German Expedition, Norway became
concerned over possible German encroachments upon Norwegian
whaling interests in the Antarctic; *^ ancj five days before
the first exploratory flight from the Schwabenland
,
a Nor-
wegian Royal Proclamation v;as issued, which claimed for Nor-
way the Antarctic coast between the British and Australian
•z r
claims. ° The Norwegian claim, however, did not extend to
the Pole because Norway rejected the sector principle, and
the southern boundary of this claim has never been delimited.
•z r
Upon being informed of the Norwegian claim, the United
33see, for example, Permanent Court of International
Justice, Legal Stat u s of H a s 1 e r a G r e s n 1 a n d , J u d g meat of
Apri 1 5
,




^ 4 Recommendation of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, January 14, 1939, in Naval War College, Doci tits
,
1948-49
, pp. 2 40-24 2.
--Norwegian Royal Proclamation, January 1.4, 1939, in
Ibid., p . 243.
^Norwegian Minister in Washington, IVilhelm Morgenst ierne
,
to Secretary of State, January 14, 1939, in "Reservation of
Rights," Foreign Relations, 1939, p. 2,
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States reserved all American rights in the area. 37
Th e N o rw e g i an claim, in addition, h ad a direct effect
on the Antarctic policy of Chile, which had maintained an
official interest in Antarctica for over a century but had
never asserted a territorial claim. In February, 1959, the
Chilean Government responded to the Norwegian claim, which
involved territory directly to the east of the regions of
greatest interest to Chile, with a reservation of Chilean
rights in the area. Eight months later, the Chilean Govern-
ment appointed a special commission to conduct a study of
Chilean rights and interests in the Antarctic. This study
was completed in 1940 and led to the formal proclamation
of a Chilean Antarctic claim.
Meanwhile, Hugh S. Camming' s study on United States
Antarctic policy had been completed, and the State Depart-
ment submitted a report on its results to President Roose-
velt on January 6, 1959. On the basis of the study, which
had relied heavily on Geographer Boggs' pr.evious v;ork, the
State Department believed that serious consideration should
b e g i v en to i.i e a s u res that the United States could t a V e to
assert territorial claims in both polar regions. The report
"Counselor of the Department of State, R. Walton Moore,
to Norwegian Minister in Washington, January 16, 1959, in
" Re s e r v a t i o n o f R i g h t s
,




1 1 Relati o n s, 19 3 9
, pp . 2 - 5
.
38e. W. Hunter Christie, Th< A ' 7 m [London:
AH en an d Un w in
, 1951), p . 2 81 .
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stated that this belief was based on the following factors:
(]) the feasibility of polar aviation, (2) American interests
in the strategic and economic implications of the polar re-
gions, (3) the measures taken by various nations toward ce-
menting their polar claims, and (4) recent indications of
German and Japanese interest in any American claims activity
in Antarctica. 39
The report further stated that the Hughes Doctrine failed
to give the proper consideration to climatic conditions and
over-emphasized the occupation required for a valid claim to
territorial sovereignty in the polar regions, and the State
Department recommended to the President that the United States
modify its position on effective occupation as necessary to
assert American claims in the Antarctic. The Department
also recommended that the United States determine the regions
of Antarctica in which it possessed rights to sovereignty
and assume the position that prior claims based on the sec-
tor principle were without validity in international law.
Finally, the State Department proposed that it begin joint
planning on Antarctica with the War, Navy, and Interior De-
39Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles to President,
File No. 800.014 An tarcti c/ 1 29 A, January 6, 1939, U. S.
National Archives, Dept. of State.
N0TE--The only Japanese expedition to Antarctica up to
this date had been that of 1910 under private auspices. Al-
though Japan was involved in Antarctic whaling and maintained




partments and the Coast. Guard and expressed the belief that
the United States should prepare to place any areas claimed
in the Antarctic under some branch of the government for
, . . . a n
administrative purposes.
President Roosevelt approved the State Department's
recommendations , and an interdepartmental committee was formed
to plan, in consultation with Byrd and Ellsworth, the speci-
fic activities to be undertaken in Antarctica. Roosevelt
believed that it might be possible to obtain congressional
appropriations for two Antarctic expeditions each year, and
he envisaged the establishment of American settlements at
Little America and in the region to the south of Africa which
was currently the focus of German operations. Roosevelt
initially intended for these settlements to be evacuated
prior to the onset of the Antarctic winter each year but
approved a subsequent recommendation by Secretary Hull that
they be occupied on a year-round basis. Hull believed that
this would both strengthen United States rights and increase
the rewards from scientific investigation in the Antarctic. 42
40 Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles to President,
File No. 800.01''; Ant arcti c/ 12.9 A, January 6, 1939, U. S.
National Archives, Dept. of State.
^President to Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles,
File No. 800.014 Antarctic/135, January 7, 1939, U, S.
National Archives, Dept. of State.
42 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs c r Cc I U Hull (2 vols.,
New York: The Macmillan Company f 1948) , Vol. 1, pp. 758-759
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With regard to the location of the proposed settlements,
differences of opinion soon developed among the members of
the interdepartmental committee. Admiral Byrd and the In-
terior Department desired that the United States establish
four Antarctic stations; one at Little America, one on the
Palmer Peninsula, and two on territory claimed by Australia. ^
In contrast, the State Department believed that the United
States should concentrate its efforts in the unclaimed sec-
tor, which had been explored and unofficially claimed for
the United States by Byrd and Ellsworth, ** Even though the
State Department maintained that the United States should
take steps toward protecting American rights in the Antarc-
tic, it was somewhat reluctant to see the United States com-
mitted to activities which could be construed as direct chal-
lenges to the Antarctic claims of other nations until the
value of Antarctica to the United States could be more pre-
cisely determined. This was particularly true in the case
of the Palmer Peninsula, where Argentina and Chile claimed
rights. For over a decade, the State Department had been
attempting to construct a system of solidarity among the
American Republics, and this goal appeared especially impor-
^Assistant Chief, Division of European Affairs, State
Department, to Chief, Division of European Affairs, File
No. 800.014 Antarctic/176, March 6, 1939, U. S. National
Archives, Dept . of State.
4 4 Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 1, pp. 75 8-75 9.
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tant in view of deteriorating conditions in Europe and Asia.
Any claims-strengthening activity on the part of the United
States in the Antarctic regions of interest to Argentina and
Chile could easily evoke new Latin American charges of 'Amer-
ican Imperialism,' and this the Department desired strongly
to avoid.
Further complicating the work of the interdepartmental
committee was the fact that until the geographic focus of
American operations could be determined, there could be no
final decision as to whether the United States should continue
to follow the lines of the Hughes Doctrine or accept a less
rigorous definition of effective occupation. If the United
States were to confine its activities an d possible future
claims to the unclaimed sector, there would no longer be
any necessity to follow Hughes' stringent criteria. The
Hughes Doctrine, by demanding permanent settlement as a basis
for a territorial claim, would become in fact a liability,
making the establishment of a United States claim a more
complicated, and more costly project. Conversely, however,
to abandon the Doctrine and assert a clain on the basis of
short-term occupation would be to make it more difficult
for the United States to contest the validity of the Antarc-
tic claims of o t h e r nations.
Although it was unable to reach an immediate decision
on either the geographic focus or the exact, nature of the
a c t i v i t i e s to be c o n d u c t e d b y t h e Unit e d S t a t e s i n An tare-
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tica, the interdepartmental committee believed that the Ger-
man operations made it imperative that the American expedi-
tion reach Antarctica that year. President Roosevelt agreed
and in May, 1939, wrote the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives, requesting an appropriation of $340,000 to pro-
vide for the expedition's expenses.'^ The President had
decided that any permanent American settlements in Antarc-
tica would be administered by the Interior Department's
Division of Territories and Island Possessions, and the
appropriation v.: as therefore requested for that agency.
The request was considered in hearings by the Subcommittee
on Deficiencies of the Mouse Appropriations Committee.
Testifying before the subcommittee were the Director
of the Interior Department's Division of T e r r i t o r i e s an d
Island Possessions, Dr. Ernest Gruening, Rear Admiral Byrd,
and Lewis Clark of the State Department. Opening testimony
was presented by Dr. Gruening, who stated that the main
purpose of the proposed expedition would be to strengthen
the bases of United States claims in the Antarctic and that
the Antarctic operations of other nations made it necessary
for the American expedition to be mounted immediately. 4 "
4^11. s., Congress, Douse of Representatives, Committee
on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Deficiencies, Hearings
on the Expeditio n to the An t a r c t i < Regions , 76th Cong.
i
] s t s e s s . , J v'ne 2 , 19 3 9 ( I / ; s h :< ngton : U n ITe d States Gove r n -
meat Printing Office, 1939), p. 1.
4 65 Ibid




In his testimony, Admiral Byrd spoke in favor of perma-
nent American settlements in Antarctica coupled with the
formal assertion of United States territorial claims. Ho
criticized the United States Government for failing to claim
certain areas of Green] and that had been explored by Americans
and compared the case of Antarctica with those of various
Pacific islands, stating that many of these islands should
belong to the United States by right of discovery but have
been occupied by nations with more foresight than the United
States, Byrd also painted a glowing picture for the sub-
committee of the economic value of the Antarctic, particular-
ly with regard to coal deposits which be had discovered;
and of especial interest was the following interchange with
Representative Louis Ludlow of Indiana:
MR. LUDLOW: Would it be practicable to bring
coal out from that area?
ADM. BYRD: Yes, if we should need it.
MR. LUDLOW: You could develop transportation
facilities for marketing the coal?
ADM. BYRD: Yes. 47
'
There is, of course, no doubt that the United States
could extract and market Antarctic coal if it were necessary
for some re as 015 to do so; but the costs involved have pre-
cluded such action even up to 1969. Admiral Byrd v;as
^House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defi
ciencies, Expedition, p. 13.
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apparently attempting to tell the subcommittee what lie
thought it wanted to hear and, in the process, made other
statements which were somewhat misleading. For example,
he discussed the earl)' explorations of Palmer and Wilkes,
the strategic importance of the Palmer Peninsula, and the
value of a United States naval base in the Antarctic, fur-
ther maintaining that not only the Palmer Peninsula but also
"most of Antarctica that lies within the Western Hemisphere"
should fall with 131 the scope of the Monroe Doctrine. 4 8 j n
subsequent testimony, however, Byrd stated that he did not
desire any international controversy and recommended perfect'
ing a United States claim to only "that area where we alone
have established rights.'"*" When asked by Representative
William P. Lambertson of Kansas if such a claim would requir :
naval defense against other powers, Byrd replied that he
could envision no dispute if the United States firmly estab-
lished itself in the area before any other nation did so.
In the latter statement, Byrd was apparently referring
to the unclaimed sector that he and Ellsworth had explored;
and it is true that a United States claim to that region
would probably not have been contested directly. But Byrd
had spoken above of the strategic value of the Palmer
48uousc Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defi-






Peninsula and of the territory explored by Wilkes; and any
claim to these areas would, of course, involve a direct con-
frontation with other claimant nations, as would invoking
the Monroe Doctrine over "most of Antarctica that lies with-
in the Western Hemisphere." The fact was that the unclaimed
sector, the region to which the United States possessed the
strongest bases for a claim, was one of the least accessible
and leas 1: valuable areas of the continent— which was precise-
ly one of the reasons why it had not heretofore been claimed
by another nation. Thus when Byrd discussed the value of
Antarctica to the United States, lie referred to regions other
than the unclaimed sector; and when he belittled the possi-
bility of international repercussions to a United States
claim, he referred to that sector alone. This distinction
apparently went unnoticed by the subcommittee.
The representative of the State Department at the Hear-
ings, Lewis Clark, was also asked if he foresaw a likelihood
of international disputes arising from the proposed Ameri-
can activities in Antarctica. He replied that he expected
no serious disputes but that if the United States did not
take immediate action, it might be confronted with a foreign
claim to the region explored by Admiral Byrd. " This state-
ment further indicated that the State Department was thinking
5°Hoiise Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defi
ciencies, Expedition, p. 8.
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primarily of the unclaimed sector, in which area American
activities would be less likely to cause the international
disputes which the Department wished to avoid.
The subcommittee was particularly concerned with the
duration of the United States effort in the Antarctic, in-
asmuch as Congress would be called upon to finance the various
annual programs* When questioned on this matter, Dr. Gruening
replied that he thought the duration of the. effort depended
on whether or not the State Department decided that perma-
nent occupation was necessary to the establishment of a valid
territorial claim. Lewis Clark admitted that the State De-
partment had as yet made no final decision i r: the matter
but informed the subcommittee that there was a possibility
that the United States might recede from Secretary Hughes 1
rigorous definition of effective occupation, thus enabling
the United States to assert a territorial claim on the basis
of limited activities. *> J
In any event, Congress provided the funds for the ex-
pedition through the passage of the Urgent Deficiency and
Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1939 on June 30.
^
2 Presi-
dent Roosevelt then moved quickly to formalize the adminis-
trative arrangements for planning the forthcoming expedition




52 U. S., Statutes at Large, Vol. 53 (1939), p. 9S6.
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and directing United States Antarctic policy as a whole,
lie requested that the Secretaries of State, the Treasury,
the Navy, and the Interior each designate a permanent repre-
sentative to a new interdepartmental committee, which v/ould
have the responsibility for "organizing, directing, and co-
ordinating" the activities to be conducted in the Antarctic.
The respective designees to the committee were Hugh S. Gum-
ming, Rear Admiral Russell R. Waesche, United States Coast
Guard, Captain Charles C. Hartigan, United States Navy, and
Dr. Grucni. ng.
Roosevelt offered the command of the expedition to Ad-
miral Byrd, and the latter promptly accepted. On July 12,
Roosevelt sent the Admiral a letter in which he expressed
his appreciation of Byrd's acceptance and the following
ideas on the mission of the expedition:
5 3
The most important thing is to prove (a) that
human beings can permanently occupy a portion of
the Continent winter and summer (b) that it is well
worth a small annual appropriation to maintain such
permanent bases because of their growing value for
four purposes - -national defense of the Western Hemi-
sphere, radio, meteorology and minerals. Each of
these four is of approximately equal importance as
^President to Secretary of State, July 13, 1939, in
U. S., Department of State, "Establishment of the United
States Antarctic Service for Exploration and Scientific
Studies," Foreign Relations of the United Sta tes , 1939
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office,
1956) , Vol. 2, p. 7.
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far as we now know.** 4
There was never any doubt that Byrd would be designated
the lender of the expedition. Before it had become appar-
ent that an official expedition would be mounted, Byrd had
begun planning a third Antarctic expedition under private
auspices. He had been involved at all stages of the prelim-
inary planning for the official expedition and, in coopera-
tion with the interdepartmental committee, had commenced
active preparations as early as the preceding January. Such
steps had included the recruitment of personnel around a
nucleus of members of his two previous expeditions and the
procurement, of supplies. After the assurance of funds from
Congress, Byrd established a headquarters and supply depot
at the Navy Yard in Bos ton,^ Moreover, irrespective of the
friendship that existed between the two men, the President
recognized Byrd's ability to convince others of the impor-
tance of Antarctica to the United States; and Roosevelt con-
cluded his letter by stating that if Antarctica were to be
occupied permanently by the United States, Byrd should be
prepared to return in the spring of 1940 and explain the
reasons for the continued American presence to Congress and




F * [)j R« > His Pe rs ona 1 Le t tejrs (4 vols., N e w Y ork:
Duell" Sloan and Pearce, c. 1950) , Vol. 2, p. 906.
55 Dewing and Kelsay, "Records of the United States Ant-
arctic Service," pp. 1-3.

the American public. *>6
In his letter to Byrd, Roosevelt indicated that he had
decided in favor of a permanent American effort in the Ant-
arctic. Six days later, the President directed that the
American activities in the region be known as 'The United
States Antarctic Service' rather than as merely an American
'expedition.' Roosevelt believed that the use of the lat-
ter term would imply that American interest in the Antarc-
tic was only temporary.
Also during the latter half of July, 19 39, it was de-
cided by Roosevelt and the interdepartmental committee that
the United States should concentrate its efforts in the un-
claimed sector of Antarctica, where the bases of American
claims were already the strongest, but should give some at-
tention to strengthening American rights in the Palmer Pen=
insula region, where any activities on the part of a hostile
power would pose the greatest threat to the nations of the
Western Hemisphere. The President was aware, however, that
the conduct of operations in the latter region could well,
cause harmful repercussions to United States relations with
Latin America; and he directed the State Department on July 2 8





His Personal Letters, Vol, 2, pp. 906-907.
c 7 Memorandum by Hugh S. Cunning, July 18, 1939, in
"Establishment of the United States Antarctic Service,"
Foreign Relations , 19 39, Vol. 2, pp. 7-8.
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to inform Argentina, the only Latin American nation claiming
sovereignty in the region, that the primary objective of the
United States expedition would be to protect the rights of
a J 1 American republics. °
President Roosevelt believed at that time than any Ant-
arctic claims disputes that might arise between nations of
the Western Hemisphere could be settled in a spirit of mu-
tual good faith. He continued to give attention, however,
to the relationship between future United States claims and
Latin American interests, sending the following memorandum















li x p e
form
f th







a b 1 e
t y c
g o v e
Tha
m i n c 1 i n
d i t i o n t
of s o v
e
e w h o 1 c
f o f , a ii




u t w o u 1 d
he futur
in pn>'
o u 1 d be
r n i n g b o
t i s a n
e d t o





u b 1 i c
poss
behal






t w o n
thin k i n r
e should g i
t y , i , e . ,
r lying sou
trust for,
e r t h i s the
whi ch has
i b 1 y s e 1 1 1 i
f of its ow
udo all the
the A m e r i c
a
d by an in
e g a r d t o t h e An t a r c -
ve some s t u d y to a
a claim to sovereig
n
t h of the Americas




ng the area, would
n exclusive sover-




r form, its sover-
ter-American Repub-
e . T h ink it over. 60
58p re sident to Secretary of State and to Under Secret a r
y
of State, File No. 800,014 An t a re t i c /?. 1 7 , July 28, 1939,
U
. S . National Archives, De p t . of State.
59 Ibid.
60 Roosevelt to Under Secretary of State, August 5, 1939,
in Elliott Roosevelt, ed«, F. D. V, . .. His Personal Letters,
Vol. 2, p. 9 09.

89
The concluding statement of the memorandum indicated
that the idea of ' inter- Americani zing* the "American sector"
was entirely that of Roosevelt and was not based upon recom-
mendations from other sources. During the next. 18 months
the State Department attempted to obtain the agreement of
Argentina and Chile to a conference on the Antarctic and ar-
rangements for the future joint development of Antarctic re-
sources. It eventually became apparent, however, that
neither Latin American nation would accept any arrangements
leading t o w a r d the dilution of t h e full sovereignty that
each claimed to possess in Antarctica. Plans to implement
Roosevelt's memorandum were therefore abandoned.
In any event, the State Department took immediate steps
to avoid any incidents that might prejudice the efforts to-
ward hemispheric solidarity. On August. 8, Acting Secretary
Welles instructed the United States diplomatic officers in
all. the American republics to inform the respective govern-
ments of the full scope and objectives of the United States
expedition. This was to be done by a confidential memorandum,
in which the purpose of the expedition would be stated as
to collect scientific, data and to determine the feasibility
of establishing permanent settlements in Antarctica. The
6*U. S,, Department of State, "Territorial Claims in
t h e An t ar c t i c Ad v an c e d b y e rt a in Co v e rn m en t s , " F o r e 5 g
n
Relations of the United States, 1.94 (Washington": United
States Co v? rumen t Printing Office,' 1957), Vol, 2, p. 339.
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Latin Americans were to be informed of the recent decision
by the interdepartmental committee to establish two Antarc-
tic bases, one at Little America and the other 1 000 miles
east at the other side of the unclaimed sector, and of the
specific programs of scientific research to be conducted by
the United States. The following points were also to be
covered in the memorandum: (J) the expanding Antarctic pro-
grams of non-American nations, (2) the Antarctic claims
which had been asserted by the United Kingdom, Australia,
New Zealand, France, and Norway, (3) the German efforts in
the Antarctic, and (4) the interest in Antarctica manifested
by Japan, It was also to be noted to the Latin Americans
that the United States had never asserted territorial claims
in the Antarctic although it had been active in the region.
Finally, the diplomatic officers concerned were instructed
to communicate orally to the respective governments that
the United States Government was confident that any Antarc-
tic claims conflicts that might arise between American na-
tions would be resolved "among mutually satisfactory lines,
in keeping with the spirit of trust and friendship which
characterizes the relations prevailing between the twenty-
one American Republics. ,,62
62 Acting Secretary of State to Diplomatic Officers in
the American Republics, August 8, 1939, in "Establishment
of the United States Antarctic Service," Foreign "' lal ij
19 39, Vol. 2, pp. 9-10.

91
The United States made no effort, however, to reassure
non-American claimants with regard to the nature and goals
of the American expedition. When New Zealand again offered
the United States the use of its 'facilities' in the Ross
Dependency, 10 the United States replied simply that it fore-
saw no need for any New Zealand facilities other than those
incidental to the expedition's intended visit to Dunedin.
By the middle of November, 1939, the interdepartmental
committee had completed planning for the American expedition,
and the results of this planning had been put into the form
of a letter of instructions to Admiral Byrd. The committee
met with Byrd on November 22 to discuss a preliminary draft
of the instructions, and final revisions were made. Hugh
Cummin g then submitted the letter to the Secretary of State,
who obtained the President's approval. * On November 25
Roosevelt signed the letter, which can be considered as the
organic directive of the United States Antarctic Service,
and sent it to Byrd,
British Ambassador in Washington to Secretary of State,
November 17, 1939, in "Establishment of the United States
Antarctic Service," Foreign Relations, 1939 , Vol, 2, p. 10,
^Secretary of State to British Ambassador in Washing-
ton, December 7, 1939, in Ibid . , Vol. 2, p. 15.
65Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of
the United States Antarctic Service, File No. 800.014 Ant-




Roosevelt's letter formally designated the interdepart-
mental committee as the Executive Committee of the United
States Antarctic Service, and the Committee was given the
authority to appoint an Executive Secretary to assist it in
its work. Rear Admiral Byrd was designated an ex-officio
member of the Committee and the Commanding Officer of the
Service, and he was instructed to establish two American
bases in the Antarctic. East Base was to be located in the
vicinity of Charcot Island or Alexander I Land, with the
area around Marguerite Bay as an alternate site. West Base
was to be constructed on the eastern coast of the Ross Sea
in the vicinity of King Edward VII Land, with a site on the
Bay of Whales at or near Little America rs an alternate.
Byrd was further instructed to keep the Executive Committee
informed of operations and progress in the field and to refer
to the Committee for approval any plans for operations be-
yond the limits specified below. In addition, Byrd was to
work, with the Committee in planning either the relief of the
Antarctic bases or the evacuation of those bases if the Ant-
arctic Service should be discontinued. °
The primary mission of the expedition was to explore
those Antarctic regions of greatest interest to the United
66 Roosevelt to Byrd, November 25, 1939, in "Establish-
ment of the United States Antarctic Service," Foreign ' li
t i on s , 19 39, Vol. 2
, pp . 11-14 .
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States and those in which the United States already possessed
the strongest bases for territorial claims. The principal
field objectives were stated in the letter as the "delinea-
tion" of the Antarctic coastline between 72° West and 148°
West and the exploration of Hearst Land, Janes W. Ellsworth
Land, and Marie Byrd Land. ' It therefore appeared that
the geographic focus of American activities would be the
unclaimed sector, as had been implied to the congressional
subcommittee and to Latin American Governments.
Roosevelt's letter continued, however, by listing as
secondary objectives the delineation of the western coast
of the Weddell Sea and the exploration of various mountain
ranges in the interior of the Antarctic Continent. The let-
ter also instructed Byrd to explore the area around the
South Magnetic Pole and the unknown areas between the Weddell
Sea and the South Geographic Pole, Thus, even though the
primary effort was to be conducted in the unclaimed sector,
President Roosevelt and the Executive Committee were unwil-
ling to confine United States activities and possible future
claims to that region of Antarctica alone. They envisaged
an effort in virtually all the areas of the Antarctic in
67 Roosevelt to Byrd, November 25, 1939, in "Establish-
ment of the United States Antarctic Service," Foreign Re la'
tions
,_
19 39, Vol. 2
,
p . 12.
6 8 1 b i el
. ,
Vol. 2
, p . l 2 .
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which the United States had been historically involved, in-
cluding territories claiip.nl by Australia, New Zealand, and
the United Kingdom and regions of interest to both Argentina
and Chile, For this reason, the United States decided that
it would remain committed to the Hughes Doctrine, and a pol-
icy statement to that effect had been released to t. h e Press
by the State Department on November 10. '" Even though this
decision would make it necessary for the United States to
base Antarctic claims on permanent occupation, the continued
reliance upon the Hughes Doctrine would facilitate any fu-
ture American challenges to the claims of of he r nations, all
of which had followed a less rigorous definition of effective
DC cup at ion.
The United States had also decided to postpone any
formal action on Antarctic claims until the b a s e s for t h e
m
had been firmly established. The precise policy which had
been determined with regard to such claims was stated in
Roosevelt's letter:
The United States has never recognized any
claims to sovereignty over territory in the Antarc-
tic regions asserted by any foreign state. No mem-
ber of the United States Antarctic Service shall
take any action or make any statements tending to
compromise this position.
Members of the Service may take appropriate
steps such as dropping written claims from airplanes,
69 The New York Tines, November 10, 1039, p. 17,

95
depositing such writings in cairns, ct cetera, which
might assist in supporting a sovereignty claim by
the United States Government. Careful record shall
be kept of the circumstances surrounding each such
act. No public announcement of such act shall, how-
ever, be made without specific authority in each
case from the Secretary of State. 70
Even though the Antarctic Service hod been established
as an agency of the United States Government, it had many
significant non-governmental aspects. The appropriation
received from Congress was far from adequate to support the
expedition, and it again had been necessary for Admiral Byrd
to utilize his talent for fund raising. He succeeded in
obtaining donations of funds and equipment valued at more
than $325,000 from the War and Navy Departments and an ad-
ditional $240,000 from private sources. The latter amount
included contributions from Byrd himself, who, in addition,
sold his polar ship, Bear of Oakland , for one dollar to the
Navy for wsc on the expedition. Finally, a majority of the
civilian members of the expedition had agreed to participate
at the nominal salary of $10 per month.
Such unofficial procurement of supplies and recruitment
of personnel was of crucial importance to the success of
70 Roosevelt to Byrd, November 25, 1939, in "Establish-
ment of the United States Antarctic Service," Foreign Rela-
tions, 1 9 39, Vol. 2
, p . 13.
71 Paul Siple, 90° South (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,
c. 1959)
, pp. 6 3-66.
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the expedition, but it led to difficulties in control and
adminis tration « Insofar as the United States Government
was concerned, the primary mission of the expedition was
the establishment of bases for American claims to Antarctic
territory. Since any scientific research carried out in
conjunction with the official expedition would have a bear-
ing on these claims and therefore on United States relations
with the other nations involved in the Antarctic, Roosevelt's
letter contained the following paragraph- -the controversial
Paragraph 9(c) p regarding secrecy:
As it is highly important that no journal or
n a r rati ve of the enterprise, either partial or c o m -
p 1 e t e
,
should be published, without the authority
and und or the supervision of the Government of the
United States
,
at whose expense this Service is im-
dertaken, you will, before they reach the first port
north o f the Antarctic regions, require from ev ery
person un d e r your command the surrender of all j o u r -
n a 1 s , d i aries , memoranda, remarks, writings, ch a r t s ,
drawing s , sketches, paintings, photographs, f i
1
ms,
plates, a s w e 11 as all specimens of every kind, col -
1 e c t e d or p r
e
pared during their absence from th r\
United State s ,72
Meanwhile, the expedition's vessels, North Star and Bear
,
had departed from Boston on November 15 and November 22 res-
pective!)'; and the members of the expedition thus had no know-
ledge of the President's instructions until they were well
72 Roosevelt to Byrd, November 25, 1939, in "Establish-
ment of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s An t arc t i c S e r vi c e , " jF o re i j . n ReJ a
tions, 3 9 59, Vol . 2, p. 14.
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at sea, where it was practically impossible for then to resign.
The delay in the order had apparently been caused by the
shortage of time and the difficulties inherent, in planning
an interdepartmental venture. In any event, Paragraph 9(cl
was to cause a near mutiny among the civilian members, many
of whom had agreed to work for nominal pay precisely because
they had expected to gain financia] reward or professional
p r e s t i g e as a r e s u 1 1 ' o f m a k 5 n g th e i r w o r k public.
Admiral Byrd boarded the North Star at Balboa, Canal
Zone, on November 30 and immediately requested on behalf of
the Executive Committee that the civilians sign a statement
to the effect that they would follow the instructions on
secrecy. Dr. Paul Siple, who had been in charge of logistics
for the expedition and who would be one of the base lenders
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group
But he
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any [of the civilian personnel]
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ad 'read' the order. When B y r
d
n s i s t e d that they had to add 'an
vilian members retaliated with a
which they decided unanimously
w h e n w e r e ached port, It \ : a s a
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put it to the men as an act of
do hi s best to have the o r d e r re
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Conflicts of this order seem to be inherent in operations
73Siple, 90° South, p, 66.
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that have both a political and a scientific mission. Similar
problems would occur in future United States efforts in the
Antarctic, where scientific operations have been inextricably
connected with the political aims related to national claims
positions. Indeed, "political results are inevitable by-
products of research, else governments would not be paying
the bills. "'4 Not until the International Geophysical Year
would the American scientific community and the United States
Government appear to arrive at some sort of understanding
of each other's goals and problems.
The expedition arrived in the Antarctic and discovered
that conditions of access were such as to preclude the estab-
lishment of West Base as close to the unclaimed sector as
had been desired. In accordance with the President's instruc-
tions, Little America was selected as the alternate site.
The North Star arrived at the Bay of Whales on January 12, 1940,
to be followed by the Bear two days later. After the base
had been established, Byrd embarked aboard the Bca_r with the
7 ^
men who had been chosen to man Hast Base.'*
It had been hoped that the latter station could be con-
structed on Charcot Island, thus enabling the exploratory
74phiiip C. Jessup and Howard J. Taubenfield, Controls
for Outer Sp; ce and the Ant; Anali y (New Yor! ; Colum
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teams to penetrate the eastern region of the unclaimed sec-
tor from a point closer to its boundary than had heretofore
been reached on the surface. Again, however, the thickness
of the pack ice forced the expedition to select an alternate
site, and East Base was es tab lis lied on Stoning ton Island,
located in Marguerite Bay some 13° inside the British claim.
The principal objectives of the men who inhabited Hast
Base were the crossing of the Palmer Peninsula and explora-
tion of the coast to the east and the penetration of the un-
claimed sector to the southwest. One party departed the base
on November 9, 1940, and its members succeeded in becoming
the first men to cross the Peninsula on the surface. They
turned back on December 25, after having explored southward
to 71° 51' South. Statements claiming the territory for the
United States were deposited in cairns at various points
along their route. 77
At the same time, another member of the expedition,
Richard B. Black, was attempting to fulfill Roosevelt's
secondary objective regarding the aerial exploration of the
region to the southeast of fast Base. He £le\; across the
Palmer Peninsula and reached approximately 74° South. As
was the practice, with all the exploratory flights, Black
76
76 Sul3ivan, Quest, pp. 15 8-159.
77 ibid., pp. 160-165.

1dropped a claims statement, inside a metal cylinder at the
furthest point reached,
A party under Finn Roane, who would later lead a pri-
vate expedition to Antarctica, was to enter the unclaimed
sector and explore to the southwest. Its mission had been
hindered by the failure to establish Hast Base as close to
the sector as had been hoped, and it was therefore decided
to airlift the group "to Charcot Island and to commence the
surface exploration from that point. This plan had to be
abandoned because of unfavorable landing conditions on the
snow, however, and Ronnc's party had to make the entire trip
on the surface. It was unable to reach even the boundary
of the unclaimed sector before being forced to return by
the lateness of the season and the depiction of supplies.
A claims statement was deposited anyway--on Ecklund Island
off the Robert English Coast- -well within the British claim. 7.
Meanwhile, the inhabitants of West Base were attempting
to establish American rights to territory as far to the cast-
as possible. In addition to the deposition of statements
and the raising of flags at various points in the unclaimed
sector, this group was responsible for the first claim to
Antarctic territory by an official of the United States Gov-
ernment acting on instructions. On November 11, 1940,
Leonard Berlin, a government surveyor, placed a statement
7 8 S u 1 J i v an , u e s t , pp. 1 6 3-166.
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atop Mount Grace McKinley, located barely within the unclaimed
sector vt the bare of the. Edward VII Peninsula, claiming the
territory east of 150° West for the United States. 79
While the United States Antarctic Service was thus en-
gaged in strengthening the bases of American claims, the
two South American nations with interests in the Antarctic
were taking steps to protect their respective positions.
On July 5, 1939, Argentina formed a National Antarctic Com-
mission of representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Re-
lations and Worship, Agriculture, and the Navy. The task
of this commission was to study Antarctic problems so that
Argentina night be prepared to participate in an Internation-
al Polar Exposition which was to be held in Bergen, Norway,
the following October. The exposition was subsequently can-
celed because of the war, but the work of the Commission had
demonstrated to the Argentine Government the necessity of
a permanent Antarctic agency. The Commission was therefore
given permanent character through an Argentine Presidential
Decree of April 30, 1940, and placed under the Foreign Pvela-
tions Ministry, It. was instructed to continue to study Ar-
gentine interests in the Antarctic and to submit to the
Executive specific plans for action to be taken by Argentina
vi y t h r e g ar d to those i n t e r e s t s .
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The Argentine National Antarctic Commission saw an im-
perative need to strengthen Argentine rights in the Antarc-
tic and recommended on June 5, 1940, that a program of offi-
cial activities be carried out in the region. 8 * As a result
of this recommendation, an expedition was sent to the Palmer
Peninsula and the South Shetland Islands in May, 1942, aboard
the Argentine naval transport, Primero de Mayo. Members of
the expedition raised the Argentine flag at various points
and deposited bronze tablets proclaiming the existence of
Argentine sovereignty over the areas in question. °* ^ comic-
opera situation then proceeded to develop betv/ecn Argentina
and the United Kingdom.
When the Primero de Mayo returned to the Antarctic in
1943, the Argentines discovered that a British warship had
visited the area in the meantime and that the Argentine
tablets had been replaced with notices declaring the areas
to be under British sovereignty. The Pimero de Mayo Expe-
dition duly replaced the notices with new bronze tablets.
The original tablets were later returned to the Argentine
Government by the British Ambassador at Buenos Aires, with
a note stating that the British Embassy "'naturally too!:
advantage of the opportunity to return the objects in qucs-
83 Naval War College, Documents , 1948-49
,
p. 218.
8 2 Christie, Antarctic Problem, p. 26 8,
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tion.*" 8 -5 There then ensued a series of protests and coun-
ter-protests accomplishing nothing.
The British Government was particularly concerned with
the Antarctic during this period, for the region had become
the site of German naval operations. On January 13, 194 3,
the German raider Pinguin effected the simultaneous capture
of 14 vessels of the Norwegian whaling fleet in the waters
off the Princess Martha Coast of Queen Maud hand. This was
perhaps the most spectacular success of the German raiders
that found havens in the uninhabited islands of the sub-Ant-
arctic, where their crews could go ashore for rest and relaxa^
ti.on and where rendezvous could take place with their supply
ships in secrecy. During the early years of the war, raid-
ers operating in sub-Antarctic waters accounted for the sink-
ing 7- capture of several hundred thousand tons of Allied
shipping and the mining of the A u s t r a 1 i a n p o r t s of S y d n s y
,
8 SAdelaide, Melbourne, and Ho hart. *
The British Navy was aware that the raiders were based
somewhere in the Antarctic regions and searched the area
constantly without success. It was during such a search
that the Argentine tablets had been discovered on Deception
8 3 Ch r i s tie, Ant a r c t i c P rob 1cm, p p . 268-269.
German Raiders in the Antarctic during the War," The
Polar Record, Vol, 4 (July, 1940), p. 402.
85 Sullivan, Quest, p. 266.
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Island, Evidence now available indicates that the only
site in the Antarctic utilized by raiders was Kerguelen Is-
land, which had been claimed by France. The IIMA5 Australia
searched Kerguelen Island in November, 1941, and laid mines
in its harbor. There is no evidence of German use of the
island after this date and no evidence, at all of Japanese
operations in the Antarctic during the war.
The concern over German raiders, coupled with that over
the pro-Nazi sympathies which had become increasingly evi-
dent in Argentina since the coup of Generals Arturo Rawson
and Pedro P. Ramirez in June, 1943, made Argentine control
of both sides of the Drake Passage particularly unacceptable
to the British Government. In addition, the two Primero de
Mayo Expeditions had raised fears of an "Argentine coup in
the Antarctic.' A small British military detachment was
therefore sent to Antarctica, arriving on February 3, 1944.
Its mission, under the code name, Operation Tabarin, was to
guard Deception Island and to establish a base on the Palmer
Peninsula. Argentina, however, conducted no further opera-
tions in the An t a r c t i c d u r i n g t h e w a r , an d its N a t. i o n a 1 An t -
8 8
arctic Gommission remained inactive for three years.
86u German Raiders," pp t 402-403.
8 7 Ghristie, Antarctic Problem, p. 247„
88 Ibid,
,
pp. 24 7-24 8, 269.
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Also during the period in which the United States Ant-
arctic Service was engaged in field operations, Chile took
steps to protect its Antarctic position. As a result of the
report submitted by the special commission created to study
Chilean rights and interests in the Antarctic, President
Pedro Aguirre Cerda of Chile issued the following decree
on N o v e mb e r 6 , 19 4 0:
All lands, islands, islets, reef [sic] of rock,
glaciers (pack-ice), already known or to be discov-
ered, and their respective territorial waters, in
the sector between longitudes S3 and 90° West, con-
stitute Chilean Antarctica or Chilean Antarctic tcr-
ri tory
.
Like Argentina, Chile based its claim on the geological
affinity of the Palmer Peninsula to Chile proper and on suc-
cession to rights allegedly possessed by Spain prior to
Chilean independence. In addition, as the nation closest
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Chile i m m c d i a t e 1 y not i f i e d t h e I J n i t e d S t a tes, J a p a i • ,
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and Argentina of 3 ts claim. Realizing that its claim in-
cluded regions of interest to Argentina, Chile proposed that
a conference on the Antarctic be held between the two nations. 9 ^
This conference, which met in Santiago in May, 1941, resulted
in no agreement other than that Argentina and Chile were
the only nations possessing rights in the •South American
sector 1 of Antarctica. * Japan responded to the Chilean
claim with a reservation of Japanese rights in the area con-
cerned, and the United States acted only to advise Chile
to inform Japan that the Chilean acknowledgment, of the note
reserving Japanese rights was not to be considered as any
recognition of those rights.
In its note, replying to the Japanese reservations, Chile
characterized its action as not a claim to a region which
9* American Ambassador in Santiago to Secretary of State,
November 7, 1940, in Foreign Relations , 1940, Vol, 2, p. 336.
92 American Ambassador in Buenos Aires to Secretary of
State, November 9, 1940, in Ibid
.
, Vol. 2, p. 336.
9 ^ Robert D. Hayton, "The 'American' Antarctic," Amer ica!
Journal of Inj 1 Law, Vol. SO (July, 1956), p. 58
"^Japanese CVoryo in Santiago to Chilean Minister of
Foreign Relations, November 13, 1940, quoted in Chilean
Ministry of Foreign Relations to Japanese Legation in San-
tiago, November 29, 19 40, in Naval War College, Documenl
1948-49, p. 2 25.
9 r> .Secretary of State to Ambassador in Santiago, Nov,.
ber 26, 1940, in Foreign Relations , 1940, Vol. 2, p. 338,
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had been res nul lius but the delimitation of boundaries of
areas which were already under Chilean sovereignty. Chile
then implied recognition of the validity of the bases of
United States and Argentine claims, stating that the Chilean
territory was comprised of "regions to which the Argentine
Republic could claim title by virtue of its propinquity on
the eastern side, and to which the United States could claim
title to the West."^"; Chile further implied recognition of
the American acts of occupation in the unclaimed sector,
stating that it was unable to discern any basis for Japanese
reservations regarding:
. , , a triangle which, starting w 3 t h seas and
lands which belong to the Republic of Chile, termi-
nates with its vertex at the Sou t h P o 1 e ; w h i. c h i s
situated in the American Antarctic; which comprises
regions possessed by Chile since long ago; and which
borders to the east and west on zones occupied by
Q 7Argentina and by the United States. y '
It appeared that the judicious reassuring of the Latin
Americans by the United States State Department had produced
the desired results. Both Chile and Argentina acted as if
all threats to their Antarctic positions originated outs id:;
the Hemisphere and as if a United States claim, should such
96chilean Ministry of Foreign Relations to Japanese Le-
gation in Santiago, November 29, 1940, in Naval V.'ar College,
Docume n t s , 1 9 4 8 - 4 9





be forthcoming, would be either confined to the unclaimed
sector or based on mutual agreement among the three American
claimants. Argentina and Chile would apparently have wel-
comed a United States claim to the unclaimed sector, believ-
ing that such an act, by bringing the United States into the
'club 1 of An t a r c t i c c 1 a i m a n t s
,
w o u 1 d 1 e a d t h e U n i ted States
to recognize their respective claims and support them more
readily in any disputes with extra-Hemispheric powers.
Roosevelt's orders to Byrd, however, had promoted United
States claims activity in various areas of Antarctica, in-
cluding the 'South American sector;' and there is no evidence
that the United States actually intended to give Argentina
and Chile a free hand in the strategic Palmer Peninsuala
regi on
.
Even though the United States Antarctic Service was
achieving remarkable successes in the field without involv-
ing the United States in Antarctic disputes, the increasing
fears of American involvement in the European war and the
corresponding pressures of rearmament on the national bud-
get led Congress to become less willing to finance American
ventures in Antarctica. The Executive Committee of the Ant-
arctic Service was aware as early as January, 1940, that the
Service's appropriation for fiscal year 194 1 would face

1 9
serious difficutieS in Congress; 98 and the Committee accord-
ingly prepared two budget estimates: one of $250,000, which
would enable the expedition to continue to operate, and one
of $171,000, which would provide for the evacuation of the
American bases." In contrast to the majority of congress-
men, President Roosevelt believed that the work of the Ant-
arctic Service should be continued especially because of
the war in Europe. lie thought that post-war settlements
might well include cessions of Antarctic territory and that
American rights in Antarctica should therefore be made as
strong as possible. 10 - Contrary to the wishes of the Presi-
dent, however, Congress allowed the Antarctic. Service only
the sum of $171,000. The two American bases were evacuated,
and the expedition arrived back in Boston in May, 1941.
The Executive Committee now had the responsibility of
disposing of the journals, records, and data that had been
^Executive Secretary, United States Antarctic Service,
Lieutenant Commander R. A. J. English, United States Navy,
t o B y r d , Miscellaneous File, January 18, 19-10, U . S . Nation
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d Statutes a1 La^pe Vr>l. 54 fl941") r. rw1 '^
"Second Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1940."

1 1
turned over to it in accordance with Paragraph 9(c) of
Roosevelt's instructions. It had been intended that the
Executive Committee would supervise the preparation of a
history of the Antarctic Service by Admiral Byrd and that
the Executive Committee and the National Academy of Sciences
together would prepare and edit the scientific data obtained
by the expedition;*^ ancj Congress appropriated the sum of
$19,610 for this purpose in June, 1941. °^ This administra-
tive task would have been difficult to fulfill even under
the best of circumstances. In an operation that was in the
process of being phased out, the task became an impossibility
D u r i n g t h e m o n t h s in w h i ch t h e e x p e d i t i o n h a d b e e n i
n
its early stages, the Executive Committee had met at sched-
uled monthly sessions, with special sessions when necessary.
With the approach of war, however, those involved in Antarc-
tic policy-making began to spend less and less time on Ant-
arctic matters as their attention, and that of their respec-
tive departments, shifted to other, more crucial, concerns.
It v;as in such a v.- ay that the executive branch of the United
States Coy nt became disengaged from the Antarctic; and
by early 1940 the State Department, had for all practical
102 Roosevelt to Byrd, November 25, 1939, in "Establish-
ment of the United States Antarctic Service," Fo ' la
tions, 1939, Vol. 2, p. 14.
103 U. S., Statutes aj Large , Vol. 55 (1942), p. 360.
"Interior Dep; Appro] ion Act of 1942."
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purposes terminated its involvement with the Antarctic Ser-
vice. The last meeting of the Executive Committee was ap-
parently held on November 4, 1941. After this date, the
responsibilities of the Committee were carried out by the
Executive Secretory, who sought the advice and consent of
the Committee members when necessary. ^4
Inasmuch as the United States Antarctic Service became
inactive rather abruptly as a result of the war, "wartime
assignments and pressures presumably scattered the personnel
before data could be studied and reports put in final form. "105
Even the smell appropriation granted in 1941 was never fully
expended. On July 2, 1942, Congress granted a final authori-
zation, allowing the Antarctic Service to utilize a sum not
to exceed $30,000 from its unspent balances. 106 When this
authorization expired on June 30, 1943, the United States
Antarctic Service ceased all operations. The official his-
tory of the service has never been written, and most of the
data obtained by the expedition has never been processed.
104 Dewing and Kelsay, "Records of the United States Ant
arctic Service," p. 2.
105
1.0 6
Ibid., p . 6
•U. S., Statutes at Large, Vol. 56 (1943), p. 597
econd Deficiency App -•(•>' .• '< ' ' ' ;- e j" 1 :'•!'! c "

THE FRA OF CONFLICT: 1945-1950
liven though World War II had caused the United States
to suspend field operations in the Antarctic, the goals and
policies upon which those operations had been based remained
unchanged in 1945. Indeed, a new factor had been added:
the existence of a potentially-hostile Soviet Union across
the Arctic regions from the United States caused American
military strategists to see an. urgent need for training mili-
tary forces in polar warfare. With this object in mind, a
six-ship naval exercise, Operation Nanook, was held in Arc-
tic waters in the summer of 1946; and the Navy intended to
conduct a major fleet exercise in the same region in 1947.
In the meantime, Admiral Byrd had been attempting to
gain official support for the continuance of the work con-
men ced by the United States Antarctic Service. With the
death of his friend and supporter, President Roosevelt, he
met with no success until fears began to be raised within
the government that the Arctic exercise planned for 1947
might antagonize the Soviets unduly. The attention of the
Navy thus shifted to the Antarctic; and in August, 1946,
Byrd succeeded in obtaining the approval of his proposals
from the Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Admiral Nimitz,
^-Walter G. Sullivan, Quest fpj ; Continent (New York





and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal.2
On August 26, 1946, Admiral N'imitz issued the confiden-
tial orders for what remains the largest Antarctic expedition
ever mounted by any nation— Operation Highjump, The Navy
released details of the planned operation to the press on
November 12, 1946, stating that units of both the Atlantic
and Pacific Fleets would be sent to the Antarctic as early
in 1947 as permitted by the condition of the Antarctic ice
pack and would carry out programs of training and research
for the duration of the navigable season. The specific ob-
jectives of Operation High jump were listed in the press re-
lease as the following: (1) training personnel and testing
equipment under polar conditions, (2) continuing the work
of the United States Antarctic Service Expedition, (3) gain-
ing experience in t h e est a b 1 i s h m en t of p o 3 a r b a s e s , a n
d
(4) conducting research in various scientific fields.
^
The operation order itself, which remained confidential
until 1955, listed still another objective of the expedition-
one which had not appeared in the press release--that of
"consolidating and extending United States sovereignty over
2 P au 1 S i p .1 e , 9 ° S o u t h ( N e w York: G . P . Put n a in ' s So n s
c, 1959), p. 76; and Sullivan, Ojoest , p. 173.
5 U. S., Ucparti'ient of the Navy, Press Release, Novem-
ber 12,1946, in "United S t a t e s N a v y D e p a r t m : n t E xp e d i t i o
n
to the Antarctic (Operation High jump), 1946-47," The Polar
Record, Vol. 4 (July, 1946), pp. 399-401.
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the largest practicable area of the Antarctic Continent. "^
It was therefore evident that the United States had aban-
doned neither the policies leading toward eventual claims
to Antarctic territory nor Roosevelt's policy of maintain-
ing secrecy to avoid diplomatic complications before such
c 1 a i in s w ere f o r m a 1 ] y a s s e r t e d
.
The control of Operation llighjump was vested almost
entirely in the Navy,- although arrangements were made with
other governmental agencies for scientific research to be
conducted in non-military fields. Rear Admiral Byrd was
placed on duty in the Office of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions as a s p e c i a 1 a d viscr on p o 1 a r matters an d w a s g i. v e
n
technical control of the expedition as officer-in-charge of
the field programs to be carried out by Operation Highju
under the name, Antarctic Development Project 1947. The
scientific program was placed under the overall guidance
of the Director of Naval Research, Rear Admiral P. F. Lee.
The 13 ships and 4,700 men which comprised the actual c
pedition were formed into Task Force 68 under Rear Ad-
miral. Richard H. Cruzen, who exercised tactical command
in the f i e 1 d .
-
q
^U. S., Navy, Operation Order, Operation High jui
(August. 26, 1946), Library of the U. S. Navl 1 S~u port Force,
An t a r c t i c a , W a s h :; n g t on , . C
.
5 U. S., -Department of the Navy, Press Release, Nov;
ber 12, 1946, in "Expedition, 1946-4 7," pp. 4 00-401.

The Navy also planned to utilize the publicity atten-
dant on such an expedition as a means toward increasing the
level of public support for its activities, hoping thereby
to insulate itself somewhat against the post-war budget cuts
currently in progress. Accordingly, arrangements were made
with Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios in Hollywood for a notion
picture to be made of the exploits of the expedition. The
film was subsequently re] eased under the title, "The Secret
Land." 6
Once in the. Antarctic, the expedition would be divided
into three sections: East Group, West Group, and Central
Group. The latter had the responsibility of constructing
a base and air field at Little America, to which the carrier
Philippine Sea would dispatch aircraft for use in exploring
the interior of the continent. East and West Groups would
each be organized around a seaplane tender and would travel
along the coast in opposite directions v:hile their aircraft
conducted photo-mapping operations.'
On December 30, 1946., the ships assigned to Central
Group rendezvoused off Scott Island in the northern reaches
of the Moss Sea, Although the pack-ice v/as among the heavi-




7 1 b i d .
, p . 174.
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Northwind succeeded in clearing a route to Little America.
This narked the advent of the modern icebreaker in Antarc-
tic operations, and the success of the Northwind had a pro-
found effect on the conduct of future expeditions.^
The Navy had planned to construct the airfield at Little
America of pierced-pl anking , which had been used successful-
ly during the war in situations where a hard-surfaced run-
way had to be obtained in a short period of time. Delays
caused the idea to be abandoned, however; and the aircraft
were forced to operate with skis, which reduced their speed
and range. Even with this handicap, the 3 groups together
managed to take some 7 0,0 00 aerial photographs, which in-
volved a n e s t i m a t e d total of 3 5
,
s q u a r e m i 1 e s of n e w 1 y
-
discovered territory. Sixty percent of the Antarctic coast-
line was photographed by the expedition, and twenty -five
C)
percent of this i n v o 1 v e d heretofore unseen areas.
Also during 1947, Commander Finn Ronne, United States
Naval Reserve, was completing his plans for a privately-
financed expedition to the Antarctic. Me intended to cut
his costs by utilizing the abandoned American base at Ston-
ington Island in Marguerite Hay, from which he had operated
as a member of the Antarctic Service. A British expedition
was currently encamped on the island, and Ronne requested
"Sullivan, Quest, p. 183.
9
1 b i d
. , pp. 215, 247.
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the State Department to ask the British for a report on the
condition of the American buildings and equipment, which
were located some 200 yards from the British base. The
British Government, however, had recently learned of the
plans of both Chile and Argentina to establish bases in the
Palmer Peninsula region durinp the upcoming season and feared
that the addition of an American base in the same area would
further weaken the British claims position. The British
Embassy in Washington therefore attempted to discourage
Ronne, replying to the State Department that Stoning ton Is-
land had neither enough seals for dog food nor sufficient
space to support two expeditions.
The State Department dismissed the British objections
to Ronne' s plans for two reasons. First, th? limited bud-
get of the Ronne Expedition precluded its constructing a
n e w b a s e in t h e An tnrctic, Second, the D e p a r t m e n t w as still
promoting the strengthening of American rights in Antarctica
with a view toward the future assertion of territorial claims,
and it intended for the Ronne Expedition to add to the claims
bases that had been es tab lis lied in the Palmer Peninsula re-
gion by the men of the United States Antarctic Service. 11
^Statement °>' Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson,
December 27, 1916, in "Clarification of U. S. Position on
Antarctic Claims," Depj tm enl of State Bull tin, Vol, 16
(January 5, 194 7), p. 30i
11 Sullivan, Qver,X. } pp. 271-272

118
In fact, the State Department had apparently come to believe
that the work of the Ronne Expedition, coupled with that
of Operation Highjump, would finally strengthen the bases
of United States Antarctic claims to the point where a for-
mal claim could be defended successfully in the internation-
al diplomatic and legal arena.,
On January 5, 1947, State Department officials reported-
ly disclosed to The New York Times that the United States
would definitely assert claims to Antarctic territory in
the very near future. It was further disclosed that inter-
departmental conferences would be held in the spring, after
Admiral Byrd's return to the United States upon the comple-
tion of Operation Highjump, to consider the timing of formal
claims, the resolution of claims disputes, and future United
States Antarctic programs. ^ Even though it was also reported
in The New York Times that the claims were expected to be
based largely on American activities in the unclaimed sec-
tor, the Palmer Peninsula remained of great interest to the
United States Government. Any formal American claims would
probably have i n c 1 u d e d at ] e a s t a p a r t of the 1 a 1 1 e r r e g i on ,
and unknown to the British and Latin Americans, the State
Department arranged for Ronne to be sworn in as a postmaster
so that he could operate an official United States Post Of-
12
"U. S. Maps Formal Claims," The Now York Times , Jan
uary 6, 194 7,. p. 21.
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fice on Stonington Is] and and thus help to fulfill juridical
requirements of administration.**
Three days after the reported disclosure of United States
intentions regarding Antarctica, Secretary of State Byrnes
was asked at a press conference if he were planning to call
an international conference to consider the natter of Ant-
arctic claims. Byrnes replied that he did not believe the
matter was of sufficient urgency to warrant an international
conference, especially in view of the large number of con-
ferences already scheduled on more essential subjects.
By February 23, 1947, the last contingent of Operation
Highjump had left Antarctica by icebreaker. On March 12
Ronne arrived at Stonington Island, and after a period of
strained relations between his expedition and that of the
British, the two expeditions agreed to pool their resources
and conduct joint scientific operations. - Within the next
IS months, however, not only did the United States fail to
assert the Antarctic claims which now appeared imminent,
but the State Department was pressing for the conference on
Antarctica that Secretary Byrnes had thought to be unneces-
sary. The reasons for these shifts in policy lay in the
* 3 S u 1 1 i v a n , Qu est , p . 272,
^"Byrnes Cool to Conference," The New York Tines , Jan-
uary 8, 1947, p. 13.
15 c ullivan, Quest, pp. 2 72-27 3.
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worsening dispute over the Antarctic between the United King
dom and the two Latin American claimants.
At the end of World War II, the United Kingdom's Opera-
tion Tab a. r in had been reorganized on a civilian basis and
had been placed under the Colonial Ministry. Renamed the
Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey, its mission became
that of conducting scientific studies and maintaining the
bases of British Antarctic claims through occupation. This
brought the United Kingdom into direct, conflict with Argen-
tina, for in 1946 the Antarctic became a major point of em-
phasis of the foreign policy of the Peron Regime. The Ar-
gentine N a t i o n a 1 An t a r c t i c Co n m i s s i o n w a s a 1 s o reorganized,
and its me m b e r s h i p w as i n c r e a s e d to inc.] u d c representatives
of the Ministries of Aeronautics and Justice. Its mission
was broadened to include the planning of expeditions to
strengthen the bases of Argentine territorial claims,
Argentina finally indicated the precise extent of its
claim to the mainland of Antarctica on June 3, 1946, in a
note to the United Kingdom, Argentina stated in the note
that it had learned of the release of a new series of post-
age stamps intended for use in the Falkland Islands Depen-
dencies and that it was informing the Universal Postal Union
that the validity of the stamps would not be recognized in
16E. W. Hunter Christie, The / ctic Problem (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1951), pp. 25T7"2 6 97

12]
Argentina, Argentina reiterated its claim to sovereignty
over the Falklands themselves and added that it possessed
an "indisputable right." to the Antarctic territory between
25° West and 68° 34' West, south of 60° South. 17 The Argen-
tine claim was indicated as extending westward to 74° West
in an official map published by the Military Geographic In-
stitutc in November, 1946, and this delimitation also ap-
peared in March, 1947, in a publication of the Argentine
National Antarctic Commission. Argentina currently (1969)
considers 74° West as the western boundary of its Antarctic
sector, which includes almost the entire sector claimed by
the United Kingdom and overlaps the Chilean sector by 21
degrees
.
In early 1947, in conjunction with an intensive propa-
ganda campaign to foster public support for its Antarctic-
policies, Argentina launched its largest Antarctic expedi-
tion up to that time. The expedition carried out various
scientific programs, placed navigational aids in Antarctic
waters, and established an Argentine base on Gamma Island
1
'Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations, Juan 1. Cooke,
to British Ambassador in Buenos Aires, Sir Reginald Leeper,
June 3, 1946, in U. S., Naval War College, "Declarations
Concerning Antarctic Territories," l_nt at ion a 3 Law D
ments
,
1948-49 (Washington: United State: Go - t Print-
( .Tiro, 1950)
, pp. 222-223.
***Christie, Antarctic Pj b 1 em
,
p. 2 70.
19 Naval War College, Documents, 1948-49, p. 218.
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2in the Melchoirs. u During the sane season, a Chilean ex-
pedition visited the South Shet lands and established a base
on Greenwich Island. 23 The United Kingdom responded to what
it considered ns unauthorized foreign activities on British
territory with notes of protest to Argentina and Chile, all
o f w h i c h were summarily r e j e c t e d , 2
Argentina and Chile, moreover, were soon presented
with an opportunity to gain wider support in their res-
pective Antarctic claims disputes with the United Kingdom,,
On August 15, 1947, delegations fron 20 American Republics
met at Quitandinha, near Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and, after
conferring for 18 days, signed the Inter- American Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact), In Article 3 of the
Treaty, the Contracting Parties agreed that "an armed at-
tack by any State against an American State shall be con-
sidered as an attack against all the American States" and
that in such a case each Party would undertake "to assist
in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defense recognized by
2 0j uan Carlos Moreno, Nuestras M a 1 v
i
n as; La An ta rt id;
(Buenos Aires: El Ateneo, 19*64), p. 237,
*'Oscar Pinochet-de 1? Barra, Chilean Sovereignty in
Antarctica (Santiago: Editorial del Pacifico, 3 '.>!. 5 J
,
p, 55,
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Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. .,2 3 Of
greater importance to the existing situation in the Antarc-
tic, however, was Article 6, which states that in cases of
aggression which is not an armed attack, the Organ of
Consultation, defined in Article ]1 as the Meetings of Foreign
Ministers of the American Republics, would meet immediately
to seek agreement on the measures to be taken to assist the
victim of the aggression. Such aggression was specifically
defined in Article 9(b) as:
Invasion, by the armed forces of a State, of
the t e i r i t o r y o f a n Am e r i c an S t a to, t h r o u g h t h e
trespassing of boundaries demarcated in accordance
with a treaty, judicial decision, or arbitral award,
or , in the ab: of f r< ' thus demarcated
,
in-
vasion a£? ct Ln whicTi i*s 1u I Fec"^"
tive j url STatfe.
Finally, at the insistence primarily of ths Argentine
delegation, the Security Zone in which the Treaty was to be
operative included the sector of Antarctica between longi-
tudes 24° West and 90° West, which comprised both the Argen
2 3 inter- American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, in
U. S., Department of State, In ter- American Conf ce for
tl Maint en an ce of Coi I : ; ' I and J curi ty t Qui an-
di'nl a. Bra ;;'i J , ' :]:: I r ' 2 , J 94 '• : I o f the
!'
j c : the United Stai ol .' rica [Washington :
United Stai Govt i Prln'tTng Of fice , 1948)
,
pp. 59-65.
2-1 Ibid., pp. 59-65. Italics nine.
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tine and Chilean claims in their entirety.
Since Argentina and Chile claimed to he exercising
"effective jurisdiction" over their respective Antarctic
territories, they could he expected to invoice the Rio Pact
in the near future against the Antarctic activities of the
United Kingdom. As if to underline this intention, both
Latin American nations made reservations to the Final Act
of the Conference stating that they did not recognize the
existence of Furopcnn possessions within the Security Zone
of the Treaty and that they specifically reserved their
rights and titles to the territories included in their res-
pective Antarctic claims. 26 % y thus refusing to recognize
the e x i s t e n c e of J) r i t i s h 'pos.se s s ions' in t li e An t a r c t i c
,
Argentina and Chile could claim that British activities in
the region constituted aggressive trespass as defined in
Article 9(b) of the Treaty.
The United States delegation to the conference, bended
by Secretary of State George C. Marshall, did not wish, to
see the United States called upon at some future date to
25inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, i.7i
Quitandinha, Re] - I of th n. S, D 1 tion, pp. 59-65; and
HaToTd I, Pete'rson, /• sntlna i ~< tn U ited States 181 1 -• 1 9j30
"(New York: State Un i vers ity™Press , 196TJ*) p. -it;'/.
^statements of Argentina and Chile after the Resolutions
of the Final Act of the Inter- Ameri can Conference for the
Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, in Quitand
Report of the U. S U legation, p. 56,
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take measures toward ousting the British from Antarctica
or, for that matter, from British Honduras, which had been
the subject of similar reservations by Mexico and Guatemala;
and although no nation was bound under the Rio Pact to use
armed force against an aggressor, any lesser measures to
which two- thirds of the Contracting Parties might agree were
2 7binding on all. The United States therefore made a reser-
vation to the Final Act, recording its position that the
Rio Pact had no effect upon the sovereignty or the "national
or international status" of any of the territories located
within the Security Zone.
Despite the United States reservation, both Latin Am-
erican claimants continued to maintain that, the British pres
ence in Antarctica was contrary to the terms of the Rio Pact
The Chilean Minister of Foreign Relations, German Vergara,
who had headed his country's delegation to the Conference,
formally stated this position five months later:
. . .
the Chilean Government feels that its
inte jests in the American Antarctic are securely
bound to the principles of continental security and
that: in defending them unhesitatingly they are
merely carrying out obligations which they have con
^Inter- American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in
Qui.tandinha, Report of the U. S, V ' gation, pp. 59-65,
28Statement of the United States after the Resolutions
of the Final Act of the Inter- American Conference for the
Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, in 0v ; '."n-





t r a c t e <1 in respect of these principles. 2 9
By December, 1947, tensions between the United Kingdom
and the tv;o Latin American claimants had risen considerably,
and the British Government instructed the Governor of the
Falkland Islands, Miles Clifford, to visit the British Ant-
arctic sector aboard a Royal Navy frigate, the U. M. S.
Snipe. v™ On December 17, the United Kingdom registered a
strong protest against the recent Argentine and Chilean
activities in the Antarctic and offered the two nations the
alternatives of applying for British leases for the sites
of their Antarctic bases or submitting the claims dispute
to the International Court of Justice, to whose decision
the United Kingdom would bind itself in advance. If Argen-
tina and Chile were to reject both these alternatives, the
United Kingdom stated that it would be compelled to request
that their Antarctic bases be evacuated. The United King-
dom also reserved its right to take action in the interim
to insure t h a t. its s o v e r e i g n t y w a s respect e d .
29 Chi lean Minister of Foreign Relations to British
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"Christie, Ant rcti( Problem) p. 25 8.
^British Ambassador in Buenos Aires, Sir Reginald Leeper,
to Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations and Worship, and
British Ambassador in Santiago, J. H. Leche, to Chilean
Minister of Foreign Relations, December 17, 1947, in "Recent
1) i p 1 o m a t. i c E x c h a n g e s , " pp. 229-231, 2 3 7 • ? 3 9 .
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Meanwhile, Argentina had sent a nava] task force to
establish a new base on Deception Island. This island has
the one good harbor in the region and is considered the
•gate-way' to the Palmer Peninsula. The United Kingdom res
ponded on December 2 3 with a second protest to Argentina
against what were characterized as continuing acts of tres-
3?pass on British territory.
By the beginning of 1948, the Antarctic situation ap-
peared to be leading toward serious conflict. The British
frigate Snipe arrived in the Antarctic en January 17 but
limited its action to the exchange of protests with the
commanders of the Argentine bases. On January 23 Argentina
announced that, it was sending a detachment of mountain
troops to the Antarctic.--"' Five days later, Argentina re-
plied to the British protests in a strongly-worded note.
Rejecting the alternatives offered by the United Kingdom,
Argentina stated that if it submitted the dispute to the
Internationa] Court, it could appear to be in tiie position
of requesting something which it possessed de j ure but not
de facto. Argentina refused to place itself in such a posi-
tion, claiming that its permanent Antarctic stations proved
^British Ambassador in Buenos Aires to Argentine Minis
ter of foreign Relations and Worship, December 23, 1947,
in "Recent Diplomatic Exchanges," pp. 232-233.
3 3 Chris tie, Antarctic. I . , pp. 2 5 8-25 9, 2 74.

128
that its sovereignty was being exercised effectively. 34
Enclosed with the Argon note was a copy of a joint dec-
laration on the Antarctic, signed six months earlier by the
two Latin American claimants, which stated that Argentina
and Chile were convinced of their rights in the Antarctic
and intended to conclude a treaty regarding the boundaries
of their respective Antarctic claims. 35 Argentina now in-
voked this declaration as further justification for its
refusal to submit the dispute to the International Court:
Argentina has always honoured her word. It
would be a breach of this practice if she were now
to apply on her own to the international court to
present her request for sovereignty over the Antarc-
tic . 3 6
Chile similarly rejected the British proposals on Jan-
uary 31. 3 ' Two weeks later, a major portion of the Argen-
tine Navy was sent to Antarctic waters for ' manue vers ; ' and









34 Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations and Worship,
n A. Bramuglia, to British Ambassador in Buenos Aires,
uary 28, 1948, in "Recent Diplomatic Exchanges," pp. 233-
«
3 -' Joint Declaration of Argentina and Chile on the Ant-
tic, Buenos Aires, July 1.2, 1947, in Naval IV ar College,
unrents , J 9 I 8 '.?
, pp . 2 26-2 2 7.
36 Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations and Worship to
tish Ambassador in Buenos Aires, January 28, 1948, in
cent Diplomatic Exchanges," p. 2 36.
3 7 Ch i ] e a n M i n i s t e r o f F o r e i g n R e 1 a t i on s , German V e r g a r a
,
British Ambassador in Santiago, January 31, 1948, in
d
.
, p . 2 4 0.
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warship, the cruiser Nigeria, to join the frigate a] reedy
there. There was fortunately no armed confrontation; the
British warships arrived off Deception Island after the Ar-
gentine force had left the region, and British action was
3 P
again limited to a round of local protests," This marked
the peak of the crisis, and no serious diplomatic or mili-
tary incidents occurred during the remainder of the year.
Argentina and Chile continued, however, to apply pressure
to the United Kingdom through the In ter- American System,
in their attempt to obtain the support of other nations of
the Western Hemisphere for their Antarctic claims.
The Ninth International Conference of American States
was scheduled to open in Bogota, Colombia, on March 30, 1948,
and one of the items on its agenda was the question of Eu-
ropean colonies in the Western Hemisphere. The colonial
issue could be counted upon to arouse emotions in Latin Am-
erica, and Argentina and Chile intended to make full use of
this issue in th eir dispute with the United Kingdom over
39Antarctica/ In order to facilitate a common front against
the United Kingdom at Bogota, Argentina sent a special am-
bassador, Pascual La Rosa, to Santiago to discuss the Ant-
38 r .Christie, Antarctic Problem, pp. 2 60, 2 74.
Olive Holmes, "Antarctic Claims Raise Colonial Issue
in Americas," Foreign Policy Bulletin, Vol. 27 (Septem-
ber 3 , 19-18), p . 2 ,
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arctic situation with Chilean Foreign Minister German Ver-
gara. As a result of these discussions, Argentina and
Chile signed a second joint declaration on the Antarctic,
which stated that the two nations would act together in the
protection of their rights in the "South American Antarctic'." 4 *
There was an obvious inconsistency between the intended
use of the colonial issue at Bogota r.nd the reservations
that Argentina and Chile had made at the Rio Conference re-
garding the non-recognition of the existence of European
possessions in the Western Hemisphere. This inconsistency
apparently went unnoticed, however, and the tv:o nations were
able to gain significant support within the Americas, aided
by the present or past disputes of other Latin American na-
tions with the United Kingdom over questions of territorial
sovereignty, Guatemala, for example, called upon the United
States to assist Latin American nations in such disputes,
including that over Antarctica, and stated that the failure
of the United States to do so quickly would result in the
"bankruptcy" of the Inter- American System, 42
On the first day of the Bogota Conference, the itei s
- AQjiinoch-ei-, -Chi Lean _Sqs ' ')', p« 57,
Joint Declaration of Argentina and Chile on the Ant'
arctic, March 4, 1948, in Naval War College, Documents,
1948-49
, p. 2.2 7.
42 "Guatemala Bids U. S. Act in Belize Case,' The Ne
Y o r k '1' i 1 1 e s
,




on, the a g c n d a w e r c a p p o r t i o n e d an o n g s :i x w o r k i n g c o m ni i 1 1 e s ;
and various political and juridical issues, which included
the colonial question, were assigned to the Sixth Committee.
In this committee, Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala promoted
a resolution calling for the complete elimination of all
European colonies in the Western Hemisphere . 44 The United
States thus found itself in a rather awkward position be-
tween its Latin American and European allies. The United
States, moreover, was a colonial power itself and did not
wish to risk compromising its interests in its own dependen-
cies. The United States delegation to the Conference, again
headed by Secretary Marshall, therefore opposed the anti-
colonial resolution and was successful in obtaining the pas-
sage of a version which called merely for the establishment
of an 'American Committee on Dependent Territories' to con-
sider the problem at a later date. Even on this milder res-
olution, the United States abstained from voting. 45
The conflict over Antarctica had placed the United States
in a position where it could become forced to choose between
its desire to cement relations with I, at in America on the
one hand and, on the other, that of supporting its allies
Gordon Connell-Smith , The Inter ' : Sy I (Lon-
don: Oxford University Press'," ' )
, pp . U L 97
.
^Harold F. Peterson, A tina and the United tes
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in Europe. Even if the United States could remain neutral
in the Antarctic claims dispute, it still feared that the
attention of both sides could become diverted from what it
considered to be the major issue of solidarity in the face
of the Cold War, Fur t lie rmore
,
the dispute had increased
in seriousness over the preceding two Antarctic operating
seasons and could easily develop into armed conflict in
seasons to come.
It was thus becoming increasingly evident t h a t the
United States policy of countering the pressures of foreign
claims by attempting to strengthen the bases of its own
claims would lead neither toward a stable political situa»
tion in the Antarctic nor toward an atmosphere facilitatinp
the scientific research that had proved to be of such great
value. At the height of the Anglo- Argent ine« Chi lean con-
frontation, therefore, the United States began to re-evaluate
its goals and policies regarding Antarctica, and the Depart-
ments of State and Defense commenced studies on Antarctica
in relation to three, possible policy alternatives. These
alternatives were (1) to formally assert a territorial
claim or claims and seek judicial settlement of disputes,
(2) to attempt to establish a_cqnd.pminium administered
jointly by the nations with direct interests in the An tare
-
Walter G, Sullivan, "Antarctica in a Two- Power World,"
Forei gn Affairs, Vol. 36 (October, 1957), p. 160.
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tic, or (3) to promote international control on a brood
basis, possibly under the United Nations/
Kith regard to the assertion of formal claims, the United
States was faced with the same problem that had existed in
the past: its bases for claims were the strongest in the
least desirable region of the continent. Moreover, the Am-
erican position in the potentially- valuable Palmer Peninsula
region appeared to have weakened in the past five years,
during which period the three claimants had established a
total of nine stations in the region while the only Ameri-
can activity had been the occupation of Stonington Island
for eleven months by the unofficial Ronne Expedition.
Finally, a formal United States claim offered no solution
to the current Antarctic conflict, inasmuch as Argentina
an d Chile h a d made i. t porfec 1 1 y c 1 e a r in their c o r r e s p o n -
dence with the United Kingdom that they would not submit
their claims to judicial determination.
The actual results of the studies conducted within the
United States Government are unavailable at this time (1969).
The United Stales concluded, however, that scientific re-
search constituted the most significant American interest
^
'John Manes si an, Jr., The No n claiman t Nations (Part: 3,
National Activities and Ints 3 parts,
New York: American Uni .; ; Field Staff, 1962), p. 16,
A a Christie, Antarctic Problem, p. 26],
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in Antarctica and that this interest, could best be served
by the establishment of some type of international regime.
Such a regime could offer the advantages of enabling scien-
tists to operate freely in all areas of the Antarctic and,
at the sane time, could provide a peaceful solution to the
Anglo- Argentine- Chile an claims dispute without the United
States being forced to abandon its neutrality in the matter.
As a result of tlie.se conclusions, the United States commenced
informal discussions in the summer of 1948 with the seven
An t a r c t i c c 1 a i m an t s , in hopes of ob t a i n i n g a free m e n t to a
conference leading toward "some form of internationalization"
of the An t a r c t i c . '
The American proposals had particular appeal to the
United K i n g d o m , whose An t a r c t i c p o 1 i c y h a d un d e r g one c h a n g e
s
as a result of the claims dispute. The United Kingdom had
shown no interest in creating international arrangements
for the Antarctic in the past, but now, with the adamant
positions of Argentina and Chile and the corresponding un-
willingness of these two nations to accept a judicial solu-
tion, the only other alternatives open to the United King-
d o m w ere ( 1 ) to co n t i n u e in the present si t u a t i o n , risking
increased friction and possible damage to its commercial
^^"Discussions Asked on Territorial Problem of Antarc






interests in Latin America, or (2) to negotiate the liquida-
tion of its territorial claims in favor of the Latin Ameri-
can claimants.* Accordingly, the United Kingdom indicated
its willingness to accept the American proposals in princi-
ple. Observers reported from London, however, that the
British, sensitive to Josses of other colonial holdings and
to recent affronts to its sovereignty by smaller nations,
would probably stud}' the American proposals very carefully
before making any final commitments. ^
Besides the United Kingdom, only New Zealand demonstrated
any interest in the American proposals, which were rejected
flatly by Chile; and, as had occurred eight years before
in regard to President Roosevelt's ideas toward int. er- Ameri-
canizing the 'American sector, 1 the United States ceased
its efforts toward implementing the proposals. In both
cases, the r e c i p i en t s of t h e p r o p o s a 1 s were or s o o n w o u 1
d
be partners of the United States in defense alliances which
it had no wish to jeopardize over the Antarctic question;
and in both cases, the United State's was unwilling to apply
^"Robert V. Hayton, "The 'American' Antarctic," Ameri
can Jo urn a 3 of In t e rn a. t i.on a 1 Law , Vol. 5 (July, 19 5 67"]
p. 6 9.'
51,1 Antarctic Accord Pressed by U. S.," The New Yorl
Times, August 28, 1948, p. 12.
52,. U. S. Proposes Joint Rule to End Antarctic Disputes,"








further pressure to the claimants once their firm opposi-
tion to, or lock of interest, in, the internationalization
of Antarctica had been registered. On their parts, the
claimants appeared to comprehend the dilemma of the United
States and take it into consideration in the formulation
of their ov/rt Antarctic policies.
With the failure of the United States to effect an in-
ternational agreement concerning sovereignty in the Antarc-
tic, the United Kingdom commenced discussions with the two
Latin American claimants. The British hoped that the three
nations could reach agreement among themselves, if not on
a solution to the basic conflict, at least upon measures
reducing the risk of incidents that could lead to a further
deterioration of relations and perhaps to the use of force,
As a result of these discussi o n s
,
the: t h r e e nations a g reed
not to send warships south of latitude 60° South d \\r i n g the
Antarctic summer of 1948-1949 except for routine operations
5 4
such as had been customary for a number of years. The
United States had been kept informed of the progress of the
discussions and announced that it did not contemplate send-
ing any vessels into the re pi on during the period in ques-
•*^Statement of the British Foreign Office, January 18,
19-19, in "Territorial Claims in the Antarctic," The Pol a
Reco rd, Vol. 5 (January-July, 1949), p. 361.
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55tion. a The agreement was extended by the three claimants
annually up to the International Geophysical Year.
In the preceding Antarctic summer, the United States
had. mounted a small expedition. As a result of the successes
of the icebreaker No-' : ; Lnd during Operation Highjump, the
Navy developed the idea of pairing helicopters with ice-
breakers in order to survey and photograph coastal areas
w h i c h ha d p r e v i o u sly been inaccessible. The e x p e d i t i o n w a
s
named Operation Windmill and carried out the 'Second Antarc-
tic Developments Project (1947-1948) . ' It involved two ice-
breakers, organized as T a s k Force 39 u n d e r t h e c o m m a n d o f
Commander Gerald Ketchum, United States Navy. " Admiral
Byrd then attempted to obtain official approval for another
expedition to continue the mapping work of Operations High-
j ump and Windmill. He believed that with recent improve-
ments in techniques and equipment, it should now be possible
to complete the mapping of the entire continent. Since
two-thirds of Antarctica still remained unseen and unexplored
such a feat could enable the United States to assert a claim
to virtually the entire continent."
^Statement of the United States State Department, Jan-
uary IS, 1949, in "Territorial Claims," p. 361.
S^Sullivan, Quest, p. 2A9.
57 Paul Siple, 90° South (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,
c . 19 5 9 ) , p , 81.
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The Navy approved Byrd's proposals, and the expedition,
Operation High jump II, was planned for the 1949-1950 season.
On August 2, 1949, the Navy released details of the expedi-
tion to the Press, stating that 8 vessels and 3,5 00 men
r o
would be involved. Two weeks Inter, however, Assistant
Secretary of the Navy Dan A. Kimball announced that the
forthcoming expedition had been cancelled due to reasons of
economy. *>9 ^o further explanations were offered by the Navy
Department, and all Navy press officers were instructed not
to discuss the matter beyond the statement of Assistant Sec-
6
retary Kimball. There were rumors, however, that a fac-
tor other than simple reasons of economy was involved in
the cancellation. Senator Harry P. Byrd of Virginia, the
brother of Admiral Byrd, had apparently angered President
Truman by insisting upon economy in the government; and the
President, unable to retaliate directly against the Senator,
allegedly obtained his revenge by cancelling the expedition
which was to be headed by the letter's brother. 61
Thus, as had occurred in 1941, the United States abrupt'
58,
'Admiral Byrd Plans an Expedition of 3,500 Men to
Antarctica for Navy," The New York Times
, August 3, 1949,
p. 1
.
^""Antarctic Expedition Is Deferred, by Navy," The New
York Times
,
August 17, 1949, p. l c
60
I b i d t
, p , 1 .
61c.,.,.See, for example, Siple, 9 South, p. 81.
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ly ceased operations in Antarctica for what were primarily
reasons of economy and internal politics. This disengage-
ment, however, v;as destined to be short-lived. Right months
after the cancellation of Operation Highjump II, the United
States again became urgently concerned with its Antarctic
position. This renewal of concern was due to a claim to
rights and interests in the Antarctic made by the Soviet
Union
.
As previously stated, the Russian navigator, Captain
Fabian von Bellingshausen, circumnavigated the Antarctic
Continent during his expedition of 1819-1821 and may have
been the first to sight the mainland. This had been the
only Russian activity in the Antarctic up to 1949, with the
exception of whaling and oceanographic operations conducted
in sub- Antarct j c waters after World War II. The United
States therefore did not believe that the Soviet Union had
significant interests in the Antarctic and did not invite
the Soviet Government to participate in the discussions of
1948.
In response to the Soviet omission from the discussions,
the President of the All -Soviet Geographic Society, L. S.
& er £» prepared a paper entitled "Russian Discoveries in the
Antarctic and Present-day Interest in that Area," which he
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presented at a meeting of the Society in February, 1949,62
After discussing the matter, the Society resolved that the
activities of early Russian explorers had established the
"indisputable right of the Soviet Union to participate in
the solution of problems of the Antarctic."^ j n regard to
the character of the discussions initiated by the United
States in 19^8, the resolution continued:
The problems of the Antarctic must be solved
primarily by those states that have the historical
right to participate in this solution. However,
according to reports in the foreign press, certain
states are attempting to secure a solution of pro-
blems of the Antarctic without the participation of
the Soviet Union, The Geographic Society of the
U. S« S, R. cannot but register a most decisive pro-
test against t h i s , 6 4
Sixteen months later, the Soviet Union sent a memoran-
dum stating the Soviet position on the Antarctic to all the
nations which had been involved in the discussions--with
the exception of Chile, whose diplomatic relations with the
Soviet Union had been broken in 1948. In reference to the
discussions of 1948, the Soviet Union stated that it could
not agree to "such a question as that of the Antarctic being
2 Petcr A, Toma, "Soviet Attitude towards the Acquisi-
tion of Territorial Sovereignty in the Antarctic," American
Journal of International Lav;, Vol. SO (July, 1956) ,' p . (-' .
63p,eso i u -[;ion of the All-Soviet Geographic Society, Feb-
ruary 10, 1949, in J hi d .
,
p. 626.
6 4 I b i d
, , p . 6 2 6.
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settled without its participation .""^ The Soviet memorai
dum then enumerated the alleged bases of Soviet rights and
interests in the Antarctic and concluded with an expression
of Soviet willingness to consider proposals on the matter
of sovereignty over Antarctic territory.
With this manifestation of interest in the Antarctic
on the part of the Soviet Union, coupled with the recent
failure of the proposals for international arrangements,
the United States again decided to conduct studies on its
claims position. Since the mass of data on previous Ameri-
can operations in the Antarctic still had not been compiled
or even examined officially, the Department of State was
again faced with the lack of easily available information
on the matter. To correct this deficiency, work was begun
on an official history of American activities in the Ant-
arctic. At the same time, interdepartmental committees
were formed to consider future Antarctic programs, includ-
ing an expedition to conduct the mapping operations that
had been planned for Operation Highjump II.
Before the United States could take any further action.
relative to its position in the Antarctic, however, exter-
nal developments again affected the nature of policy. By
^Soviet Memorandum on the Question of the Regime of
the Antarctic, June 7, 19S0, in Toma, "Soviet Attitude,"
p. 624.
66 Siple, 90 c South., p. 88.
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1950, many scientists of various nationalities had arrived
at tho opinion that further progress in the geophysical
sciences was being impeded by a lack of world-wide, coordin-
ated effort. This led to a plan to conduct an Internation-
al Geophysical Year from July 1, 1957, to December 31, 1958,
during which time concerted, multinational scientific stud-
ies would be made of the earth and its surrounding environ-
ment. The International Geophysical Year became the most
extensive international scientific undertaking in the his-
tory of mankind, involving some 4,000 scientific stations
and 30,000 scientists and technicians representing 67 na-
tions of every shade of the political spectrum,"'
67
l.
T alter G. Sullivan, "The International Geophysical
Year," J_nte rnajt ionaj Conci 1 i ; on, No. 521 (January, 1959),
p. 2 95.

THE INTERNATIONAL GEOPHYSICAL YEAR
Although political rivalries had frustrated the devel-
opment of lasting international arrangements in the Antarc-
tic, there had been several joint scientific efforts in
the region prior to 1950. In 1874, scientists from the
United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France vis-
ited Kerguelen Island to observe the transit of the planet.
Venus across the sun. Eight years later, the United States
and eleven other nations joined in the First International
Polar Year to conduct research in meteorology, magnetism,
astronomy, and the auroras. Although the primary focus of
the Year's activities was the Arctic, research stations
were established on Cape Horn and South Georgia by France
and Germany respectively.
Tli e first official multinational effort on the conti-
nent itself took place in 1929 with the British-Australian-
New Zealand Antarctic Research Expedition. The results of
this two-year program clearly demonstrated the value of
^U. S., Department of State, United Stntes Policy and
JjlS 'tXJl? t-L? p r: 1 C£o_p erati on i n An t a r c j :< c \ ( V,' a shi ng t on : i i t r- d
States Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 2.
2 International Council of Scientific Unions, Comite
Special de l'Annee Geophysique Internationale (CSAGI),
—AfHia l s -of the 1 n t
e
rnat ional Geophysica 1 Y e a r ( 1 GY ) (45 vols.
to 19 6 9~] i n d e te riin a t e n c> ." of v o 1 sT~ ' i- n p rbee's s , London:




international cooperation in Antarctic science. In 1932
the Second International Polar Year was inaugurated, and
scientists from 44 nations participated in programs of polar
research «. United States participation was again confined
to the Arctic regions. During the years from 1945 to 1950,
ten nations sent scientific expeditions to the Antarctic,
one of these expeditions being the combined Norwegian-Swed-
ish-British Expedition of 1945, ° Moreover, there had been
a long history of cooperation among separate national ex-
peditions in the field* Recent examples of such cooperation
were the joint programs conducted by the Ronne and British
Expeditions on Stonington Island and the provision by the
United States Government to a French expedition in 194 9 of
aerial photographs of Adelie Land obtained on Operation
High j ump «
The International Geophysical Year (IGY) was born at
an informal dinner at the home of an eminent geophysi cist
,
Dr. James A. Van Allen, in Silver Springs, Maryland, on
April 5, 1950. In a discussion among the several scientists
^John Hanessian, Jr., International Scientific Coopera
tion in the Antarctic (New V; : k ; American Universit i
V 3 - '} d Staff7" J 96 2 j , p . 1
.
4 CSAGI, IGY Annals
,
Vol. 1, p. 218.
^Hanessian, Sci. cntifie Cooperation, p. 1,
6 W alter G . S u 1 1 i v an, Q u e s t for a C o i 1 i n c nt ( N e w Y o r k :
McGraw-Hill, c. 1957), p. 287.
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present, Dr. Lloyd V, Berkner, head of the Section on Ex-
ploratory Geophysics of the Atmosphere in the Department
of Terrestrial Magnetism of the Carnegie Institution, pro-
posed that a Third Polar Year be held during 1957 and 1958.
Dr. Berkner maintained that recent advances in scientific
instrumentation, coupled with the need for concerted, multi-
national geophysical observations, made such a program high-
ly desirable at that time, which would fall exactly 25
years after the last Polar Year, In addition, the years
195 7 and 195 8 would correspond with a maximum level of solar
activity, This would enable useful comparisons to be made
with the data obtained 25 years earlier, when such activity
1had been at a minimum.
1 1 w as decided b y those p r e s c n t at the dinner that
Dr. Berkner should present his proposals at the next meet-
ing of the Mixed Commission on the Ionosphere, which he was
to attend in Brussels in July, Such mixed commissions are
formed by the International Co unci) of Scientific Unions
(ICSU) to bring members of its various affiliated unions
together on research problems v.'hich overlap their respective
areas of competence. This particular mixed commission had
been composed of members of the International Scientific
Radio Union, the International Astronomical Union, and the




Internationa] Union for Geodesy and Geophysics. The IGSU
itself is a non-governmental body, composed at that time
of 13 international scientific unions, with the participa-
tion of 45 National Science Academies and equivalent organi-
zations.
At Brussels, the Mixed Commission on the Ionosphere
supported the proposal for a Third Polar Year and adopted
the following resolution:
That the third International Polar Year be
nominated for 1957-1958 and that, in view of the
length of time necessary for adequate organization
of the complex physical equipment now potentially
available, an International Polar Year Commission
be appointed in 1951 to supervise planning,"
The above resolution was approved by the Executive
Board of the ICSU at its meeting in Washington in Gctober,
1951. To initiate planning for the Polar Year, the ICSU
decided to form a special committee, composed of members
of interested scientific unions. Colonel E. Herbrays of
Belgium, appointed Convenor of this committee on May 16, 1952,
sent notes to each of the member academies, inviting them
to affiliate with the Polar Year and requesting that they
form national committees to plan their respective scienti-








10fie programs. The Soviet Academy of Sciences was not a
member of ICSU, but the ICSU believed that the success of
the endeavor would be affected to a great degree by the
ability to obtain data from the large expanse of Soviet
territory. The Soviet Academy was accordingly sent a sep-
arate invitation. ^
The World Meteorological Organization, which is also
not a member of ICSU but whose work lw;s obvious relevance
to polar operations, was also invited to participate in the
initial planning. This organization believed, along with
others, that the need for world-wide geophysical observa-
tions was such as to warrant the expansion of the program
to include research in other than the polar regions. This
idea was approved by the ICSU General Assembly in early
October, 1952, and the name of the project was changed to
the International Geophysical Year. The special committee
which had been formed to plan the Polar Year was officially




IGY Annals, Vol. 1, pp. 383-384.
13
I bid., V o 1 . 1 , p . 3 8 4
12 Ibid. , Vol, 1, pp. 384-385.
N0TE--The name of this committee in Trench, rather
than 'Special Committee for the International Geophysical




The United States member of ICSU, the National Academy
of Sciences, accepted the invitation of the parent body and
formed the United States National Committee for the IGY
(USNOIGY) of eminent scientific personnel from government,
the universities, and private industry. Under the direction
of Dr. Joseph Kaplan of the California Institute of Technol-
ogy, the USNC-IGY began to plan the specific United States
1 3IGY p r o g r a m s .
'
The first meeting of the Comite Special do l'Annee
Geophysique Internationale was held in Brussels from June 30
to July 3, 1953, The representatives agreed upon provision-
al recomnendations regarding the nature of IGY research in
various fields and established Hay, 1954, as the deadline
for the submission of specific national programs. By this
time 21 nations, in addition to the United States, had
formed IGY committees. No response had been received from
the Soviet Union, however, and CSAGI invited its represen-
tatives from the World Meteorological Organization and the
International Astronomical Union, to which the Soviets did
belong, to urge the Soviet Union to affiliate with the IGY
and attempt to induce other Communist nations to do so. 14
13(j t s., Congress, House of Representatives, Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, International Geophysi-
c al Ye ar, The Arctic and Ai rctica, 85th Cong., 2n< ! ss.,
i ise R pt, Ni 1348, Serial No. 12072 (Washington: United
States Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 11,
14 CSAGI, IGY Annals, Vol. 2, pp. 1-2.
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The United States National Committee for the IGY de-
cided to concentrate its efforts in 13 fields of geophysics:
aurora, airglow, cosmic, rays, geomagnetism, glaciology,
gravity, the ionosphere, longitude and latitude determina-
tions, meteorology, oceanography, seismology, solar activity,
and rocket and satellite studies of the upper atmosphere * **>
Subcommittees were established to plan the programs for
each discipline and estimate their costs. In addition,
three ad hoc committees were formed to consider the programs
on a geographic, basis for the Arctic, the tropics, and the
Antarctic. The latter committee was established in Novem-
ber, 1953, under the chairmanship of Dr. Laurence M. Gould
of Carleton College, and denominated the USNC-IGY Antarctic
Committee, It had the responsibility of examining the pro-
grams in the geophysical disciplines and relating them to
an overall Antarctic program. '
In early 1954, the National Security Council recommended
to President Eisenhower that the United States make a major
commitment to the IGY. The recommendation was approved,
and the National Science Foundation was assigned the task
of representing the requirements for funds and equipment
15 House Commerce Committee, IGY, p. 12,
16 Paul Siple, 90° South (New York: G. P, Putnam's Sons,
c . 19 5 9), p , 93,
17 House Commerce Committee, IGY, p , 16,
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before the legislative and executive brandies of the govern-
ment. 18 By March, 1954, the USNC-IGY had outlined its IGY
program, which had been based on the suggestions of hundreds
of scientists from various institutions throughout the coun-
try. 19 On June 7, President Eisenhower submitted a request
to Congress for an appropriation of $2.5 million to be made
to the National Science Foundation for United States parti-
cipation in the IGY, Two weeks later, the President sent
a letter to Dr. Chester I. Barnard, the Chairman of the
Foundation's National Science Board, stating:
I am glad to support this undertaking. It is
a striking example of the opportunities which exist
for cooperative action among the peoples of the
world.
. . ,
I am sure that our participation in this far-
reaching effort will very materially strengthen our
bonds with the many cooperating nations and make a
constructive contribution toward the solution of
mutual problems. 20
On August 25, Congress passed the Supplemental Appro-
priations Act of 1955, which included a reduced appropria-
tion of $2 million for United States participation in the
*°Walter G. Sullivan, "The International Geophysical
Year," International Conciliation, No. 5 2.1 (January, 1959),
p. 2 72.
19 Ibid., p . 272
^President to Chairman of National Science Board,
June 25, 1954, in Publi< I' of the Pj i ' rats of the








„ 21IGY, In 19SS and 1956, Congress passed additional appro-
priations for IGY activities of $10 million and $2 7 million
2 2
respectively, " but these funds were used primarily in the
earth satellite program. The National Science Foundation,
in cooperation with the USNC-IGY, utilized these three ap-
propriations to grant contracts for scientific research to
universities and private institutions and to finance the
IGY programs conducted by governmental agencies.
By September, 1954, when the Second CSAGI Conference
opened in Rome, the number of nations which had formed IGY
committees had increased to 35, still not including the
Soviet Union, On the first clay of the Conference, however,
the Soviet Embassy in Rome informed the delegates that the
Soviet Academy of Sciences had accepted the i n v i t a t i o n to
participate in the IGY and had formed a national IGY com-
mittee. The Soviet Embassy further stated that the delega-
tion of Soviet scientists which had observed the General
Assembly of the International Union for Geodesy and Geophy-
sics in Rome earlier that month had been appointed to at-
tend the conference of CSAGI.*-
2 1 U , S
.
, Statutes at Large , Vol. 6 8 (19 5 5), p . 818.
22 U. S., Statutes at Large, Vol, 69 (1955), p. 208.
" I n d e p e n d e n t Ol: f i c e s Ap , opr'i a t i o n A ct of 19 5 6 ; " and U . S .
,
Statutes at Large , Vol"/ 7 (195 7), p. 16 7. "Second Supple-
mental Appropriation Act of 195 6,"
23CSAGI, ICY Annals, Vol. 1, pp. 592.393.
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It is to be noted that the National Academies of Sci-
ence involved in planning IGY programs had varying degrees
of affiliation with their respective governments. Activi-
ties, such as the IGY, conducted under the auspices of the
International Council of Scientific Unions, however, are
supposed to remain on a non-political basis. From the ear-
liest stages of planning, therefore, the ICSU attempted to
keep the IGY as free as possible from all political influ-
ences. To this end, CSAGI membership was limited to repre-
sentatives of scientific unions; and although members of
national IGY committees attended CSAGI conferences and par-
ticipated in the discussions, their status was that of ob-
servers. In addition, particular IGY programs might be
supported by governments, but they were supposed to be de-
signed by scientists. Even though such formal attempts to
separate science from politics may have little relevance
in actuality, CSAGI was successful in this vc^:ivO. to a re-
markable degree- - especi a 1 1 y considering the significant
roles that governmental organs played in the specific sci-
entific p r o j e c t s « •
The first open test of the non-political character of
the IGY occurred at the Rome Conference, when the chairman
of the Soviet delegation, Pr, V. V. Beloussov, proposed that
representatives of large nations, such as China, India, and
the Soviet Union itself, be appointed to the Comite Special
d e 1 ' An nee Geo p h y s i q u e I n t e r n a t i o n a 1 ? . Th e Pre
s
id? n t o f

15 3
CSAG1, Dr. Sydney Chapman of the United Kingdom, replied
to the Soviet proposal with a firm reiteration of the basic
principle that CSAGI members were selected on functional
bases and represented international scientific bodies rather
than their respective nations. Dr. Chapman expressed the
hope that Soviet nationals would participate in the work of
CSAGI, but on behalf of one or more of the scientific unions
to which they belonged. Two Soviet representatives were
eventually included as delegates from the International
Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, which the Soviets joined
in 1955.
The Rome Conference established the basic philosophy
behind the research conducted during the IGY, National
programs were to be selected "with a view to solving speci-
fic planetary problems of the earth. "25 The various nation-
al committees were to place especial emphasis on that type
of research which demanded the collection of data simulta-
neously throughout the world and which could be of assistance
in understanding long-range geophysical trends. Six areas
of the world were selected to receive particular emphasis
during the IGY: the Arctic, Antarctic and equatorial re-
gions, end three pole-to-pole meridians. The Conference
24 CSAGI, IGY Annals, Vol. 2, p. 85.
25 Ibid.
,
Vol. 2, p. 85.
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believed that Antarctica, b xause of its unique position
and its physical characteristics,' represented a region of
extreme interest to the geophysical sciences; and the Comite
Special de l'Annse Geophysique Internationale therefore re-
solved that "as many nations as possible undertake geophysi-
cal observations in Antarctica during the International.
Geophysical Year. ,z- U CSAGI appointed an Adjoint Secretory
for Antarctica, and the planning and coordination of IGY
Antarctic programs were conducted from this point at special
Antarctic conferences.
Up to this time, the USNC-IGY Antarctic Committee had
been considering the establishment of only one Antarctic
station— at Little America where maximum advantage could be
taken from previous knowledge rr.d experience. In fact, the
Committee believed that it could consider itself fortunate
if it were able to obtain governmental support for this
effort alone. The Antarctic planning committees that had
been formed by the United States in 195 were still in op-
eration, however, and those groups came to the conclusion
that the establishment of a number of American IGY stations
in Antarctica could further their own aims of mapping the
Continent in preparation for the possible assertion of ter-
ritorial claims. The Defense Department supported this
m a pp i n g prog r a m and also f a v o r e d a m a x i.ra u m n u m b e r o f A n t a r c -
2&CSAGI, IGY Annals, Vol. 2, p. 172,
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tic stations. The United States National Committee for the
ICY therefore found the Defense Department to be much more
willing to offer its assistance in the establishment of the
stations than had been anticipated. The scientists accord-
ingly found their "appetites whetted" and requests for ad-
2 7diti onal Antarctic stations came pouring in.
While the Second CSAG1 Conference was still in session
in Rome, the United States formally announced its intention
to participate in IGY activities in Antarctica and s to ted
that it would dispatch a small expedition aboard an ice-
breaker, the U. S. S. Atka, to determine the suitability of
sites for Antarctic stations and to survey the conditions
for their logistic support. Three American stations were
projected at this tine: one at the South Pole, one at
Little America, and one to be located in the interior of
Marie Byrd band in the unclaimed sector. The Atka was also
instructed to examine an alternate site on the coast of the
IV e d d e 1 1 Sea. 28
Although the United States Government respected the
fton-political character of the IGY in the main, its politi-
cal interest in the Antarctic was such that it could not
give the scientists an entirely free hand. On approving
2 7siple, 90° South, pp. 95-97.
28
"U. S t to Send Party to the Antarctic," The New Yo
j
Jimes, October 5, 1954, pp. 1, 26,
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Americaj) participation in IGY Antarctic programs, President
Eisenhower designated the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB)
of the National Security Council as the agency with the res-
ponsibility for overseeing and coordinating broad United
States plans and policies for the region. For assistance
in this task, the OCB created an 'Antarctic Working Group'
composed of representatives of the government agencies with
29interests in Antarctic matters,
Within the United States, only the Department of Defense
commanded the equipment, personnel, and experience necessary
to establish bases in the Antarctic and provide them w ith
continuing logistic assistance, Accordingly, the President
appointed the Secretary of Defense "executive agent for
logistic support, "• The direct responsibility was assigned,
in turn, to the Department of the Navy. Coordination of
the roles of the Navy and the USNC-IGY in Antarctic programs
was effected through an Antarctic Office established by
the National Ac a d e m y of Sciences, This office also a c t c
d
as liaison with the Polar Operations Group of the United
States Weather Bureau and assisted in the coordination of
United States Antarctic activities with those of other
2"llenry M. Dater, "Organizational Developments in the
United St a t e s An t a r c t i c Program, 1954-1965. " . i
c
J ourn a 3 of the United St; ' . Vol, 3 ( January-Feb~ruary
,
T9 6 0)
', p. 2 3.




To fulfill its Antarctic responsibilities, the Navy
organized a logistic support force under Rear Admiral
George J. Dufek, who had served v:ith both the United States
Antarctic Service and Operation Highjump. The Navy then
commenced field operations with the dispatch of the ice-
breaker Atka, On February 1, 1955, the Navy gave formal
existence to Dufek' s group as the United States Naval Sup-
port Force, Antarctica, which was organized as part of the
Atlantic Fleet as Task Force 43.32
During the period of planning for the 1GY, political
rivalries over the Antarctic had not. remained quiescent.
In 1952 and 1953, tensions between the United Kingdom and
the two Latin American claimants had risen to the point
where armed force had been utilized by both sides. A Brit-
ish expedition aboard the vessel, John Biscoe t arrived in
Hope Bay off the Palmer Peninsula's Trinity Peninsula on
January 30, 1952, to rebuild a weather station which had
been destroyed by fire three years before. Earlier that
season, an Argentine expedition arrived at Hope Bay and
was encamped a few hundred yards from the site of the for-
mer British base.
31-House Commerce Committee, 1GY, p. 16,
S^Dater, "Organizational Developments," p. 21; and





On the morning of February 1, the British began to
unload supplies from the J ohn Bi scoe and were informed by
the naval lieutenant in charge of the Argentine base that
he had been instructed to prevent them, by force if neces-
sary, from establishing a British base at that location,
Ignoring the threat, the British were met at noon by bursts
of machine-gun fire over their heads and a group of Argen-
tine riflemen moving in to surround them. Two hours later,
the unarmed British were forced into an Argentine launch
and returned to the John Biscoe at gunpoint. The captain
of the John Biscoe was then informed by the Argentine base
leader that the machine-gun fire had been accidental but
that any further attempts to unload supplies would be f i : d
33
upon . °
Immediately after details of the incident had reached
Buenos Aires, consultations were held between the Argentine
Foreign Minister and, in the temporary absence of the Brit-
ish Ambassador, the Minister of the British Embassy. Ar-
gentina took the position that t h e base leader had exceeded
his instructions but was responsible only for "an excess
of zeal in the defense of the national territory of the
^British Minister in Buenos Aires, Richard Allen, to
Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations and Worship,
Jeronimo Remorino, February 3, 1952, in "Antarctic Claims-
Diplomatic Exchanges between Great Britain, Argentina and







Republic,' Neither nation desired a war over the Antarc-
tic, however, and both decided to treat the incident as
'unfortunate, ' The Argentine expedition was instructed
"to avoid, as far as possible, any action which might pre-
judice the framework of peace and friendship in which Anglo-
Argentine relations have always been conducted,"*^ and the
British expedition aboard the John Biscoe proceeded with
its mission without further hindrance.
The United Kingdom sent a formal note of protest against
the actions of the Argentine party at Hope Bay to Argentina
on February 3. Both this note and the Argentine reply
of February 27^' were less harshly worded than past corre-
spondence over less serious incidents, as if both nations
had been shocked by the occurrence of violence. The initial
shock over the Hope Bay incident apparently had little last-
ing effect, however, for force was again used in the Ant-
arctic the following year.
3 4 A r g e n t i n e M i n i s t e r of F o r s i g n R e 1 a t i o n s a n d W o r ship
to British Ambassador in Buenos Aires, Henry B. Mack, Feb-
ruary 27, 1952, in "Diplomatic Exchanges in 1952 and 1953,"
p . 215.
35 Ibid., p. 215.
^British Minister in Buenos Aires to Argentine Minis-
ter of Foreign Relations and Worship, February 3, 1952, in
"Diplomatic Exchanges in 1952 and 1953," pp. 213-214.
•^Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations and Worship
to British Ambassador in Buenos Aires, February 27, 1952,
in Ibid., pp, 214-215.

160
During the 1952-1953 season, both Argentina and Chile
sent expeditions to Deception Island in the South Shetlands,
which was already the site of permanent Argentine and Brit-
ish stations. Upon arrival, the two now expeditions began
to construct huts on the edge of the airstrip which ad-
joined the British base. The. Acting Governor of the Falk-
land Islands protested the action to the commander of the
existing Argentine base and the leaders of the two newly-
arrived expeditions to no avail. 38 The British Government
then instructed the Acting Falklands Governor to destroy
the buildings in question and to arrest and deport their
occupants under the Falkland Islands Aliens Ordinance. On
February 15, 1953, a British magistrate and several consta-
bles of the Falkland Islands Police, backed by a contingent
of Royal Marines from the frigate Snipe
,
dismantled the
huts. The Chilean hut was found to be unoccupied zX, that
time, but two Argentines were arrested without resistance.
The prisoners were taken to South Georgia three days later
and plr-ced aboard an Argentine ship bound for Buenos Aires. 39
38British Ambassador in Buenos Aires to Argentine Minis
ter of Foreign Relations and Worship, February 16, 1953, in
"Diplomatic Exchanges in 1952 and 1953," pp. 218-219; and
British Ambassador in Santiago to Chilean Minister of For-
eign Relations, February 16, 1953, in Ibid .
, pp. 223-22<1 .
^Statement of the British Secretary of State for For-






In one respect the British action had been poorly
timed. President Juan Peron of Argentina was currently
in Chile on a good- will visit, vnd the two Latin American
nations were thus able to coordinate their responses close-
ly.'* Each sent a note of protest, to the United Kingdom
on the same day, reserving its respective rights in the
Antarctic and maintaining that the Ri o Pact justified its
defense of these rights against the activities of non-hemi-
spheric powers. * With the close of the current operating
season, however, the crisis diminished. On November 26,
195 3, the three nations again declared that they would not
send warships south of latitude 6 0° South for other than
the customary reasons relating to peaceful exploration, ^
an d b y t h e 1 9
5
4-19 5 5 s e a s on , the y w e r e e n g a g e d in pi an n i n
g
their I G Y An t a r c t i c p r o g r a m s «
Twelve nations decided to participate in Antarctic
activities during the IGY on a heretofore unprecedented
scale, and one of the tasks of the first CSAGI Antarctic
Robert D. Hay ton, "The 'American 1 Antarctic," Ameri
Jour.vi of Intern a 1 j c . a3 Law, Vol. SO (July, 1956), p. 59~3.
*' J A c t i n g A r g e n t i n e M i n 5 s t e r of F o r e i g n Relation s an d
Worship to British Ambassador in Buenos Aires, February 20,
1953, in "Diplomatic Exchai in" 1952 and 195.3," pp. 220-
22 3; arid Chilean Minister of Foreign Relations to British
Ambassador in Santiago, February 20, 1953, in Ibid . , pp. 224'
226.
4 2" Renew a] of Tripartite Antarctic N; "; Declarations
for Season 1953-54," The Pol; Record, Vol. 7 (July, 3954),
p . 2 2 6.
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Conference, which opened in Paris on July 6, 1955, was the
allocation of sites for scientific stations. This led to
a political conflict similar to the one at Rome discussed
above, Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom saw vital
interests at stake in decisions involving the Palmer Penin-
sula region, and all the scientific delegates became aroused
upon discovering that the two Latin American delegations
were headed respectively by the Argentine and Chilean Am-
bassadors in Paris--which appeared to the scientists as an
affront to the non-political character of the IGY, The
situation was handled firmly, however, by the CSAGI Adjoint
Secretary for Antarctica and President of the Conference,
Georges Laclavere of France, who stated that political
A 1
questions had no place in the current discussions. This
position was accepted by the head of the Chilean delega-
tion, Ambassador J, Rossetti, who then presented the fol=
lowing resolution, which was adopted unanimously:
The Antarctic Conference entirely endorses
M. I. ac lave re's statement of purposes at the open-
ing session, and specifically his affirmation that
the over-all airs of the Conference are exclusive-
ly scientific. 44
At the Second Plenary Session, in the afternoon of th
43CSAGI, ICY Annals
,
Vol. 2, p. 397; and Sullivan,
"IGY," p. 320.
44 CSAGI, IGY Annals, Vol, 2, p. 39 7,
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first day of the Paris Conference, each delegation sub-
mitted its plans for the establishment of ICY stations.
It was noted that a dense cluster of stations had been pro-
jected for the Palmer Peninsula region, primarily by its
three claimant nations, for what appeared to be political
rather than scientific reasons. President Laclavere ques-
tioned "whether it would be possible for several nations
to instal [sic] bases in the same region without losing
sight of the objectives of the program," 4 ** and it was de-
cided to form a working group to study the matter of relo-
cating stations. The head of the Argentine delegation,
Ambassador J. A. de Tezanos Pinto, then informed the Con-
ference tli at Argentina reserved its rights to sovereignty
in certain areas of the Antarctic and, while not opposing
the intentions of other nations to conduct 1GY programs
in its sector, claimed the first right, to establish sta-
tions in those areas in the event that stations were relo-
cated.^ The Argentine statement was apparently ignored
by the other participants, and, in the end, the cluster




ducing some duplication in the IGY scientific effort.
Needless to say, neither Argentina nor Chile was
pleased by the attention given to Antarctica during the
4S CSAGI, ICY Annals, Vol. 2, p. 402
46 Ibid., Vol. 2, p, 4 02.
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IGY, and both nations were particularly wary of the in-
c r c a s e d 1 e v e 1 of B r a t i s h activity a n d strong S o v 5 e t presence
There war. little cither nation could do, however, in the
face of world scientific and public opinion on the one
hand and, on the other, the determination of the Great Pow-
ers to make the IGY a success. The only real option avail-
able to the Latin Americans, or to any other claimant for
that matter, was to carry out as extensive a program as
possible in order to maintain their Antarctic claims posi-
tions and attempt to influence the course of the IGY in a
manner favoring their interests. Consequently, in an at-
tempt to protect their claims positions against the influx
of IGY stations, Argentina and. Chile presented the follow-
ing joint reservation at the final plenary session of the
Conference
:
The Argentine and Chilean delegations give
their accord to the recommendations for the co-or-
dination of existing and n e w b a s e s , w i t h the pro-
viso that « . t these are temporary measures calcu-
lated to achieve the best results of the IGY and
adopted in the interests of scientific development,
and that these resolutions do not modify the exist-
ing status in the Antarctic regarding the relations
of the participating coun tries. ^7
This reservation was accepted by all the delegations
and constituted the so-called gentlemen's agreement on the
freezing of Antarctic claims positions at their pre -IGY
4 7 CS AG 1
'
,
IGY An n a 1 s , V o 1 . ? , p . 409
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status. By accepting the reservation, the scientists hoped
to protect the claimants against an erosion of their posi-
tions and the non-claimants against any political repercus-
sions resulting from activities in territory claimed by
other nations. Such an agreement, made among scientists
who were not officials of their governments but reoresenta-
tives of private scientific organizations, obviously could
not bind their respective governments, but the governments
tended to respect the agreement, or at least paid lip-
service to it, and political frictions in Antarctica dur-
ing the IGY were diminished as a result.
There were other problems involving station allocation
at the Paris Conference. The Soviet delegation announced
plans for the construction of three stations, including
one at the Pole. The United States delegation had tenative
ly committed itself to the establishment of a Polar station
at the CSAGI Conference in Rome ten months earlier; but the
Defense Department had not been certain that the feat would
be within its capabilities, and no further planning on the
matter had taken place.' President Laclavere, however,
was apparently under the impression that the American com-
mitment was of a much firmer-nature , for he informed the
Soviets that the American offer had. already been accepted.
The Soviet delegation amicably agreed to accept a point
48 Sip!c, 90° South, pp. 98-99.
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midway between the Pole and the Australian bases. on the
coast as a substitute site. Under the circumstances, the
United States considered it expedient to at least attempt
to construct a station at the Pole. The other two Soviet
bases were also to be located in Australian -claimed terri-
tory. The Australians were disturbed about what they con-
sidered to be a possible threat to their security but; made
no public comment on the matter.
The question of mutual logistic support among the vari
ous national expeditions was also raised at the Paris Con-
ference c Some delegates proposed that such arrangements
be effected by a working committee of scientists, but the
majority believed that this question had too many political
and financial ramifications to be handled by the Comite
Special de l'Annee Geophysiqus Internationale, The Confer-
ence according))' resolved that Mutual support, other than
that afforded in emergency situations, should be the sub-
ject of bilateral agreement among the nations concerned,,
The icebreaker At) a had returned to the United St a',
in March, 1955, and the White House subsequently announced
that the Navy would send, a major expedition in November




Sullivan, "IGY," p. 321.
CS AG I
,
ICY Aii n al s , Vol. 2
, pp . 403 - 4 4 , 4 1 4

1 6 7
to prepare the sites for the American IGY stations in Ant-
arctica, The White House also stated that Admira] Byrd
would serve as the direct representative of the Secretary
of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations and "act in
an advisory capacity in the preparation of operational
plans and as a consultant in the operational conduct of
the expedition . "52 As commanding officer of the United
States Naval Support Force, Antarctica, and of Task Force
4 3, Admiral Dufek would be in charge of "the detailed op-
erational planning and conduct of the expedition and have
overall command of the surface and air forces involved,
C 7.
afloat and ashore."*
On October 21, 1955, the Secretary of Defense formal-
ly appointed Admiral Byrd Officer-in-Charge , United States
Antarctic Programs and charged him with "maintaining effec-
tive monitorship over those political, scientific, legis-
lative, and operational activities which comprise the total
U. S. Antarctic. Program. "^ Byrd was instructed to report
52 White House Press Release, March 28, 1955, in "Plan
for Antarctic Expedition," Dj t of State B L letj




54 Deputy Secretary of Defense Reuben B. Robertson to
Byrd, October 21, 1955, in U. S., Deps ent of Defense,
Of ficer-in-Charge , United Stairs Antarctic Programs, Ai
tic a , the Last F : ') ; / uua] Report of thj Of"fTc
j | J
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on matters concerning Antarctica to the Secretary of De-
fense and through him to the Operations Coordinating Board.
In addition t Byrd was authorized to form a staff to assist
him in his duties, and the resulting Office of Antarctic
Programs became the first organization within the United
States Government to have the specific responsibility for
r r
all phases of United States activity in the Antarctic.
The number of major Antarctic research stations to
be established by the United States for IGV activities had
now been increased to seven. In addition to those previous
ly planned for Little America, the South Pole, and Marie
Byrd Land, these included a Naval Air Facility at McMurdo
Sound, Wilkes Station on the coast of Wilkes Land in the
Australian claim, Ellsworth Station on the coast of the
V/cddell Sea in the territory claimed by both Argentina and
the United Kingdom, and Hallett Station in Victoria Land,
which would be operated jointly with New Zealand,'
The Navy conducted two Antarctic expeditions before
the official commencement of the IGY on July 1, 1957. The
first of these, Operation Deep Freeze I, arrived in the
Ross Sea on December 16, 195 S. Its primary mission was
the construction of the principal American base at Little
"Officer-in-Charge , United States Antarctic Programs,
Antarctica, the L ast Frontier
,
p. 5.
^Housc Commerce Committee, IGY, p. 21,
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America and the Air Facility at McMurdo Sound. The rei ain-
inr< bases were constructed during the next Antarctic, sum-
mer by Operation Deep Freer, e J]
J
whose task was greatly
facilitated by the airstrip. During the IGY itself, the
stations were re supplied by Operation Deep Freeze III.
These 3 expeditions cost 18 Ai Lean lives and over $31
million in addition to the salaries for the 3, SCO men and





Operation Deep Freeze I was also responsible for the
first open d i s a p. r e e rr, e n t bet w e e n the U n i t c d S t a t e s G o v e rn -
ment and the scientists involved in United Sta.tes IGY Ant-
arctic prog r am s . As p r e v i o u s 1 y s t a t e d , 1 1 1 e D e £ e 1 1 s e D e p a r t
-
ment and the other agencies involved in the United States
claims-strengthening pro^rci; desired to take advantage of
1 1 .' IGY to improve the United States Antarctic claims posi-
tion, and the Navy's operation order for Deep Freeze I in-
cluded an objective similar to that of Operation High jump
of the p r e v i o u s dec a d e :
F. s t a b ] i s h i 1 1 g p e rm an e n t s t a t i o n s i. n t h e An t a r c -
tic as requested by competent authority, in support
of United States rights in the area. 58
v
5 ?ilouse Commerce Committee, IGY
,
pp. 33-35.
58 U , S , , Navy , Op ratio Plan , Operatioi Ds Fj
(duly }, J 955), Library of th U. S. Navaj Suppo I Fo:
An t a r c t i c a
,
W a s h 3 n g t o n , D . C . 1 1 a 1 i c s r i i n e .
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The Anicrican scientific community protested against
this statement, which it considered a blatant violation
of the gentlemen's agree m e n t reached at Paris on the s t a i
quo of claims, and was successful in having such statements
omitted from future Deep Freeze operation orders. "
In any event, the claims-strengthening program did
not have long to last. Its participants requested that
their mapping program be carried out. in conjunction with
Deep Freeze II at an estimated cost of $56 million. Presi-
dent Eisenhower was reluctant to approve an additional ex-
pense of this magnitude and requested a clarification of
the United States Antarctic commitment from the National
Science Foundation, The Director of the Foundation, Dr.
Alan Waterman, reportedly informed the President that the
United States was committed to IGY programs only. Funds
for the mapping project were not included in the next re-
quest for appropriations from Congress, and the claims-
strengthening program collapsed.
With regard to the Deep Freeze I operation order and
also with regard to various issues at the IGY conferences,
the scientists were successful in maintaining the non-polit>
5
^Philip C. J ess up and Howard J. Taub en field, Controls
for Outer Space and t) Anta rctij .' 1 y (New York:
Columbfi University Press, 1959), pp. 15~5*-156.
60 Siple, 90° South, p « 126,
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ical character of the IGY in matters of form and procedure,
which was of dubious importance. The process of alloc at inn
sites for Antarctic stations, however, was cased by the
facts that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union
saw a vital security or policy interest at stake in the
results and that the claimants had no choice but to take
whatever comfort they could from the 'gentlemen's agreement'
on the status of claims. Cases illustrated below indicate
that when important interests were seen to exist by the
Great Powers, the scientists were much less successful in
obtaining their desires.
At the final plenary session of the Paris Conference,
Soviet Dele g a t e B e 1 o u s s o v h a d r a i s e d the question of the
aerial mapping of Antarctica. He proposed that the various
nations operating in the Antarctic cooperate in the prepara-
tion of a map based on the complete photographic coverage
of the continent. Since the Paris Confer' nee was to adjourn
that morning, discussion of the matter was postponed until
the Second CSAGI Antarctic Conference, which opened in
Brussels on September 8, 1955. 1 At Brussels, Professor
M, Somov outlined the Soviet proposals in more specific
terms and requested that the Conference adopt, conventions
for the preparation of the map."
61CSAGI, IGY Annals, Vol. 2, pp. 408-430.





There has always been a lack of coordination in Ant-
arctic cartography, and nations have jealously guarded
their work because of its relationship to territorial
claims. J It appeared that while the claimants were will-
ing to accept the existence of temporary scientific stations
within their sectors, they objected to other nations engag-
ing in c a r t o g r a p h i c a c t i v i t y , w h i c h c o u 1 d rep r esent a per-
manent threat to their positions,, It was therefore decided
at the Conference that "the cartography of Antarctica was
not a proper discipline for inclusion within the program
of the ICY," 64
In this case, the two Great Powers simply ignored the
wishes of the scientists. When the United States mappii
program which had been envisioned for Operation Deep
Freeze II was canceled the following year, it was for fi-
nancial reasons unrelated to the objections of American
scientists to what they believed introduced a political
element into the IGY. The extensive Soviet cartographic
effort conducted in Antarctica during the ICY also seemed
to have been unaffected by the decision of the Brussels
Cor; f erencc ,
A similar case in which scientists were overruled by
6 3
64
Hanessian, S c i e nt i i i c C o o p e r a t i o n , p . 10.
CSAGI, ICY Annals, Vol, 2, p, 249.
65 cSullivan, "IGY," p. 32 2

173
their governments occurred with regard to the Arctic, a
region in which both the United States and the Soviet Union
possess a security interest much more vita! than that in
Antarctica, It was noted by the delegates to the CSAGI
Arctic Conference in Stockholm in May, 19S6, that little
was known of the drifting pack-ice of the Arctic Ocean.
The United States delegation then proposed that the United
States and the Soviet Union cooperate in mapping the ice.
The Soviets demonstrated interest in the plan and made an
additional proposal that aircraft of both nations be per-
mitted to travel between Murmansk and Fairbanks in order
to better obtain composite photographs of the entire ocean.
The delegates at the Stockholm Conference were in accord
on the value of these proposals and resolved that "regular
aerial photographic traverses of the Arctic Basin be car-
ried out with the objective of securing comprehensive data
on sea ice distribution, lead patterns, and degrees of ice
concentration ,
"
It was soon discovered, however, that Washington op-
posed the plan, due allegedly to the recent construction
of two Air Force bases in the area, which had been regular-
ly visited by Soviet ferry pilots during World War II,
The Un i t e d S t a t e s then propose d t h a t N o m e b e u s e d instead
of Fairbanks, but the former city is so close to Siberia
66 CSAGI, ICY A als, Vol, 2, p. 5 06,
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as to be virtually useless to the Soviet effort, Relations
between the United States and the Soviet Union soon became
strained over the Hungarian and Suez crises; and on Novem-
ber 21 the Soviet Union stated that it needed no help in
mapping the Soviet side of the Arctic Ocean and that if
the United States v;ere unable to map the American side,
the Soviet Union might offer its assistance. With that,
the idea d i e d t ^ ?
A further case of disagreement between the scientists
and their governments over the substance of an IGY program
occurred with regard to a proposal by the Netherlands IGY
committee for a study to be conducted of air movements by
means of the injection of radioactive trace elements into
the atmosphere « The plan was approved in principle at the
Third CSAG1 Conference, in Brussels in September, 1955, by
the CSAGI Bureau, which stated:
(a) The proposed experiments using radioactive
tracers offer in principle an avenue to increased
knowledge of transport and mixing in the air and
in the oceans.
(b) The IGY would be a specially appropriate
time at which to make such experiments, because
of the exceptional volume of related data, and the
large number of observers during the IGY. 08
After further consideration in the interim, the plan
67 Sullivan, "IGY," p. 280.
68 CSAGI, IGY Annals, Vol. 2, p. 298,
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received the forma] end, merit of the. Fourth CSAGI Con-
ference in September, 1956, in Barcelona. When a coi
mittec met to consider the operational requirements of the
study four months later in Utrecht, however, no Soviet dele
gates were present. Moscow had apparently ruled against
Soviet participation over the desires of its scientists.
Since the data on air movements would be obtained by means
of what was, in effect, nuclear fallout, the Soviet Union,
involved at that time in a United Nations Science Committee
study on the biological effects of radiation, might have
been unwilling to admit that fallout had any beneficial
It must be stated that cases such as the above were
by far the exception. For every IGY program which caused
political conflict, there were hundreds conducted in a
spirit of cooperation and amicability. The Soviet scien-
tific community had apparently shown suspicion at first,
due perhaps to its long period of isolation from the West
and to the fact that much of the earlier planning for the
IGY w a s conducted w i t h o u t S o v i e t p a
r
ticipation.^ I n a n
y
event, the International Geophysical Year was highly sue-
69 CSAGI, IGY Annals, Vol, 2, pp. 364-366.
70Sullivan, "IGY," p. 282.





One of the greatest successes of the IGY was the es-
tablishment of Antarctic Weather Central at the United
States base at Little America, which provided a clearing
house for meteorological information regarding the entire
Antarctic region. Meteorologists of various nations served
tours of duty there; and this led. to further personnel ex-
changes, such as that . involving American meteorologists
72
at the Soviet base, Mirny.
With regard to the free exchange of scientific data,
without which the IGY would have been of little value, it
had been resolved at the Third CSAGI Conference that data
obtained as a result of IGY programs would be made available
to scientists and scientific institutions in all nations.
It \i?.s further decided, for safety and convenience, to es-
tablish three World Data Centers, with each to possess a
complete set of records»«one in the United States, one in
the Soviet Union, and the third to be divided among Western
Europe, Australia, and Japan, Each national committee was
responsible for supplying copies of data obtained from aJ]
phases of its IGY programs to one of the three centers,
'^House Commerce Committee, IGY, p. 30; and. State De
partment , U . S . Po Licy
, p « 5 .
73 CSAGI, IGY Annals, Vol. 2, p. 294,
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which then supplied copies to the other two. 7 '*
Data was exchanged in accordance with the decisions
of the Co mi t e Special do 1 ' An nee G e op h y s i q u e I n t c rn a t i o n a 1 e
,
with one exception. The exception con cc Died the Soviet un-
willingness to exchanj satellite data to the degree de~
7 ^
sired by scientists of other nations. This remained a
sore point all during the IGY and illustrates another case
in which a government placed what it considered to be a
security consideration over the desires of the scientific
community
.
The IGY was also extremely successful from an organi-
zational point of view. The work was carried out by the
national committees and was coordinated at the internation-
al level with a minimum of expense. Funds for the opera-
tion of CSAGI, approximately $100,000 yearly, were obtained
primarily from the International Council of Scientific
Unions, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cult u r a 1 Org a n i z a t i o n , a n d t h e United States, Soviet, a n
d
British Academics of Sciences. In the main, the govern-
ments fully supported the projects designed by the scien-
tists with the funds and materiel necessary.
74CSAGI, IGY Annals, Vol, 2, p. 36 8.
75sullivan, "IGY," p. 334.





Within the United States, a remarkable degree of. co-
operation existed between the Antarctic Committee of the
National Committee for the IGY and the Naval Support Force,
Antarctica, due in great measure to the personalities and'
attitudes of the heads of the respective organizations, Dr,
Gould and Rear Admiral Uufek, The former attempted to exer-
cise moderation in his requests for logistic assistance,
and the latter utilized all the resources at his command
to carry out the wishes of the scientists. ' In addition,
Admiral D.ufek was able to obtain the assistance of the oth-
er military services whenever necessary.
This level of cooperation also extended to the stations
in the field, each of which was manned by two separate
units: a civilian scientific staff under the command of
a Scientific Lender and a military 'housekeeping' group.
The latter was responsible for such tasks as construction,
maintenance, communications, food preparation, and the pro-
vision of medic:; 1 1 services. The USNC-IGY had desired that
the scientific leaders exercise overall command of the Ant-
arctic stations, but the Navy succeeded in obtaining a
split- command arrangement, whereby the leaders of both
groups had authority over their own personnel only and re-
ferred any disputes upward through their separate chains
^
' D a t e r , "0 r g an t i o n a 1 I) e v e 1 o p m e n t s , " p , ? 1 .
78 House Commerce Committee, IGY, p. 31,
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of command. In situations involving serious physical d;
ger to the station, however, the military assumed temporary
command over all personnel. Differences of opinion did
occur at the Antarctic stations, of course, but all dis-
putes referred upward to Dufek and Gould were settled by
them without the necessity for recourse to higher authority.
Although these command arrangements appear unwieldy, they





Thus an important success of the IGY was in the clari-
fication of the relationship between scientists and govern-
mental officials. Each of the two groups seemed to achieve
a greater appreciation and respect for the problems and
goals of the other. In the Antarctic, this marked a definite
improvement over the peremptory treatment afforded to civil-
ian scientists on previous United States expeditions. The
lessons of the IGY in this regard appear to have borne
fruit in the increasing acceptance of technical talks as
a prelude to political agreement on international questions
of a scientific or technological nature.
The IGY also had important effects on the Antarctic
policies of the 12 nations involved, and these effects be-
79 Siple, 90* South, p. 129; and Deter, "Organizational
De ve 1 o pm en t. s , " p . 2 3,
80 Sullivan, "IGY," p, 334.
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came apparent as a result of the successful attempt by A
erican scientists to secure arrangements for the continu-
ance of multinational scientific activities in Antarctica
after the end of the IGY.
Discussions regarding the possible extension of IGY
programs in the Antarctic began even before the official
commencement of the IGY itself. The United States National
Committee for the IGY believed that the IGY should be ex-
tended for one year in Antarctica in order that maximum
scientific advantage might be realized from the present
level of training and the large investments that the par-
ticipating nations were making in equipment, bases, and
supply 15r.es,, In December, 1956, the USNC-IGY formally
inquired of the Coraite Special de l*Annee Geophysique In-
ternationale v/h ether the participating nations and CSAGI
itself favored such an extension and, if so, wh ether a con-
ference might be convened by the CSAGI Adjoint Secretary
for the Antarctic to con. rider the nature of the programs
8 1to be conducted during the additional year.
Adjoint Secretary Laclavere immediately attempted to
obtain the views of the other participants on extending
the IGY in Antarct ica and circulated his findings in. a let-
ter to the 12 national committees on December 23. Comments
81 Executive Director of USNC-IGY to Secretary Cm..
of CSAGI, December 6, 1956, in CSAGI, IGY Annals, Vol. 2,
pp. 4 7 5-/. 74.
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on the United Slates proposal were reported by Laclavere
as being "scarce and vague./' 82 and the majority of the no-
tional committees appeared to be opposed to the extension
for three principal reasons. First, they doubted that
their respective governments would agree to provide the
additional funds required. Second, they foresaw difficul-
ties in recruiting personnel, especially since the person-
nel currently involved in Antarctic operations intended
to return, home at the end of 1958. Finally, the majority
of the national committees feared that an extension of the
IGY in Antarctica alone would lead the participants to delay
processing the data obtained in other regions of the world
and that, in the meantime, enthusiasm over the data v;ould
have partly evaporated, resulting in damage to the IGY as
a whole. The third objection was perhaps the most telling,
for the problem of diminished enthusiasm over data once
it had been collected had plagued previous United States
Antarctic expeditions. In any event, the USNC-IGY request-
ed that the matter be placed on the agenda of the next
(Fourth and final) CSAG1 Antarctic Conference, which was
to be h e 1 d a g
a
i n i n Paris in June, 3 9 S 7 .
At Paris, the Executive Director of the USNC-IGY, Dr.
82CSAGI » IGY Annals, Vol. 2, p. 474.
83lbid. , Vol . 2, p. 474.
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Hugh Odishaw, stressed the scientific importance of contin-
uing the IGY studies in Antarctica. He pointed out th
the major expense connected with Antarctic programs was
that involved in the establishment of bases and that the
extension of scientific operations at those bases would in-
volve comparatively little additional cost. Dr. Odisha
further informed the delegates that the extension proposal
had originated unexpectedly from a USNC-IGY meeting and
that no official request for additional funds had as yet
been made to the United States Government. Thus the finan-
cial position of his national committee was just as uncer-
tain as that of any other; but if Antarctic operations wei
in fact to be continued into the 1958-1959 season, he be~
lieved that the scientists should reach a decision at this
time. 84
Principal opposition to extension came from the (Brit-
ish) Royal Society, whose position on the matter was official
ly stated at the Conference by the British delegate, Sir
David Brunt. The Society believed that there was no ques-
tion as to the value of additional work in the Antarctic
but that it was "no port, of the IGY business to get obser-
vations over one relatively small part of the whole globe,
for which there will be no other observations to compare
* 4 CSAGI, ICY Annals, Vol. 2, p. 476.
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over other regions." 85 The Society believed that it would
be better to have another global IGY some years hence, af-
ter the data from the current one had been properly ana-
lyzed, and that if certain nations did wish to continue
Antarctic operations in the meantime, they should work out
arrangements among themselves.
The position expounded by the British delegate was
supported by the delegations of Australia, South Africa,
and Chile. The United States proposal received the sup-
port of the Belgian, Soviet, and French delegations, al-
though the latter informed the Conference that the French
Government had "almost determined not to give any financial
support." ' The four remaining delegations were uncommitted
at that time. It was finally decided that the matter war-
ranted further thought and discussion, and the Conference
recommended that "1CSU appoint a scientific committee to
examine the merits of further investigations in the Antarc-
tic covering the entire field of science. "8? The ICSU Ex-
ecutive Board considered the recommendation at its meeting
in Brussels on June 27 and decided to form a committee to
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scientific delegates and met in Stockholm on September 9,
19S7, 88
The consensus at Stockholm was one of opposition to
the extension of IGY activities in Antarctica, primarily
because of the costs involved; and. the proposal appeared
doomed— that is, until the Soviet delegate arrived on the
second day of the meeting:
The delegate indicated on a map where the
Russian Antarctic stations were and where they [the
Soviets] wanted to go, said they expected to con-
tinue their studies in the Antarctic, and expressed
the opinion that while Russia did not wish to in-
fluence other countries to go ahead if they did
not wish to do so, they felt in such cases new na-
tions should be invited in to carry on the studies.
°
9
The statement of the Soviet delegate proved to have
far-reaching consequences for Antarctica,. Since the major-
ity of the other nations did not. wish to give the Soviet
Union a free hand in the region, a continuation of inter-
national scientific operations was thereby assured. The
Stockholm Conference recommended that the International
Council of Scientific Unions establish a committee to study
the matter of future arrangements. 90
"88john Hanessianj Jr., "Antarctica: Current National
Interests and Legal Realities," Pi of thj A
can Society of International Law' \ -. 5*2 (1958), pT 3
89 House Commerce Committee, IGY, p. 44
90Hanessian, "Antarctica: Interests and Realities,"
p . 14 9 .
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Tv;o weeks later, the ICSU decided to create a Special
Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) to prepare a plan
for the scientific research to be conducted in Antarctica
after the ICY. Delegations to SCAR were to be composed of
scientists and appointed by ICSU member bodies. Invitations
to participate in the work of SCAR were then sent to the
12 national ICY committees involved in Antarctic programs. 91
Now it was up to the respective governments to decide if
they wished to provide the necessary funds.
In November the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce of the United States House of Representatives com-
menced a study on the achievements of the ICY in the Arctic
and Antarctica and the direction and magnitude desired with
regard to post-IGY programs of the United States in the
polrr regions. The Committee justified its concern on the
basis of the legislative j u r i s d i c t ion t h a t it ex e r c i s e
d
over questions relating to civil aviation, communications,
weather, science in general, and the National Science Foun-
dation in particular. 9 ^
As a result of its study, the Committee concluded that
"the ICY vas one of the most important undertakings and
could have the most far-reaching implications of any scien-
9 1 II an e s s 3 an
,
'" An t ?. r c t i ca : I n t e r c s t s an d R ealities,"
p. 14 9.
92 House Commerce Committee, ICY, pp. 1-3.
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tific work we have anywhere at this time." J -3 The scienc
of geophysics was seen to have relevance to all of man's
major activities and to be of particularly crucial impor-
tance to transports tier j. communication, and agriculture.
The Committee therefore believed that the United States
must continue to engage in the type of research embodied
in the IGY. With specific regard to Antarctica, the Com-
mittee supported the position of the USNC-IGY regarding
the further utilization of the scientific stations which
had been established during the IGY, stating:
Once established, the cost of maintenance is
low; abandoned, the cost of re -es tab lis) t and
rcli a b i J i t a t '< o n i s h i g h . We b e 1 i e v e t h a t the scion^
tific stations in the Antarctic should be contin-
ued. 94
Although the Committee was of the expressed belief
that scientific considerations were adequate in themselves
to justify continued United States operations in the Ant-
arctic, it maintained that Soviet intentions, as stated
at Stockholm, made such operations imperative.
The Committee expressed an awareness of the difficul-
ties inherent in a program that combined private direction








and funds with governmental financing and logistic support.
It saw a need for further study on whether a continuing
program should be financed through one direct appropriation
each year rather than through the current procedure of
utilizing several indirect appropriations but found itself
satisfied in the main with the present arrangements under
the direction of the National Academy of Sciences. The
Committee therefore recommended that the Academy form a
committee to outline future Antarctic programs and their
budgetary requirements. This recommendation was communi-
cated to the President of the Academy, Or. Oetlev Bronk,
by t h e Mouse Co m m e r c e Com m i 1 1 e e Chairm a n , H e p r e s s n t a t i v
e
Or en Harris of Arkansas, in a letter of January 13, 1958.
Dr. Bronl. replied on January 2'\ , stating that he was form-
ing an Academy Committee on Polar Research under Dr. Gould.
The Committee also commended the logistic support af-
forded by the military under Admiral Dufek and stated that
the military should continue to fulfill this responsibility.
It noted, however, that the Naval Support force, Antarctica,
had not been receiving as modern equipment as, in the opin-
ion of the Committee, the importance of its task warranted.
In the words of the Committee R.eport
:
96
96 House Commerce Committee, IGY, p. 43
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Indeed, in a measure there is a ppearance
of some of our obsolete military equipment being
written off by having been relegated to them. 9 7
On the basis of all the above considerations
,
the
House Commerce Committee made the following recommendations,
which were communicated to President Eisenhower by Chair-
man Harris on January 17:
We recommend that it straightaway be decided
that our activities in the Antarctic will continue
for another year, that the National Science Foun-
dation prepare a budget for additional funds ena-
bling it to continue to act as fiscal agent for
the scientific studies, and that the National Se-
curity Council authorize and direct the Defense
Department to furnish logistic support. 9°
The President immediately approved the recommendations,
and, on January 24, the Committee was informed by the Direc-
tor of the National Science Foundation, Dr, Alan T, Water-
man, that the United States would definitely continue scien-
tific operations in the Antarctic after the IGY and that
the Navy Department was instructing Admiral Dufek to make
the necessary preparations .9
On the international }c\':;l t the newly-created Special
Committee on Antarctic Research met at The Hague on Febru-




99 lb id., p, 45.
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ary 3 and decided to encouraj - as many nations as possible
to continue or expend their current programs of Antarctic
research. Once it had become apparent that both the Soviet
Union and the United States v;ould continue operations in
the Antarctic, the .10 other nations soon decided that they
would follow suit, albeit on somewhat reduced scales. At
the Stockholm meeting of the International Council of Scien
tific Unions, the British delegate had stated flatly that
the Royal Society was against the extension of IGY activi-
ties in tli e Antarctic. By the time of the first SCAR meet-
ing, however, the interest demonstrated by the Great Po'.
had caused the British to relent somewhat, and they indi-
cated the possibility of continued scientific operations
in the Antarctic. *00
Australia was extremely concerned over the Soviet de-
cision to remain in the region, inasmuch as all the Soviet
IGY stations were located in Australian-claimed territory.
Australia had traditionally attempted to protect itself
against any possible security threats from the south, and
it was at Australian insistence that the 1951 Peace Treaty
with Japan had contained a clause by which the latter re-
nounced "all claim to any right or title to or interest in
l°°Hanossian , "Antarctica :
pp. 3 50, 15 7.
I n t e r e s t s and Realities,
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connection with any part of the Antarctic area. * The
apparent Soviet permanence in Antarctica now caused the
Australians to decide to continue work at at least one of
10?their Antarctic stations,
There is little doubt that one of the most significant
effects of the IGY upon Antarctic politics was the corre-
sponding penetration of the Continent by the Soviet Union.
A polar nation itself, the Soviet Union was highly inter-
ested in Antarctic research, and the IGY had presented it
with the opportunity to work in Antarctica with a minimum
of politic?! difficulties with the claimant nations. Soviet
scientists were among the most ardent proponents of ?. for-
mal e x t e n s i o n of the IGY an d a p p
a
j e n 1 3 y e x p e c t e d 1 i 1 1 1
e
difficult)' in obtaining the necessary funds on the basis
of the Kremlin's original decision in favor of Soviet par-
ticipation in IGY Antarctic programs. Jn contrast, most of
the scientists from Western nations doubted their ability
to obtain government financing for programs as formal ; : nd
extensive as those currently being undertaken . *^3
A compromise was reached between the Soviet scientists
]0] U. S., Department of State, "Treaty of Peace with
Japan," United State s Treaties and Other Intep I maj .'
r ts (Wash on : United States Go . nt Printinj fee",
T952T, Vol. 3, p. 3172.
102 Hen es si en, "Antarctica: Interests and Realities,
p. 15 3.
103Su] 1 i van , "IGY ," p. 32 7.
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and their Western colleagues at the Fifth, and final, CSAGI
Conference in July, 1958, in Moscow. The delegates agreed
to end the IGY on December 3] as previously envisaged and
to conduct. "Internationa] Geophysical Co-operation 1959,"
utilizing the Special Committee for Antarctic Research and
similar committees which had been formed to coordinate
researcli in other areas, such as the oceans and outer
space. 1^4
While the scientists v:cre thus attempting to obtain
conditions favorable to a continuation of the scientific
programs of the IGY, the United States Gove: I was mak-
ing an attempt to maintain the current political climate
in Antarctica through international arrangements. Unlike
the two previous United States attempts at internationali-
zation, however, this one would prove successful.
104
"Extension of I. G. Y t Activities into 3959,'' Thj
Polar 1 cord, Vol. 9 (January, 1959), p. 345.

THE ANTARCTIC TREATY
T!i c United States had attempted to obtain agreement
on international ai ranj i nts for Antarctica in 1948 part-
ly through a desire to extricate itself from the difficult
position in which the Anglo- Argent ine- Chi 1 ean claims rival-
ry had placed it. Now, 10 years later, the United Stater
was beginning to find itself in a similar position, but
between different antagonists-- Aus tralia and the Soviet
Union.
According to an article in The (London) Times of Febru-
ary 7, 1957, the United States Government had been informed
s o m e tine b e fo re of Australian concern o v e r S o v i e t i n t e n •-
t i o n s in the An t a r c t i c . The A u s t r a 3 i < n G o v e r n m e n t h o p c d
that the Soviet Union would be cooperative in exchanging
data obtained in the Antarctic and in withdrawing upon the





reportedly feared that the Soviet interest, in Antarctic
oceanography could be related to plans for the establish-
ment of a submarine bast, As Soviet intentions to remain
i n An t arctic n b e c r; m s i n c r e a s i n g 1 y a p p a rent d u ring 1 9 5 7 ,
Australia began to press the United States to render as sis
-
t n a c e in o u s t i n g the S o v i e t s . The Aus t r a 1 i a n s were inter-
~ested primarily in raining United States recognition of
* " llu s s ) a n B a s e i n An t ar c t i c : A u s t r a 1 i r- n Co n c e rn
,
"




its Antarctic claims, arguing that without such recogni-
tion, Australia would find it virtually impossible to coun-
ter a Soviet refusal to vacate its bases once the IGY were
concluded
.
In September, 1957, as a result of both the Australian
pressures and a desire not to see the Antarctic situation
deteriorate to the condition of the late 1940' s and early
1950' s, Secretary of State Dulles requested Ambassador
Paul C. Daniels to conduct a detailed study of the United
States position in the Antarctic with an eye toward find-
ing a solution to the current political problems. Secre-
tary Dulles had no specific proposals in mind at that time,
desiring only that such a solution achieve a reasonable
level of stability in the Antarctic without unduly jeopard-
izing United States relations in other areas of the world.
The reconciliation of these two criteria, however, had been
previously impossible to obtain.
Ambassador Daniels organized a team of State Depart-
ment personnel, which spent the next eight months in consul
2john Hanessian, Jr., "Antarctica: Current National
Interests and Legal Realities," Pro cee ding s of the American
Society of Int ti ) Law
,
YcY. § / (J (.;.s;;j, p\ ITS^
3,Much valuable information concerning this period of
United States involvement with the Antarctic was gained
through conversations with Ambassador Paul C, Daniels, al-
ternate United States representative to the International
Con fe r c n c e on Ant a re t i r
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tation with members of other government agencies. It. was
decided that the most practicable solution to the problems
of the Antarctic, consonant with the best interests of the
United States, would be the conclusion of a treaty guaran-
teeing the free access of scientists to all parts of the
region and insuring the utilization of the region for
peaceful purposes only. Accordingly, on May 2, 1958, the
United States sent a note to the 11 other nations current-
ly involved in IGY Antarctic programs, inviting them to
participate in a conference on Antarctica. The note, draft-
ed by Ambassador Daniels, discussed the value of the coopera*
t i v e r e s c a r ch c u r r e n 1 1 y b e i n g c o n d 1 1 c t e d i n t he An t a r c t i c
and stressed the need for agreement on arrangements which
would allow that work to continue. Such arrangements, in
the opinion of the United States, could have the further
advantage of "preventing unnecessary and undesirable polit-
ical rivalries in that continent, the uneconomical expen-
diture of funds to defend individual national interests,
and the recurrent possibility of international misunderstand-
ings."' The United Slates proposed that the above goals
could best be obtained through the conclusion of a treaty,
which would have the following specific purposes:
^ United States Invitation to Twelve -Nat ion Antarctic
Conference, May 2, 1958, in U. S., Department of State,
Unit'. -' ' Policy aw.< Inter] at ion a 3 Coop ; r-.! in Ant-
< ca (*W a s h in ton": Uri SI GcT rnme rit Prinl
Lee, 1964)
, pp. 2 3-24,
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A t Freedom of scientific inv gat ion throi
out An t a r c t i c a by citizens, org an i z a t ions, an cl g o v -
ernments of all countries; and i continuance of the
international scientific cooperation which is be-
ing carried out so successfully during the current
International G e op h y s i c 1 Y e a r
.
B. International agreement to ensure that
Antarctica be used for peaceful purposes only.^
In addition, the )- traced the history of American
operations in the Antarctic and reserved "all of the rights
of the United States with respect to the Antarctic region,
including the right to assert a territorial claim or claims
It was the opinion of the United States, however, that the
proposed treaty w o u .1 d n o t h a v e to r e q u i r e t h e r e n un c i a t i o
n
by any nation of whatever rights or claims to sovereignty
it might possess in the region:
,,6
It could be specifical 3 y p r o v 3 d
.
d that such
basic r i g hts and such c 1 a i m s w oul d remain unaffe ct e d
while th e t r s a t y is in force, and that no new ri ght s
w o u 1 d b e acqui red and no new c ] a i ] i s made by any
country d u r i n g t h • durat i on of'the treaty. In oth-
er words
t the leg al status quo i n Antarctica wc Id
be froze n for the duration of the treaty, p e
i
ting
coop e rat ion in scientific an
d




tcrs to b e carri
e
d out in a constructive manner
without b c i n g h i pered or af fe ctcd in any way by
p o ? 5 1 i c a ] cons i do rat ions « ,
^United States Invitation to Twelve-Nation Antarctic
Conference, May 2, 19 5.8, in Department of State, United
! tes Policy, p. 24.
6 Ibid..
, p. 24.
7 1 b i d .
, p p . 24-25.
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The 11 nations accepted the United States proposal?
in principle, but the State Department believed that it
would be useless to hold a formal conference before basic
Agreement had been reached on certain crucial points, spe-
cifically those regarding free scientific access, the sta-
tus of claims, and demilitarization under a reliable sys-
tem of inspection. In June, therefore, the team under Am-
bassador Daniels began weekly preparatory talks with rep-
resentatives of the 11 embassies in W ashington. By March,
1959, a consensus had been reached on only those matters
relating to scientific access, joint research programs,
and the utilization of the Antarctic for peaceful purpos
only. Within the next few weeks, however, enough basic
agreement had been reached on other issues to warrant the
g
calling of the formal conference.
The I n t e rnational Co n f e r e n c e o n An t a r c t i c a o p e n e d i
n
Washington on October 15, 1959. The official United Slates
representative and head of the United States delegation
was Mr. Herman Phlegar of the State Department, Ambassador
Daniels and Mr. Qoorps H, Owen, also of the Department of
State, served as alternate representatives. The Defense
D e p a r t m
e
i 1 1 was represents d i. n t h e d e 1 e g a t i on b y C a p t a i
n
Eugene V,'. Davis, United Steles Navy. Advisers to the United
department of State, United S tes Policy, p. 9.
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States delegation included a committee of ; Lsts,
appointed by the National Academy of Sciences at the re-
quest of the State 1)
|
ment, and Senators Fr; ' Carlson
of Kansas and Gale He Ore of Wyoming.
The United States delegation to the Antarctic Conference
sought to obtain four major objectives through the prospec-
tive treaty: (I) the prevention, under a reliable system
of inspection, of the utilization of Antarctica for oilier
than peaceful purposes, (2) the continuance of scientific
research in Antarctica under the freest possible conditions,
(3) the reduction of claims controversies a d the accompany-
ing p o 1 i t i c a 1 t e n s i o n s , and ( A ) t he est a b 1 5 s 1 1 m e n t o f a s y s -
tern of continuing consultation among the govei ts of
nations "actively engaged in scientific investigation in
Antarctica." 1 During the course of the negotiations, the
United States delegation operated from detailed positii
p a p c r s , \ • h i c h h a d b e e n p re p a red in c o 1 1 a b o : • a t i on w i t h a .1
1
t h e g o v s r n m e n t a I d e p a r t m e n t s a n d a g e n c i e s wit h i n t e r e s t s
in Antarctic affairs. Whenever the delegation found it
necessary to deviate from these recorded positions, the
approval of the agencies concerned was obtained before the
9 U . S . , Con g r s s s , S e n a t e , Commit t s e o n Foreign R e
1
1 -
tions, Hearings on thj AnJ ' ' c T : a. t
y
, 86th Cong., 2nd
sess., June 1 •'
,
1960 (1 : U ted St Govern-
ment Printing Office, I960), pp. 37-38.
3 Ibid.
, pp. 44- 15.
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United States agreed to the item in question. In addition,
throughout the negotiations there was daily consultation
between the two govern . ta] agencies most direct?)' con-
cerned with Antarctic matters, the Departments of State
and Defense ,
It had been realized in Washington at the outset that
the major obstacle to the success of the conference would
be the position of the two Latin American claimants t Pub-
lic opinion in Argentina and Chile was such that the two
nations could not accept any arrangement that had the ap-
pearance of diluting their respective 'sovereignties' in
the Antarctic, It had therefore been politically impos-
sible to propose any permanent solutions to the Antarctic
claims problem; and it had been necessary to suggest an
arrangement, similar to that which had worked so well on
an informal basis during the IGY, under which the legal
status of Antarctic claims would be 'frozen, 1 The Argen-
tine delegation, however, still had misgivings regarding
the level of internationalization that its counterparts
might attempt to obtain. At the opening of the Conference
the chairman of that delegation, Dr. Rodolfo Sci lingo,




, pp « 37 , 71
.
1 2 \v a 1 1 e r G . S u 1 1 i v an , " T h e Intern a t i o n a 1 G e oph y s Leal
Year," li al Conci li;
,




firmly statod the she qua non of furthei tine parti-
cipation :
This Confe rence .
to institute re gimes or
not its m is s ion to chan
ing that is c her< w
disregard ri ght The
is to re a ch eemen
rence of a] 1 th • partie
and scicn t i £ i c cooperat
Wit h that cl ea r under st
pal- t in the w o r k with a
ate 13
« c has not been convened
create structures. It is
ge or alter anything. No th-
ill give rise to, affect, or
objective of this Conference
t , w i th the e xp re s s e d concur-
s, upon the peaceful use of
ion in the Antarctic
. . .
Argentina will take
sincere desire to cooper-
It was clear that the successful conclusion of the
Antarctic Conference was dependent on the central problem
of developing an arrangement which would insure maximum
freedom for scientific investigation while, at the s;
time, satisfying the claimant nations with regard to the
status of their 'sovereignties' over Antarctic territory.
Indeed, during the period of planning for the ICY most of
the claimants had taken steps toward binding their Ant
tic claims more securely to the national administrative
hierarchy
.
In 1954 Australia, through the passage of the Antarc-
tic Territory Bill, rrrc.n^cd for the application to its
Antarctic sector of the laws of the Australian Capital
13u, S., Department of State, "The Conference on A
arcticr.,'' Intern, tional 0: i ( I :




T e r r i t o r y . * ' T h e f o 1 1 o w i n g y e a r , F r a n c e r e m o v c d i t s An t
«
arcitc sector from the authority of the Governor General
of Mad a g a s c a r an d c o i i s t i t u ted it a s a so p a rate colo n
y
under t h e n a m e
,
F r e n c. h Southern an d An t a r c t i c T e r r i t o r i c s . ->
In 1956, the Statute of the Chilean Antarctic Territory
est ab 1 i s h e d t h e Ch i 1 e an s e c t c r a s an i n t e g r a 1 part of
Magallanes Province. '" On February 28, 1957, an Argentine
P r e s i d e n t i
a
) I ) e c r e e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e J y c o : b i n e d T i e r i a del
Puego and various adjacent islands with the Argentine
Antarctic sector and "re-established" the National Territory
of Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica, and the Islands of the
S out h At ] an t i c
,,
w i t h its c ap i t a l at U s h u a i a. F i n a 3 3 y
,
on June 21, 1957, the Norwegian civil and < . ' .. ) cod r-s
v; ere extended to Q u e e n M a u d Land by Roy a 1 1' r o c 1 a m a t i o n , * °
Moreover, it v.- as soon discovered at the Antarctic Co
ference that the level of agreement on the question of free
*4r. A. Swan, Au lij in the Antarctic (Melbourne:
Un i v e r s i t y o f M e 1 b o urn t ! i e i s , 1 9 6 1 ) , p , 2 7 5 <
*^John Hanessian, Jr., The CI; ' Nat ions (Part 2,
N ! • : 1 ' : L ti es and [n1 ii ; , 3 parts
,




- 17 Ar; . ' ', ; )K-rr: c ].: : :io, ?][;], February 28, -1957,
in The Pol a) Record, Vol. 9 (January, 1958), pp. 5 ? •• 5 3
.
^Norwegian Royal Proclj at ion, June 21, 1957, in "Ad-
ffiinistration of Norwegian Territories in the Antarctic,"
Th e Pol a r R e c o r d , Vol. 9 ( M a y , 1 9 5 8 ) , p . 160.
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scientific access was not as hi as had been believed dur-
ing the preliminai y d ; s c u s s ions. F e v r s \
i
c r e n o w b •:. i n g e x
-
pressed within Latin / Lea that thin question could be
related to a desire on the part, of the Great Powers to test
nuclear weapons in a region far removed from their metro-
politan territo] ; : . Since the winds tend to blov; con-
stantly northwards from the Pole, any fallout from a nucle-
ar explosion would be carried from Antarctica and deposited
in particularly high concentrations upon Argentina and
Chile
t
the two nearest nations.^ Concern over the possible
testing of nuclear weapons in Antarctica had preoccupied
the Latin Americans a3 1 during the IGY, under which such
activity had not been precluded. For unknown reasons, h r
ever, this subject had not been introduced a1 the prelimi-
nary discussions, and it became the only really new matter
to be considered at the formal conference. On November 20,
the A r g e n t in e d e 1 e g a t i o n m a d e a f o r m a 1 p r o p o s a 1 to bar all
nuclear explosions and disposal of radioactive wastes f-
t h e An t a r c t i e Con t i n e n t an d a d j ac en t i s .1 a n d s . This w a
s
accepted, by the other delegations, and a major obstacle to
*^.'!Los Intereses de la Argentina en la Zona Antartica,"
La Prensa (Buenos Aires), Novenber 4, 19S9, p, S,
2 ^5 en ate Foreign Relations Committee, Ante
H •
'
s pp , 40, 4 2.
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21final agreement was thereby removed.
The success of the Antarctic Conference was aided pri-
marily by the existence of factors which had not been pres-
ent during the two previous attempts by the United States
to obtain an international agreement regarding Antarctica.
The first and perhaps most important such factor was the
Soviet penetration of Antarctica, Soviet IGY bases had
been established in the Australian claim, and Soviet expe-
ditions had ranged all over the continent. In neither case
had the Soviet Union requested the permission of claimants
or indicated in any other way that it attached any validity
to the existing claims to Antarctic territory. '* The Soviet
activities had greatly increased the recept i veness of the
United Kingdom and the other Commonwealth claimants to
plans for international arrangements. In the past these
nations had feared that such steps might lead to Soviet
involvement; but: now that the Soviet presence in Antarctica
appeared to have a permanent nature, international arrange-
ments seemed the only manner in which Soviet activities
co u 1 d b e con t ro 1 1 ed
.
2 3
The second factor, which led all the nations to have
21 M Uso Pacifico del Atomo en la Antartida," La Prei
( B uen os Ai re s ) , N o ve rab e r 2 0, 1959, p . 2
.
22 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Antarctic 1
H
, p, 40,
23sullivan, "IGY," p. 324.
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an interest in seeing that agreement was reached, was the
ample proof of the value of international scientific co(
eration in the Antarctic that had been afforded by the IGY.
Through such cooperation and the concurrent free exchange
of scientific data, each nation was able to reap benefits
far in excess of those attainable through the expenditure
of its own resources alone; and the continuance of these
arrangements under a treaty offered particular benefits
to the three smaller non-claimants: Belgium, Japan, and
South Africa,
Belgium claimed an interest in Antarctic matters on
the basis of its expedition of 1807-1899, which spent a
year beset in the ice aboard its vessel, Bel gic< The Bel-
gian Expedition thus became, albeit inadvertently, the first
to winter« over in the Antarctic, The Belgian Government
had asserted, no territorial claims and had refused to grant
funds for fur titer expeditions prior to the IGY, Unwilling
to commit resources to a permanent effort in the Antarctic,
Belgium f a v o r e d 3 n t e r n a t i o n a 1 a r r a n gem e n t s as e n a b 1 i n g B e 1 -
gian scientists to participate more freely in the expedi-
tions of o t h e r n a t i on s <
-Inasmuch as-Japan had been compelled to renounce all
2
'John Hanessian, Jr. , The None lai 1 N; 1 Loi s (Part 3,
Natj and Inl , /-parts,




rights to Antarctic claims in 1951, the Japanese delegation
to the Antarctic Conference supported the United States
proposals as affording the best opportunity to maintain
Japanese access to the region.' '
The United States proposals also offered particular
advantages to South Africa, whose formal claims, as asserted
in 1948, were limited to the sub-Antarctic Marion and Prince
Edward Islands. South Africa's primary interest in the
Antarctic regions is meteorology, and studies conducted
at a weather station on Marion Island had indicated a need
for an expanded program of observations. The proposals
for international arrangements were seen by South Africa
as facilitating its desires to continue the work on the
Antarctic Continent that it had begun during the ICY, In
fact, one month after the Treaty was signed, South Africa
was granted possession of the ICY station in Queen Maud
Land which had been evacuated by Norway for lack of funds. 2
'
The success of the United States in gaining final ac-
ceptance of its proposals was also aided by the support
that these proposals enjoyed among all major international
scientific organizations and by the fear that the failure
-of these negotiations would cause adverse reactions in the
"Hanessian, None la I ' Ions, p. 20
2 ° h a n e s s i an , CI a i m a n t N a t i o r, s
, p . 2 8.
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world political situation and be a bad precedent for future
? 7
such negotiations.
In addition, a major effort was made at the Antarctic
Conference to accommodate the position of the claimants.
No attempt was made to force the relinquishment of terri-
torial claims nor even to create some type of centralized
administrative organ. In the final analysis, however, the
claimants faced the same lack of alternatives that had
existed with regard to the IGY. Although they may have
feared with good reason that the level of international
controls obtained through the Treaty might lead to greater
steps in this direction at a later time, the claimants had
little choice but to accept.
One cause of the failures of the previous proposals
for the internationalization of Antarctica had been the
reluctance of the United States to exert pressure on the
claimants over an issue of secondary importance to its
global interests. Another cause had been the corresponding
belief held by the claimants that the United States would
not act peremptorily against their Antarctic interests.
The Soviet Union, however, had no such compunctions-«*the
—claimants were not its allies— and the claimants see;
^'"Llegaran a un Acuerdo sobre la Antartida," La P
(Buenos Aires), November 1, 1959, p. 1;
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fully aware of this fact. Mo . r, ob: the Ant-
arctic Conference reported that if the Conference did fail,
there was a strong likelihood that both the Soviet Union
and the United Stat'..: would change their traditional poli-
9 c>
cies and enter the clan raci t] ems< Ives. ° While there
is no evidence that: direct threats in this regard were \
by either nation, the possibility was probably made cle;
to the c 1 a i m a n t s at t h e C o n f e r e n c e
,
The Antarctic Treaty was signed on December 1, 1959,
and consists of a preamble and 14 articles. It basically
represented the highest common denomin of possible areas
of agreement, affording no final solution to the political
problems of the Antarctic.
Article 1 reserves the Antarctic regions for peaceful
purposes only. Specifically prohibited are "<:>) i :-;r.ures
o f a m i 1 i t a r y n a t u r e , s u c h a s t h e est. ab 1 i s h men t o f m i 1 i t a ry
base s an d f o r t i fi c a t i on s , t h e c a r
r
y i n g out of m 3 1 i t a ry
manuevers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons. "^ y
In recognition, hottfever, of the vital, roles played in Ant-
arctic operations by military forces of ?}} rations,
° " S c :: t a S e man £ t1 e D e 1 .i b « 1 a c i o n e s e 1 1 1 a Con f e r en c i
AntartJe.a de Washington," La Prensa (Buenos Aires), N<
b r 2 2, 1959, p , 1
.
9 C)49 u, S., Department of State, "The Antarctic Treaty,"
United St 1 at i i 1 1
i
'
: riiatioi 1 Aj . t
(Was! 1 : U n i t e d S
1
G < t "l L n t i I L
1
1961), V o 1 . 12, p t . 1




Article 1 excepts from the above prohibition "the use of
m i 1 i t a r y pers o n n e 1 an d e q u i. p m e
n
tfor scientific rose a r c
h
or for any other peaceful purpose." 30
The question of demilitarization afforded the negoti-
ators few problems for the primary reason that, unlike oth-
er areas of the world i ding which similar attempts had
been and w o u 1 d b s m a d e , Ant a r c t i c a h a d n ever bee n ' m i 1 i t a r
-
ized' in the first place except for isolated instances of
naval forces in adjacent waters,^ The Great Powers had
d e mon s t r a t e d 1 i t tie interest in e s t ab 1 i s h i n g m i 1 i t a r y b ; s e
s
in Antarctica, and the smaller nations had tended to be
deterred from doing so by the costs involved. All the dele
gations were therefore satisfied with arrangements that in-
sured that the region could not be used as a base for he
tile op er a t i on s d i re ct e d a g a i n s t t h e i r n a t i ons ,
Articles 2 and 3 attempt to pro rote the continuance
of the in t e rn a t i o n a 1 s c j e n t i f i c c o o p e r a t i o n t h a 1 e x i s 1
dur i n g the I G Y . F r e e d o m o f s c 5 e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a 1 5 o n w
established in the Antarctic, arid the Contracting Parti t
agreed t o e n g a g e i n s p e c i f i c con d u c t d e s i g n e d 1 o a :: d. c o
erative research, including exchanges of data, information
30
"The Antarctic Treaty," United Sj ! Tr '' s,
V o 1 . 3 2, p t , 1, p , 7 9 5
,
^Howard J, Taubenfield, "A Treaty for Antarctica,"
1 n t




on plans and programs, and scientific personnel
Article 4 effectively freezes the legal status of
claims to sovereignty over Antarctic territory, stating:
No acts or activities taking place while the
present Treaty .is in force shall constitute a basis
for asserting, supporting, or denying a claim to
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create
any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new
claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to ter-
ritorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted
while the present Treaty is in force. °
Article 4 further states that nothing in the Treaty
shall be interpreted as a renunciation or dimunition of any
claim, right, or basis of ? claim or right to territorial
sovereignty in the Antarctic. Neither is the Treaty to
have any effect upon the recognition or non-recognition
by any Party of a claim or right of another.
The ban on certain nuclear activities is contained in
Article 5, which expressly prohibits "any nuclear explosions
in Antarctica and the disposal there of radioactive waste
Article 6 defines the region over which the Treaty
shall be in force as "the area south of 60° South Latitude,
including all ice shelves" and further states that "nothing
,,34
32
"Thc Antarctic Treaty," United S 1 ities,
Vo), 12, pt. 1, pp. 795-796.
33
J bid,, Vol. 12, pt. 1, p. 796 c
34
1 bid., Vol, 12, pt. 1, p. 796.
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in the present Treaty shal] prejudice or in any way affect
the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State
under international law with regard to the high seas with-
in that area,"" This article presented a particular prob-
1 c 11 to the negotiators, inasmuch as the claimants accepted
varying definitions of ly what constituted territor-
ial waters. In addition, there was no consensus on whether
ice shelves should be considered as land or water for legal
purposes. The del'; tions at the Conference wished to
avoid controversy over these points, and the article was
purposely worded in a manner that left them undecided but
served the purposes of the Treaty. "
While the United States delegation did not. wish to
impair any nation's rights on the high seas, it did insist
upon a system of inspection that could protect all the Par-
ties against violations of the Treaty, particularly with
regard to the article concerning demilitarization. The
United States believed that any such system, to be reliable,
should include the right, to inspect vessels in the process
of embarking and/or discharging personnel and equipment in
"*> 7the Treaty Area,' The specific right to inspect vessels
35"The Antarctic Treaty," United .l Treat]
\'oU 12, pt. 1
,
p. 79 7.
36 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Anti '• ty
Hea rin gs
, p , 6C ,
3 7
1 b .1 d .
,
p , 6 6.
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engaged in such activity was conferred on all signatories
in Article 7 , w h i c h d e a 1 t w i t h i n s p e c t i o n p rocedures
.
The United States had exp d serious difficultii
in obtaining agr< t to the inclusion in the Treaty of
a reliable system of inspection. The Defense Department
believed that the right of overflight in itself constituted
"a very effective inspection system,"^ and the United
States would probably have accepted this right alone if it
had failed to obtain agreement on a more comprehensive system
In fact, little opposition to inspection was encounter
among the other delegations. Some favo i d the creation of
a mult inationa] organ, but the Lati n Americans opposed a
such steps, which they considered to be leading toward a
system of international administration. In any event, the
United States insist? d u p on a un i 1 a t e r a ] s y s t « m a s m o r
e
likely to be e f f e c t i v e . * - }
Jn the negotiation of the Treaty, and especially with
r e g a r d t o A r t i c 1 e 7 , t. h e U n i t e d Si a t e s d e 1 e g a t i on w a s ] - a r -
t i c u 1 a r 1 y i n t e r e
s
ted i n i n s ur i n g that " n o r i g h t g r a n t c d
by the treaty was subject to any approval by any other
party in order to be exercised,"^ thus hoping to forestall




' , p . 6 7.
Ibid.
, p . 6 7
.
4 1 b i d
.
, p . 5 6 ,
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any future situations in which activities under the Treaty
con] cl b e o b s t r u c t. e d b y t h e v e t o of o n e o r m o r e s i gnatories.
As defined in Article 7, the right of inspection under the
Antarctic Treaty is both unilateral and unlimited. bach
nation is to keep the others app ised of the identity of
its official observers, and these personnel "shall have
complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas
of Antarctica c « « including all stations, installations
and equipment within those areas, and all ships and air-
craft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or per-
sonnel in Antarctica, * To increase both the reliability
and the ease of the inspection process, each of the Parties
is required to give advance notice to the other Parties
of all Antarctic expeditions conducted by its nationals
or its vessels or organized on its territory, all Antarc-
tic stations to be occupied by its nationals, and all pirns
for the introduction of military personnel or equipment ,
for peaceful purposes as authorized in Article 1,
In order to further insure the effectiveness of the
provisions granting free access to scientists and observers,
Article F, provides that such personnel and their staffs
shall, anywhere in time Antarctic, be subject only to their
41
"The Antarctic Treaty," Un ite d Si T] Les,




national jurisdiction, ' ' This article represented a con-
cession by the claimants, all of which have civil and crim-
inal codes which they c] be effective within their
sectors » The concession was of on. ly a partial nature, how-
ever, in that Article 8 refers explicitly to scientists and
observers only, Persons not in one of these two categories
receive no immunity under the Treaty from the jurisdiction
of a claimant state, as illustrated in the following hypo-
thetical case presented by Mr. Phlegar at the hearings or:
the Treaty before the Foreign Relations Committee of the
United St a t e s S e n a 1 1 :
I f w e send a s c i e n t i s t o r an in s p e c t o r i n t
o
the sec t o r c 1 a :' i . d b y C h i 1 c , he cannot be arrested
b y C h i 1 e . , , b u t if there s h o u 3 d b e a mil i i n g e n -
gineer who wenl down into the sector claimed by
Chi) e an d h e g o 1 i n t o s o m e t r o ub 1 e , Chile w o u 1
d
c 1 aim t h a t 5 t s 1 a w s go v e r n e d
»
W e w o u Id c 1 a i m t hat Chile's 3 r. w d id not g o v
-
ern because we do not recognize Chile's claim, and
there would be an international contro\ ;y as to
who had jurisdiction over the individual . *^
A r t. i c 1 e 9 r> r o v ides fo r r e g u 3 a r m e e t i n ; s of cons u 1 1 a -
tion among representatives of the orij • 1 signatories for
the purpose of considering and recommending to their res-
pective governments "measures in furtherance of the prir.-
42,, The Antarctic Treaty," U I ] ties
,
Vol, 12, pt. 1, pp. 797-798.








:ciples and objectives of the Treaty."'' Any nation subs
quently adhering to the Treaty is able to participat* and
vote in these meetings only if it "demonstrates its inter'
in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific research
activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific
station or the despatch of a scientific expedition . " 4 ^
In Article 10 , the Parties agreed to "exert appropriate
efforts, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations,
to the end that no one engages in any activity in Antarc-
tica contrary to the principles or purposes of the Present
Treaty." 46
Article 11 concerns procedures for the settlement of
any disputes that may arise with regard to the Treaty. The
United S t a t e s and eight of t h e e 1 e v e n o t her p a r t i c i p a n t s de-
sired that nations unable to resolve such disputes peaceful-
ly among themselves be compelled to submit them to the In-
ternational Court of Justice, whose decision would be bind-
ing on the parties concerned. The United States delegation,
in particular, believed that such an arrangement would be
vital to the enforcement of demilitarization in addition
to affording a forum in which the facts of each case could
be ascertained. The delegations of Argentina, Chile, and
44
"The Antarctic Treaty," United Stal Tj ; es_,
Vol. 12, pt. 1, p. 79 3.
45 Ibid. , Vol . 1?
,
pt. 1, p. 79 8.





the Soviet Union, however, were adamant in their refu
to agree to compulsory Court jurisdiction, and the majo
was forced to relent. The rticle, as finally drafted,
states that parties to a dispute with regard to the Treaty
shall first seek resolution through peaceful neans of their
choice and that, if a settlement is not. thereby achieved,
they shall submit the dispute to the International Court
of Justice with the consent of all parties concerni d.
The Antarctic Treaty is to be of indefinite duration,
and Article 12 provides that the Treaty may be amended
through the unanimous consent of the original signatories
plus that of any later adherents that have achieved the
right to participate and vote in the mi etings of consulta-
tion. After 30 years—a period of time which represented
a compromise among the desires of the various delegations--
from the date that the Treaty enters into force, any voting
adherent way request a conference to consider modifications
or amendments to the Treaty, which can then be effected
by majority decision. Jf any such amendment or modifica-
tion fails to be ratified, by any Party within a period of
tv:o years, then: (1) that Party is deemed to have with-
"Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ante II
H ear i n g s , pp. 63, 69,
48
"The Antarctic Treaty," United St ] les,
Vol. 12, pt. 1, p. 799.
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drawn from the Treaty and (2) any other Party may withdraw
from the Treaty two years after having communicated such
49intention.
The final two articles discuss ratification and acces-
sion procedures and the authenticity of texts. Accession
to the Treaty is open to any member of the United Nations
and to any other nation with the unanimous consent of vot-
ing parties. The Treaty would enter into force upon its
ratification by all signatories,'
Quite significantly, the Treaty contains no provisions
with regard to the economic development of the Antarctic
or with regard to free access to the region for purposes
other than scientific investigate ion and official inspection.
Thus the discovery of exploitable wealth could easily lead
to conflict. This is hardly a valid criticism of the Trea-
ty itself, however, or of the United Stnt.es delegation at
the Conference, It would have been highly unrealistic to
expect the claimant nations to freely relinquish their claims
to sovereign rights over a territory whose value is not
known and will probably remain unknown for years. For the
United States and the four other non-claimants to have in-
.sisted upon such relinquishment would have been to jeopard-
49,1 The Antarctic Treaty," United States Treaties
,
Vol, 12, pt. 1, pp. 799-800,
50 Ibid., Vol , 12, pt. 1 , p. 80 0,
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j.?.e the entire Treaty. This precise point was discussed
by Dr. Laurence M« Gould, formerly the chairman of the Ant
arctic Committee of the United States National Committee
for the JGY, at the hearings on the Treaty:
My profession is geology, and I would n
give a nickel' for all the mineral resources
in Antarctica. The point is we do not know,,
to predicate a program or to assume that vas
sources are there is nonsense. We have not
ined 1% of the area geologically .... So
for many, many years to cone, maybe as many
30 years, the most important export of Antar
is going to be its scientific data, and that










In the Antarctic Treaty, the United States attained
the primary goals of its Antarctic policy as determined
through the interdepartmental discussions and position pa-
pers prior to the Antarctic Conference. In attaining these
goals, moreover, the United States relinquished no right
that it had exercised prior to the conclusion of the Treaty.
If the United States were to attempt to exploit some future
source of wealth in Antarctic territory claimed by another
nation, there would undoubtedly be a conflict between it
and the claimant; but this is, of course, the same situa-
tion that would exist without the Treaty.
The s a r. e cpji b e s a i d r e g a r d i n g t h e lack of c n fo r c e
-
^ * S e n a t e F o r e i g n K c 1 a 1 5 o n s C o mm i t tee, Anl ; i c Tj i ; 1 y
I g s
, p . 7 5 .
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ment proced and the failure to achieve agreement on
the compulsory sub] ion of disputes to the Internation-
al Court of Justice The United States maintains that if
it came to be 1 i e v e t h a t 1 1 1 e T r c a t y w e r e v i o ] a t e d , i t w o u 1
d
be released from its own obligations and again be in no
worse position t h an b e fo r e
.
Hearings on the Antarctic Treaty commenced in the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate
on June \A
,
3960, )n recommending that the consent of the
Senate be granted to ratification, President Eisenhower
stat e d
:
This i s a u n i q u e and h i s t o r i c t r e a t y . It pro
vides that a large area of the world « , .will be
used for peaceful purposes only. It contains a
b r o a d , u n r e s t r i c t e d in s p e e t i on system to e n s u r
e
that the nonmili tari zation provisions will be car-
ried out,.
. . ,
I believe that the Antarctic Treaty is a sig-
n i fi c a n t a d v a n c e t o w a r d t h a g o a 1 of a p e a c e f u 1
world with justice. 5 3
Opposition to the Treaty centered not so much on its
specifi c p r o v i s i o n s , d e f i c i e n c i e s in w h i c h h a v e been d i s
-
cussed above, but rather on the United States policies that
led up to i i s conclusion. It was believed by some senators,
notably by Clair Engle of California and Ernest Grueninj










of Alaska, that the United States should have formally ;
serted an Ant; cli im and have sought the removal of
the Soviet presence rather than having concluded an agree-
ment with the Soviet Union that, in fact, legitimized that
presence. As stated by Senator EngJe:
In essence, we are settling [sic] the seal
of free world recognition on the Soviet presence
in Antarctica in return for whatever assurance the
treaty offers that the Soviets will not be trouble'
makers < ^4
Speaking in favor of the Treaty and the policies upon
which it had been based were Dr. Gould, Mr. Phlegar, Philip
C, Jessup, the Hamilton Fish Professor of International
Lav; at Columbia University, and Rear Admiral David M. Tyree,
United States Navy, who had succeeded to the position held
by Admiral Dufek. With regard to the assertion of an Ant-
arctic claim by the United States, it was pointed out to
the Committee that there were only two possible courses of
action: the United States could restrict its claim to the
unclaimed sector, the least vain. able region of the conti-
nent, or it could challenge the claims of other nations,
all of which were partners of the United States in defense
alliances. In the latter case there were no assurances
that the other claimants would submit the resulting dispute
^•Senate foreign 1'elations Committee, Antarctic ']
H 5, p, 2.
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to p e a c e fu 1 s e 1 1 1 e m e n t , a n d i n n e i t h c r casi w o u 1 d t h e Sovi-
ets bo excluded from the continent. Moreover, the Soviet
Union would probably respond to a United States claim with
the assertion of a claim of its own.
The Soviet Union had adopted the position of the United
States regarding Antarctic claims and had made it perfectly
clear over the preceding decade that it would not accept
any arrangement concerning Antarctica that had been effected
without its consent. This would certainly include any agree-
ment between the United States and the claimant nations
aimed at Soviet exclusion from the continent. The alter-
natives open to the United States at that time with regard
to the presence in the Antarctic of the Soviet Union were
succinct!)' s t a t e d by Mr. P h 1 e g a r in the fo 1 3 o w i n g i n t e r
-
change with the chairman of the Committee, Senator J. W.
V u 1 b r i g h t of Ark a n s a s :
CHAIRMAN FULBRIGHT: Could we have not placed
limitations on Soviet activity in Antarctica with-
out entering into this arrangement with the Sovi-
et [ s i c ] a s p a r t n e r s ?
MR PHLEGAR: I know of no other wry than go«
ing down there and trying to throv; them out. "
In any event, the United States did not possess pre
•'Senate Foreign relations Committee, Antarctic Treaty
!
, p p . 4 7,51
56 Ibid.
,
pp. 66 = 67.
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d o m i n a n t r i g h t s over the entire An t a r c t i c C o 1 1 1 i n e n t , 1 h
-
er nations enjoyed histories of Antarctic operations equal
to or more extensive than its own, particularly in the Pal-
mer Peninsula region. If the United States wished to achieve
recognition of a territorial claim or claims, it would be
forced to concede the ri-ghts of other nations in certain
other arc.:, and thus to cease exercising the right of free
access to the entire region~»al 1 of this to no apparent
advantage. •>'
On August 10, I960, the Senate advised ratification
of the Antarctic Treaty by a vote of 66 to 21. Eight days
later, the United States became the fifth nation to ratify
the Treaty. On June 23, 1961, the final throe nations,
Argentina, Chile, and Australia, deposited their instruments
of ratification, and the Treaty entered into force on that
date. 58
The Antarctic Treaty was responsible for establishing
several precedents in the history of international rela-
tions. The Treaty was the first to prohibit nuclear ex-
plosions in any area of the world and to contain a system
of inspection adequate to insure compliance. In addition,
the Treaty represented the first c. lement in history to
^'Senate Foreign Relations Committee, A 'I
He a " pp. 39-4 0, 52.
5 8 Department of Stat< . United States Policy, p. 26,
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devote a large area of the world to pea< • ful pu es,
again under a comprehensive inspection systi Finally,
it was the first agr; to provide free access for scien-
tific investigation over a considerable portion of the
globe, 59
The Treaty would thus appear to offer important les-
sons for future international agreement regarding such is-
sues as disarmament, nuclear testing, and outer space.
One point, however, must be kept in mind, particularly
during the later discussion on the relevance of the Antarc-
tic experience to other areas: the Treaty did prohibit
certain types of activities in the Antarctic, but these
activities were not ones in which any nation was current-
ly engaged, Neither did it p ote any activities that
were not currently being conducted. In essence, the Trea-
ty simply formalized the situation that had existed in the
Antarctic during and immediately prior to the International
Geophysical Year and attempted to insure that the situation
would continue for at least 3? years.
This is not to imply, however, that the signatory na-
tions would have necessarily continued to abstain voluntar-
ily from those activities which were expressly prohibited
by the Treaty. Indeed, if the Treaty had not been concluded,
t; o ,,o -/ eSenate Foreign Re] Committee, An' : ' 'i • aty
H e a r i n g s
,
p t 4 5
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one c a 1 i w o ] i d e r w h e th e i t h c U n
i
ted St a t e s w o u 1 d b e t ] i
ing the waste materials from its nuclear reactor at McMurdo
Sound outside: the An1 rctic regions for disposal or whether
the French Go ight ! considered Adelie Land
as a more suitable site for the testing of nuclear weapons
than that utilized in the Tuamoto Archipelago.
The s i g n i f i c an c e of the An t a r c t i c T r e a t y would be
proved to lie not only in its stated provisions, however,
but also in the political climate which it successfully
maintained. Aided by the reduction of tensions over th
Antarctic, agreement would be reached pt the Meetings of
Consultation during the 1960 's on issues where agreement
was inconceivable before. Thus whatever the deficiencies
in the Treaty itself, the course of later events would
amply demonstrate the astuteness of the negotiators in not
jeopardizing the entire Treaty by insisting upon arrai
ments which could not be the subject of unanimity at that




THE ERA OF COOPERATION: 1960-1969
The programs condi • d under the Internation; • Geo-




b y d e fin i
t
ion, of 1 i m i t e d scope
and fixed duration. Therefore, once the United States had
decided to continue operations in Antarctic.;; on an indefi-
nite basis, both the government and the scientific commu-
nity were forced to devise new arrangements nore suitable
to a permanent effort involving constantly changing scien-
tific objective s « *
Upon the death of Admiral Byrd in 1957, the position
of Of ficer-in-Charge , United States Antarctic Programs, had
been a s s i g n e d to R e a r A d in i r a 3 G e o r g e J « Du f e k , w ho re t a i n e d
his original position of Comi d r, United States Naval
Support Force, Antarctica, The record of cooperation
achieved by Dufek and Dv , Laurence M , Gould, the chairmi
of the Antarctic Committee of the United States National
Committee for the IGY, had effectively eliminated the n<
for Byrd's position as a general overseer of Antarctic pro-
grams below the level of the Operations Coordinating Board,
and the Defense Department believed it best that Byrd's
other responsibilities be combined with those of the Con=
-Mlcnry M, Dater, "Organizational Developments in the
Un i t e d S t a t e s An t a r c t i c P r o g r a m , 1954-1965," Ant arc tj
c







i;i an d or of t h e S upp o r t Force . 2
I) u f c k r e c: e i v e d o r d e ] s in F e b r u a r y s J 9 5 8 , directin
g
him to continue to provide logistic support for Antarctic
operations after the completion of the IGY, and he immedi-
ately began studies on the manner in which this task might,
be fulfilled more economically on a permanent basis. It
was subsequently decided to abandon Wilkes and Ellsworth
Stations and concentrate American activities in the Ross
Sea Region, thus enabling the United States to use a sin-
gle supply line through the Naval Air Facility at McMurdo
Sound. Little America Station, although of great sentii
t a 1 value to the United St a t e s t w a s d e < 1 1 e d t o b e un n e i
sary to the Antarctic programs envisaged for the future,
and it was also abandoned., The meteorological role ful-
filled by Antarctic Weather Central at Little America was
a s s i g n e d t o t h e n e w 1 y - c r e a t e d 1 r; t o r n v t J o n a 1 Ar. t a r c t i c An a 1
2lJ. S., Congress, House of Representatives, Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Territor-
ial and Insular Affairs, !' ii on Dee] !' . 19 3-64
Opr- 1 i
;





Ma; 28 anc! Augi
190'.. SerTal No. 29 (Washington: United States Cover)
Printing Office, 1964), p. 18; and Dater, "Organizational
D e v e 3 o p 1 1 e n t s , " p . 2 5 .
•* U . S., Congress, House of Representatives, Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, Sub it tee on Territor-
ial and Insular Affairs, Hearings on Antarctica Legis
1
t ion- -1961, 87th Cong., lsl seis . , AiiguTt 24-25, 1961, Ser-
ial No, li (Washington: United Stater Government Printing
Office, 1962), pp. 59-60.
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ysis Center in Melbourne, Australia. '
The United Stater- offered to loan the abandoned sti
t i o n s , along w
:
; t h i n o s t of t h e \ r e q u i ] > 1 1 e n t , to a n y n a t i o n
or nations which would undertake to maintain and support
them and agree to allow American scientists to conduct re-
search there. These terms were accepted by Australia and
Argentina with regard, to Wilkes and Ellsworth Stations re-
spectively, and these nations were granted, custody in Feb-
ruary, 1959 t 5 An interesting legal problem developed with
regard to the manner in which the United States could trans
fer real est; - in two locations where it recognized no
jurisdiction but where the two recipients respectively
claimed sover e i g n
t
y » As o 1 ut i on w a s r e a c h e d w h c n the
claimants agreed to sign simple receipts stating that they
had received such property and equipment and would return
it on demand.
To further facilitate its logistic, effort in Antarc-
tica, the United States signed an agreement with New Zee-
land on December 24, 1958. Under its terms, the Unit I
4u. S,, Department of State, I ted States Polic y and
International Ci tio i ' ' ETc (
.
• EFnTted




5 H o u s e T e r r i t o
r
i a 1 ar d I n s u 1 a r A f £ r i r s S ub comm i 1 e
,
Hearing s oj ,' I L tii j ! SI
,
p . 60 ; and Dater ,
"Orgs ] i" Lo] s , " p . 2 '/
,
"Dater, "Organizational Devel tits," p. 27.
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States was permitted to establish an operational headquar-
ters and advanced staging base for the Antarctic in New
Zealand in return for the provision of logistic services
"as far as possible" for New Zealand Antarctic operations. 7
On October 18, 1960, t It i s a g r e e m e n t w as extended "to re m a i n
in force for the full period during which United States
personnel,, ships, and aircraft continue in future to be
based in New Zealand in connection with United States opera-
tions in An t a r c
t
i ca," s
The three United States Antarctic research stations
at which operations would continue were Amundsen -Scott at
the South Pole, By id in Marie Byrd Land, and. Hallett, which
would continue to be operated jointly with New Zealand*
Each of these stations was located within 800 air miles
of 1 1 1 e m a i n s t a g i n g a n d s u p p 1 y b a s e at McMu rd o Sound, w 1 1 i c h
,
in turn, was located 2,200 miles from what became the
a d v a n c e d. h e a d q u r . r t e r s a t C h ristchurch, N e w Z e a 1 a n d .
All these Antarctic stations had. been constructed dur-
ing the IGY and designed for temporary use, and the first
?U. S«, Department of State, "Operations in Antarctica
Agreement of 24 December 3958," United Stat : Tre;
Oth ej Internat 3 ' ts (Vi I Fe"cr"5~ta1
Govei Pri
.




, Department of State, "Operations in Antarctica
Ag:> t of 18 October 196 0," Uni1 d I ' and
1 hi 3 J i i ' 17 ments : I ted J >
5 n Printing . I ! .1) , Veil 2 , pt. 2, p. 2 20
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specific task facing the Navy in the field was their re-
habilitation and, in some cases, complete reconstruction.
Also desired were the installation of improved aids to
aerial navigation and the construction of airstrips at the
two inland stations to eliminate the need for airdrops,
which had frequently caused damage to equipment. The tran-
sition to permanent Antarctic facilities commenced in the
falJ of 1959 with Operation Deep Freeze 60 under Rear Ad-
miral David M, Tyree, who had succeeded to the positions
of Commander, United States Naval Support Force, Antarctica,
and Officer-in-Charge , United States Antarctic Programs
up o n t h e re 1 i r e m e n t of Ad m i r a 1 Du fe k the p r e c e d i n g An r i 1
.
"
The Navy had meanwhile become interested in the small
nuclear reactors being developed by the Army to generate
power for bases in isolated regions. The use of nuclear
power in the Antarctic appeared to offer immediate savings
over conventional fuels, the cost of transporting which
totaled 60 percent of the expenditures for Antarctic logis-
tic support, and the Navy began to prepare a site for a
^U. S., Congress, House of Representatives, Committee
o n I n t e r i o r a n d 1 n s u 1 a r A f f a i r s , S ub c o i .
m
i 1 1 e e en Territor-
ial and Insular Affairs, H Ings on Deep I '. eze J 962
erations , 87th Cong., 2nd' : May 2TJ iv-; , S rial No.
23*
(. Lngton: United States Government Printing Office,
1962)
, pp. 2- 3.
NOTE--Since 1959, the names of the annua] Operatic
Deep Freeze have corresponded with the fiscal year.
10 Dater, "Organizational Developments," p. 29.
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reactor at M c U u r d o S t a t i o n d u r i n g t he 1 9 60- 1 9 6 I s e a son.
The reactor was delivered to Antarctica in I iber, 1961,
and achieved criticality on March 4, 1962. Two years of
testing wore required before the reactor was accepted, by
the Navy, but it currently (1969) supplies a major portion
1 2
of the power required at the base.
Also in 1961, the Committee on Polar Research of the
National Academy of Sciences completed a two-volume study
of long-range Antarctic research objectives. The recommen-
dations of the Academy were translated by the National Sci-
ence Foundation into a five-year pirn for Antarctic prograi
involving specific, locations, personnel, and costs, which
was then coord in? ted with a similar five -year plan devel-
oped by the Navy for logistic support. The Foundation
a 1 so un d e r too k to prep a r e y e a r 1 y pi a n s fo r sub m i s s i on to
the Navy, which included the specific logistic, requirements
^U. S. , Congress, House of Representatives, Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Territor-
ial and 1 us o 1 a v Affairs , H Ln gs on ' tarcti ci Legisla -
tion--1 960, 86th Cong,, 2nd s ess., Sun IT^T4, 1960, Seri-
al No, 27 (Washington: United States Government Printing
Office, 1960), pp. 45-46.
* ' U „ S . , Con gre s s , S e n a t e , Co mm i 1
1
on Pub 1 i c W o r k s
,
Staf f Repi oj United States Oper ti< ii A t ica
,
89th Colig., 2nd sess, (I : "~0n . ' ; i /ern-
ment Printing Office, 1966), p. 6.
* ^Hou s e T e r r i t o r i a 1 an d I n s u 1 a r A f f a i r s S ub c( mil t e e
,
Heai " c / ' : I ' 1961, pp. 20-21; and
Hour e Te rrit( and Insular Afl Lt1 H
in on D ;p 1 1963-64 Operations, pp. 91-92.
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for operations du ' .'
; ar in questio In the 1961-
1962 season the Navy, at the scientists' reqi
,
beg;
construction of a new j Lon at the base of the Palmer
Peninsula. Subsequ tly named 1 in honor of
Dr. James Eights, ths fi American scientist to visit
the An t a i c t i c
,
i t w a s d e s i gn •
-
1 p r i m a r i 1 y fo r h i g h •- al t i t u d e
res earch . Th e ;: t a t i on w as evacuat c d in Novemb er , 1965
,
but in a y b e r e o p e 3 1 e d .. '
M e an w h i 1 e , a mo v e me n t w a s p r o g r e s s i n\ . i
!
t h i n t h e U n i t e d
States Congress toward the establishment of a separate,
central! z e d a g e n c y to v.s s u m e fu 1 1 r e s
p
onsi b ' fo r 1
1
coordination of United States plans and p: for the
Antarctic,. This movement had co: I in 1955, '.Pen in
his letter of appointment as Of ficer- in-Charge , United
States Antarctic Programs, Admiral Byrd had been assigned
the additional duty or' assisting the Defense Department
in "the development of necessary legislative programs, in-
cluding the establishment in conceit with the oilier depart-
ments of the government of a pt nt unit for Antarctic
activity.' Immediately prior to his death, Byrd began
Department of State. U "' I Stati P iicy, p. 15;
J i ! Sen r te Public 1 • United i
Ope rat io; ii ' i p . 8
.
*^Deputy Secretary of Def nse to Byrd, October 21, 1955,
in U. S., Dep; • n1 of Defense, Of ficer-in-Ch; . United
St a 1 e s An t ar ct i c P re'''' ' ' ' '
'i
]
. 1 Repo rt o f the <
i
-V'i '. . i ; : . :
S Gi Of fTc'e~, 19 5 7) , p. 12.

2 30
to develop plans foj an independent executive aj ncy which
would have full responsibility within the government for
all matters re I a t in g to the An t a r
c
tic. I n such a w a y , h
e
hoped to eliminate the lack of continuity that had plagued
the United States Antarctic effort in the past.
On March 18, 1957, seven days after Byrd's death, the
Defense Department submitted a legislative proposal for
the establishment of an Antarctic Commission to the Bureau
of the Budget. On April 27, Senator Alexander Wiley of
Wisconsin requested the Defense Department to assist him
in drafting a bill which would also create an Antarctic
Commi ssion
,
similar in structure to the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, which would be named after Admiral Byrd. The De-
partment of Defense complied, and the D \ ity United States
Antarctic Projects Officer, Dr. James E. Mooney, was assigned
1 7the task of assisting Senator Wiley. The bill received
the bi-partisan co-sponsorship of 2 3 senators and was in-
troduced by Senator Wiley on May 31, 1957. It was then
referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Works, where
l^Deputy United States Antarctic Projects Officer to
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular
Affairs,, J un e 24, I960, in Uo u s e T e r r i t o 3 i a 3 i nd In s u ]
:
Affairs Subcommittee; H Lngs c A tarctj
I960, pp. 50-51.
17 U o u s e T e r r i t o r i a I an d I n s u 1 a r Affair s S ub c o m m i 1 1 e e
,
H On 1 I - 1! 5-64 Operations, p. 45
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it received no hearings and no further consideration.
In an attempt to achieve more interest in his bill,
Senator Wiley addressed the Senate on January 27, 1958,
appealing to United States nationalism and fears of Soviet
encroachment, Dissatisfied with the emphasis on science
in current United States Antarctic programs, Wiley listed
as vital concerns other than scientific research: (1) de-
termining the United States position on territorial claims,
(2) deterring the Soviet Union from gaining control over
"strategic areas," (3) capitalizing on mineral deposits
and "strategic values
,
n and (4) maintaining the Drake Pas-
sage as an open waterway in case the Panama Canal were de-
stroyed
«
Tw o d ay s la t e r
,
Sena t o r W i 3 e y r e - in t r o d u c e d h i s bill.
An identical bill was introduced in the House of Represen-
tatives on June 30 by Representative Clement J. Zablocki,
7
also of Wisconsin. The bills proposed that a Richard
E« Byrd Antarctic Commission be established in the execu-
tive department for the following purposes:
^'U. S.j {' al Record, 85th Cong,,, 1st sess.
,





Record 85th Cong., 1st sess.,
Vol. 104, pt.'T '(.'J . /.\is:.<O t pp. 1032-1034.
2
° I ] o u s c T e r r i t o r i a 1 and In s u 1 a r A f fa i. r s S ub c o m m i 1
1
Hearinj s on A tic; Legis] 1960, p. 18.
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To provide for continuity porl of St utfy,
research and d of eac L
uses in science, c rce, and other act i vi
t
:
related to Ants . Lea, which sh a 1 1 i 5i c 1 u
„
but
s h a 1 1 n o t b c 1 :' i i t e d to
,
g s t h e i i n g , c v a 1 u a ting,
correlating, and dispersing of information i J. 1: n o w -
ledge obtained fro lor at ion
,
research, and o th-




travel, and oth areas of info \- i o n ; a 3 s v, to
coordinate Antarctic activities onj; thos e agen - '
cies of the United States Government and p ri va te
ins lit i .interested in or concerned di r e c 1 1 y





fusion of knowledge of the Ant
a
ret i c ; and to dir ect
and administer United States An t arctic pro g r a ;
in the national interest. *
Specific functions of the proposed Com!.', is si on would
include: (1) maintaining a depository of records concern-
ing the Antarctic, (2) conducting expeditions and supervis-
ing the c o n d u c t o f e x p e d i t i o n s b y o t h e r g o v i n m e n 1 « r-< en c i e s ,
(3) assisting private expeditions in programs of Antarctic
research "when such assistance is in the best interests of
the United States," and (4) disseminating information re-
latjng to the Antarctic.
The Commission would be headed by a Director and two
D e p u t y D i r e c t o r s a p p o i i
i
1 e d b y t h e Preside n t \
:
i t h the advice
and consent of the Senate, To assist the Commission, tl
President would also appoint a hoard of Governors of eleven
-men , four of whom were to be -from civilian life and the
21 Ho use Territorial : id Insula:"- Affairs Subcommitt








remaining seven to include the Director of the Commission
and representatives of the- Departments of State, Defense,
Commerce, and the Interior, the National Science Foundation,
2 ^
and the National Academy of Sciences,
On June 13 and 14, 1960, while hearings on the Antarc-
tic Treaty were being hold in the Senate Foreign. Relations
Committee, the Sub committee on Territorial and Insular Af-
fairs of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
held hearings both on the Zablocki Bill and on a bill which
had been introduced by Representative L. Mendel Rivers of
South Carolina. The latter sought to assign the overall
responsibility for Antarctic matters to the Department of
Defense } proposing that the Secretary of Defense should
"undertake and carry out a program to provide for the con-
tin u i t y , c x p i l :" i o n , s u p p o r t , a n d d e v e 1 o p m e n t o f s c i e n t i f
and other activities relating to Antarctica."
These bills were opposed by all the executive depart-
ments and independent agencies which submitted reports on
the proposed legislation, including the Department of De-
fense. These departments and agencies maintained that
present arrangements for the coordination of Antarctic ac-
tivities were operating in. a satisfactory manner and that
23House Territorial and Insular Affairs Subcommittee,
Hearings on A: cti ca Leg is 1 a t , pp . 3-4 .
2 4
I b i d
. , p . 3 0.
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a n i n d e p e n d e n t An t a r c tic commi a ]
'
y a n d
could produce duplication of effi ^ With ] d to the
Rivers Bill, it wa: rally belie> ' within the United
States Government that assigning the full responsibility
for Antarctic programs to the D f nse Department would be
contrary to the spirit of t3 A tarctic Treaty. Moreover,
P re s i. d e n t E :i s e n h o w e ha d r e c c n 1 1 y d i re c t e d t h e B ur e a u o f
the Budget to stud)- the go ental organization for
United States Antarctic programs and, as a result of tins
study, had concurred in the opinion of the executive depart-
ments. ' The President's decision i made jusl prior to
the Subcommittee hearings; and thus even the Defense Depart-
ment had reported unfavorably on both bills. With the 0]
position of the executive branch and tl : al lack of
In t e
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^Sc:: } for example, Assi: ( I ! anaj r, Atomic
Energy Commission, to Chai H se Interior and Insular
Affairs Committee, Juno 7, 1960, in Ibid., p. 7.
7 7
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,
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interest in the r on the part of Congress, no further
action v.' a s taken on the p r o p o s e d 1 e g i s ] a t i c
On August 1 3
,
'' he Director of the Bureau of the
Budget , Maurice II „ Stans, sent a circular to the heads of
the exec u t i v e d e
]
an d i 1 1 d i p e n d e n t a g e n c i e s w i t h
interests in Antarctica. On the basis of the study ap-
proved earlier by the President, the circular formally
assigned responsibilities and established general policies
for the planning and conduct of United States Antarctic
programs in the post-lGY years.
In the Budget Bureau circular, the National Science
Foundation was authorized to assume the "principal coordin-
ating and management role in the develop and cr.rryi:)?,
out of an integrated United Steles scientific program for
Antarctica,""" During the Internationa] Geophysical Year,
this responsibility had been vested in the National Acadi
of Sciences and its United States National Committee for
the IGY for the reason that the Academy was the United
States member body of the International Council of Scien-
tific Unions, under whose auspices the IGY had been con-
ducted. The Academy had a purely advisory role within the
United S t a t e s G o v e n t , hov:cvcr, and was not equip];,
1
"Bureau of the Budget Circular No. A-51, / gust 3,










to manage progi • that were now primarily unilateral and
most likely p t, The National Science Foundation,
on the other hand, had been previously z d by law
to perforin functions which made it admirably si Li d to act
as the coordinating body for United States Antarctic pro-
grains on a continuing basij , Those functions included:
(1) initiating and supporting basic scientific research,
(2) coordin ; its research programs with those of other
government agencies, and (3) cooperating in multinational
29
research, p r ogr a i n s .
Other government agencies with interests in Antarctic
matters were reqi d to assist the National Science Foun-
d a t i. o n by a p p o :i n t i n g re p r e sent.?' i v e s t o an Antarctic a d v i -
s o r >' co mm i t t e e an c! b y i n f o rm i n g b o th t h e F o un d an
d
the Defense Department of any proposals fo-j inclusion in
the United States program. The participation of the United
States in multinational programs was also to be arranged
and coordinated by the Fou dation, in consultation with
the D e p a r t m e n t of State. Fin
a
lly, t h e F o un d a t i o i \ \ ; as di-
rected to "scive a:; the: clearingh( ; d source of infor-
i
- tie n r e g a r
d
i 1 1 g t h e e x i s t e n c e an d 1 o c ; t ion o f An t a r c t i c
re cords * ,.3
29u. S., Statute: aj
j
Vol, 64 (1952), pp. 14
15 4. "Natii F< tion Act of 1950."
^Bureau of thi Budget Circular No. A- 5 1 , August 3,
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Under the Bud] I reau directive, the !' pari of
Defense retained the responsibility for planning and con-
ducting operation.1-, in sup] of Antarctic, p: ... The
Commander, United Sti ) Support Force, Antarctica,
continued to serve as the senior United States representa-
tive in Antarctica and was charged with "determj ing the
feasibility of, and insuring the success and safety of,
Antarctic operations while making all reasonable efforts
to provide the support necessary to fulfill the objectives
o f th e An t ar c t i c prog r am s . " 3 •'
The Ope., ions Coordinating Board continued to exer-
cise the ultimate responsibility for coordinating the "to-
tality of Antarctic activities" and reviewing the annual
plans for Antarctic operations. The budgetary require-
ments for future Antarctic programs would be planned ;
represented before Congress by the Nations! Science Foun-
dation, which was authorized to allocate funds to govern-
ment agencies and award grants and contracts to private
institutions for the conduct of Antarctic research. Lo-
gistic support continued to be funded by the 1 tment
_?i Bureau o_f the Budge 1 Circular Nq_. A-5.1, August 3,
1960, in House Territorial and Insular Affairs Subc
tee
,









At the subsequent request of the National Sc: ;
Foundation, the Committee on Polar Research of the Nation-
al Academy of Sciences undertook the task of advising the
Foundation of the views of the sci< itific community regard-
ing the c on t e n t of An t a r c t i c research.
4
On February 19 , 1961, the Operations Coordinating
Board and its Antarctic Working Group were abolished by
Executive Order in the general reform of the National Se-
curity Council conducted by the Kennedy Administration.
The Counci 1 p with its various hoard:;, staffs, and interde-
partmental committees, had apparently become extremely
ciu.iber s o m e b y ] 9 6 1
,
an d P r e s i. c) e n t Ken n e d y w i s h c d to o b tain
a g r eater level of c o m p a c tn e s s a n d f 1 e x i b i 1 i t y i n b o t h the
Council and its attendant machinery «'
*
Upon signing the order aboli.shi.3ig the Operations Co
ordinating Board, President Kennedy stated that the State
Department would henceforth coordinate the efforts of the
3 3_B ur e a u of the Budget C i r c u ] a r No. A- 5 1 , A u g u s t 3 ,
I960, in House Territorial und Insular Afi Subcommit-
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United States in relation to a particular country or area.^6
Subsequently directed to as; the responsibility for ov;
all coordination of United States activities in the Antar<
tic, the State Department created a Special Assistantship
for Antarctica i Bureau of International Organization
Affairs t Appoi: 1 to this position was George H, Owen,
who had served as an alternate United States representative
to the Treaty Conference. This Marked the first time in
United States history that the Department of State had as-
signed the responsibility for Antarctic affairs as oti
than a tehiporary or a collateral duty.
T h c S t a t e D epartment also c s t ab J i s h e d a 1 1 i r t c r a g e n c
y
' An t a r c t i e Coo r d i n a tin g G r cup' to a c c o r d o t h e r i n t e :< e s t e d
government : ; c ies a voice in i < 1 te : pei taining to the
Antarctic. The Group was composed of representatives of
the D e p a r t m e n t: s o f S t ate, Defense, C.c. e r c e , and the I n t e r
-
ior and commenced weekly, informal meetings under the chair-
manship of Special Assistant Owen on March 3, 1961, 38
3«Statement of the President Upon Signing Orders Abol»
ishing the Operations Coordinating Board, February 19,
1961, in Public Pi of the Pi ' of the United
States : Jo_hn I ', I 1961"" (Wash': : United States








t-c tic Legislati( 3 9 1L , p . 38
,
S^Head, Office of Ai tic Prog National Science
Foundation to Dr. J, h. Taylor, Consult; i . Territorial
Affairs, House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, Sep





Certain i rs of the House of Representatives im
mained concerned, however, with the need for more formal
arrangements for the coordination of United States activi-
ties in the Antarctic and were also becominj Ful that
the interests of the United States were not being adequate-
ly considered under the Antarctic Treaty. In hopes of cor-
recting these alleged deficiencies, Representative Zablocki
re -introduced his Richard E, Byrd Antarctic Commission Bill
in the Eighty-seventh Congress,
Hearings on the Zablocki Bill were again held by the
Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular Affairs on August 2A
and 25, 1961, Included in these hearings were three other
bills, all identical to that of Representative Zablocki,
which had been introduced respective:?)' by Representatives
Wayne N , Aspinall of Colorado, the chairman of the Interior
and Insular Affairs Committee, John P. Saylor of Pennsyl-
vania, the rani; in g minority member of the committee, and
Leo, W , * B r i e n of N e w Y o r k , t h c ch a i r m a n oft h e s u b c o mm i t
-
tee 3 9
Chairman Aspinall recognized the existence of a ju
dictional question within Congress over matters pertaining
to the Antarctic and, as the House Co e on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce had done in its report on the 1GY in
3
^Uouse Territorial and Insular Affairs Subcommittee,





1958, presented a stati it in justification of the int'
est taken by his committee. He maintained that the Inter-
ior and Insular Affairs Co sed "some jurisdic-
tion" over Antarctic mi t only because the Uni1
States exercised jurisdiction over Antarctic installations
but also because the American public was generally inter-
ested in such matters.
T e s t i m o n y b o t h i n f a v o r o f a n d in i t o th
e
proposed legislation was more specific and more heated than
it had been in the hearings of the year before. The posi-
tion of the executive departments and independent agencies
had remained that present am its for the coordination
of Antarctic pre. were operating in a satisfactory man-
ner and that an Antarctic commission was therefore unneces-
sary. Even if such a commission were established, it was
stated before 1 1 < e S ub c o mi :; 1 1 e c
,
i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a 1 c o o r d i n a -
40iiou.se Territorial and InsulaT Affairs Subcommittee,
Hearings on Antarctic a Legislati 19 5], p , 1
«
^Assistant Secretary of the Interior to> Chairman,
Horse Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, August 23,
1961
r
in Ibid., p. 5; Assistant Secretary of State to
Chairman, "Hous e Interior and Insular Affairs ( Lttee,
August 17, 1961, in Ibid
.
,
pp. 5-6; Acti Secretary of
Commerce to Chad e Interior and Insular Affai
Committee, August 23, 1961, in Ibid., pp. 6-7; Genera]
Counsel, I'm nt of Defense, to Chi i, Horse Inter-
ior and Insular Affairs Committee, August 10, 1961, in
Ibid
. , pp. 7-8; and Director, National Science Foundation,
to Ch n, House Interior and Insular Affairs Committ*
,
August 23, 1961, in Ibid., pp. 9-10.
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tion would still be required. Sp lly, the Stat* De-
partment spokesman, Special Assistant for Antarctica Owen,
maintained that any activiti involving relatioi Lth
other nations would have to remain under the guidance of
the State Dep; .^2 Rear Admira] Tyree expressed the
similar belief held by the Navy with regard to its role
in logistic support.
The executive departments also agreed that the pri-
mary American activity in the Antarctic for the foreseeable
future would be the collection of scientific data and that
the coordination of specific Antarctic programs should
therefore continue to be effected by the National Science
Foundation, Regarding these scientific activities, Dr.
Albert P. Crary, the Chief Scientist for Antarctic Research
P iog rams of the Found; tion, stated, "I have seen no lack
of coordination nor have I heard the sciei '• ts express
any lack of coordination." 44 Dr. Crary also expressed the
Foundation's belief that the creation of new administrative
arrangements could be detrimental to the present success-
ful effort. 45
ilov.se Territorial and Insular Affairs Subcommittee,
1
' on Ant j ! 1 at ion 1961










4 5 I b i d
.
,
p . 2 2.

24 3
The executive departments and independent agencies
were specifically opposed to the centr; lization of An1
tic data as envisaged by the proposed commission. They
believed that in most cases data from the Antarctic was
meaningless unless combined with information obtained in
other areas and that to replace the 'clearinghouse' func-
tion exercised by the National Science Foundation with a
central repository would therefore result in duplication
of effort. The Department of Commerce, in particular,
maintained that its Weather Bureau should retain the respon'
sibility for all meteorological data, as should its Coast
and Geodetic Survey with regard to data relating to tides,
seismology, and geomagnetism* 46
Testifying in favor of his bill, Representative Saylor
criticized the haphazard manner in which he believed Ant-
arctic operations were being coordinated* He maintained,
in addition, that the United States should anticipate de-
velopments iii the Antarctic that might cause a shift in
emphasis from scientific goals to those connected with po-
litical, economic, or defense interests by creating an
agency which could plan for all eventualities. He accuse:1
the opponents of the Antarctic Commission of "empire build-
4 6 Ac ting Secretary of Cora : to Ch tan, Hour ]
terior and Insular Affairs Committee, August 23, 1961, in
House Territorial and Insular Affairs Subcommittee, H
ings on Antarctica Legislatj 1961, p. 7.

2 A
ing" within their Les f and this a< tion was su]
ported by Committee Ch; • Aspmall.
Repr< Lve Say lor and other proponents of the Ant-
arctic Commission indicated a lac!:, of knowledge regarding
the current gov. ntal organizal for Antarctic ; ;.~
ties and .* d to be under the imp 'on that the Nation-
al Science Foundation was the coordinating agency for the
entirety of United States Antarctic programs rather than
for only those relating to science. Representative Zablockj
went one step further and stated that no agency had be
authorized or directed to coordinate the American effo
in the Antarctic. ^ In fvct
s
however, t) sponsibility
for such overall coordination had been sp Fically assig:
to the Department of State following tl abolishment of
the Operations Coordinating Board. Whether this responsi-
bility should hove been so assignee' o ] was being exercis d
e ffe ctively is another ques t .' on c n t i n 1 y .
It also appeared that dissatisfaction with the emp]
sis on science in the Antarctic Treaty was an important
motive behind the
j
posed legislation. Certain congress-
men not only maintained that the United States should
47nouse Territorial and Insular Affairs Subcommitl i
,
1








, pp. 12 , 44 „ 47.
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anticipate a shift to other than scientific goals in the
Antarctic bul : d to b that an Antarctic com
sion could so ' pr< that shift. Representative
Zablocki stated that it was precisely this concern over
the Treaty which had led hxi~ to introduce his bill in the
first place. Representative Saylor characterized the
Treaty as a "sacrifice on the altar of State Department
expediency" and expressed the doubt that supporters of th<
Treaty could be considered "red-blooded Americans . "^1
More specifically, R e p r e s en t a t i v e S a y 1 o r s t at e d to M r
.
Owen :
What you have done as a result of that tree
ty> Y° v have taken this country, your country and
miir,
,
the country that has done more exploring,
spent more money, and done more work in finding
out what is down there than a 33 the rest of the
world put together— you have handcuffed the Defense




In fact, the only "defense experiments" prohibited
under the Treat) were those related to weaponry. In addi-
tion, the failure of the Treaty to concern itself with eco-
nomic development did not mean that the United States was
SOnouse Territorial and Insular Affairs Subcommittee,
1
'
; ori / Legislatio 19
,




5 2 ib i d .
, p . 4 2 .
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refraining from activities in that regard, Morton Pomeranz,
the Assistant for International Activities of the Interi
Department's Technical Review Staff, informed the subcom-
mittee that the Interior Dep nt's Bureau of Mines and
Geological Survey wore preparing to conduct scientific
studies in the Antarctic with a view toward the future eco-
5 3
nornic development of the region.*
As had occurred in 1960, the Antarctic Commission
bills were never voted out of committee* Identical bills
were again introduced in 1963 by Representative Zablocki,
Say lor , and Craig Hosmer of California and in 1965 by the
same three congressmen and also by Representative Rogers
C. B, Morton of Maryland. These bills received no fori
hearings but were the subject of testimony in herrings on
the Navy's Operations Deep Freeze on various dates in 1964
and 1965. *>4 The objections of the executive departments
and the National Science Foundation have remained unchanged
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for the establish) ent of an A): ctic co: ' .. re-
ceived official consideration,
Regardless of the advantages or di: ntages of a
Antarctic commission, which will be discussed in the con-
cluding chapter, the congressional criticism of the nature
of the coo/ 1 ' ; ion bi effected by the State Depart:. ent
was not unwarranted. Prior to 196)
,,
the 0] jonr. Co;
dinating Board had pn ilgated annual statements of Antarc-
tic policy and broad guidelines for Antarctic operations.
This practice had not been followed by the State Dc ent
and the coordinal of specific pre ; . had accordingly
55been made more difficult. This lack i f direction could
not be alleviated by the State D« t*s interagency
committee, which involved informal meetings among relative-
ly 1 o w - 3 e ve ] p e r s on n e 1 .
Th e need for i mp r o v e m e n t s i n t h e c o o rd i \ t i o n o f An t -
arctic programs and, undoubtedly, the desire to avoid fur-
ther criticise from Congress led to discussions in October,
1964, among the Assistant Secretary of State for Interna-
tional Organization Aff: Lrs, r Clev< ": \ tl /, Ls-
tant Secretary ef Defense for Interns tional Security Af-
fairs, Johr 'j, McNaughton, end Director Leland J. Haworth
55nouse Territorial and Insular Affairs Subcommittee,





of the National Sr Foundation. After consulting with
the Dep; nt j of ( srior, the three of-
ficials decided to form an 'Antarctic Policy Group.' con-
sisting of t h e m s e 1 v e
s
} t o p r o
v
i d e a 3 eve] o f o v e r a ] 1 p o 1 i c
y
guidance higher than thai currently being afforded. The
Group would ha\ a peri 1 natu e, and the Si. at. o I 1 .:
ment member would ad ; s its chaii On April 10 , 1965,
their decision was approved by President Johnson, who charged
the Group with guiding United States Antarctic policy and
assisting in the development of United States Antarctic
5 7programs
«
Th e An t a r c t i c P o 1 i c. y G r o u p w a s r : s i g 1 1 e d specific r
sponsibi lities similar to those held by the Op s Go-
ordinating Board four years earlier. There included:
(1) formulating lJ:;'lC' , States Antarcti< policies, (?) es-
t ab 1 i s h i ] i g g u i c! e 1 i n e s fo r An t a r c t i c a c t i v i t J e s , a n d ( 3 ) r e -
viewing and approving plans iov specific United States pro-
grams. The interaj ;• committee established in 3961 re-
•>°0pen i ng St i 1 emen t by the Honor; I "' H 1 i i CI e \ e ) : n d
,
Assistant Secretary of State for In' . ' g';
Affairs, before the House Subcommittee on Territorial and
Insular Affai
,
April 12, 19 65, mimeo., Edward Ginn Li I
ry, Fletcher School of Lav era Diplomacy, p. 11.
r -i
•''St. by the President in Response to a Progre:
Report by the Am : Poli I roup, May 3 > 3 965, in Pub
i





(2 vols ".''7~Washi : i
'
l .
, 1966), Vol. 1, p. 469..
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mained in existence to afford a forum for the disi sion
of policy at a lower level. 58 The State Depart] !-
ished the Special Assistant sin p for Antarctica, however,
and thi r< p< isibility foj Antarctic ; again became
a collai ; in the Bureau of International Organi
zation / s s .
To f a c i 1 i t a t e t ho n e w a r r angements, the D e £ < ] s e D e -
partment abolished the position of Officer-in-Charge
,
United States Antarctic Programs on April 22, 1965, Duties
of this office relating to the coordination of Antarctic
activities between the Defense Department and other agen-
cies were transferred to a newly-created Special Assistant-
ship for An t a r c 1 i c M a 1 1 e r s in t h e f fice of the As s i s t a n
t
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs,
No further changes have been made in the arrangements
within the United States Government for Antarctic activi-
ties. With the exception of the above changes occasioned
by the abolishment of the Op e
r
i . 1 1 o n s Co o r
d
i n a t :» n g B o a r
d
and the later creation of the Antarctic Policy Group, the
Budget Bur . Circular of I96 remains at presort. (1969)
the organi'/ a t
:
; o n a 3 d i r e c t i v e fo r t h e f o rmulation an d c o o r
-
d i n a t i o n o f U n i t e d S t a t e s An t a r c t i c p o .! i c i c s a n d p r o g r am s ,
^Statement of Assistant S r ary of State for Int
national Organization A Lrs, April 12., 1965, mimeo., up.
11-1 2
.
S^Dater, "Organizatii D velopi ," p. 31.
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The United States is < ting field operations in
the Antarctic in J 9 6 9 in accord with the second five-
year plan of tin National Science Foundation. Submi
in 1 9 G'l and reis: ued in an upd ted version in 1966, it de-
fines as a principj ] objective the ; , "[:.1 o-,'ation of the 40
percent of the / tic Continent that remains relativi •
ly unknoi , The p] also calls for a major effort on the
Palmer Peninsula, v;hich is particularly important to the
sciences of geology and biology as both a i extension of
the Andes Mountains and the region of Antarctica most pro-
lific in plant and animal lif Di ing "his five-year per-
j. o d
,
t h c r e s e a r ch t o b e c o n d u c t e d i n An t a r c t i c a i n v o 1 v e s.
eight major scientific disciplines: biology, cartography,
geology, glaciology, earth geophysics, vv'hich includes seis-
mology and studies of gravity and tism, meteorology,
oceanography, and upper atmosphere physics.
To facilitate the scientific effort on the Palmer Pen-
insula, Palmei Station was constructed on Anvers Island dur
ing the 1964-1965 : A sixth permanent United States
Antarctic Station, Plateau, was constructed during the Ant-
a r c t. i c s i r o f 1 9 6 5 • ] 9 6 6 o n the p o 1 a r p 1 a t e au , so m e 600
^U . S ,
,





1 ! 1-69, in House Inl ' ;lai
,
He a: ] ' 1963-64 Ope:
1 ; •




mile:; beyond the Pole from McMurdo Sound.
Of g; significance to the scale of scientific activ-
ity that can be condu 1 in the Antarctic has been the
revolution in Antarctic air transport, effected by the
United State:; Navy ' Air Force. In the past, a research-
er was fon d to arrive in A ica in the austral sui
mer, spend the winter at a station, and then commence his
studies the following spring. His period of effective
work was further limited by the time involved in surface
travel to the specific region in which he wished to con-
duct his r e s e a r c h « S c i e n t i s t s t. h u s h a d to s p e n d o v e r ;
year away from their home institute in order to carry
out a few wee! s of research. Now a researcher can be flown
directly to and from the Antarctic area of interest in one
season ,
The n umb e r of r e s c a r c h e r s i n v o 1 v e d i n Ai 1
1
1 r c t i c pro -
grams under the auspices of the National Science Foundation
has incn d from 109 in 1960-1961 to 220 in 1967-1968.
Of the latter total, 61 percent were affiliated with uni-
versities, 13 percent represented private research insti-
tutions, ai - 1 21 percent were ei d in projects on behalf
of gOA ient agencies, which included the Departments of
"^Senate Public Works Cora ,'.] o United Si
1 Ln Ant; c a , p . 8
.
"^Dater, "Organizational Developments," p* 29,
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Commerce, the Interior, the Army, and the Air Force, and
the National Aeronautics and Spn.ce Admin i: at ion. The
remaining five percent was composed of eleven administra-
tors re] resenting either the National Scien< e Foundation
or the National Academy of Science* « Not included in these
totals arc the various scientific projects conducted by
the Navy in conjunction with its Operations Deep Freeze.**
Expenditures for United States Antarctic programs
have increased correspondingly during the seven-year per-
iod... In fiscal year 1961 , the National Science Foundation
a v.- a r d e d g r an t s fo r An 1 I' i c r i c h t o t a 1 i n g $5,460,82 ,
a sun which exceeded by over $400,000 the amount award*
for such research during the entire IGY. In the sane fis-
cal year, the Navy's direct expenditures for Antarctic
log i stic s up p o r t to t a ] e d $ 16, 265,000-- an i n c e « : e o f a p
-
p r o x 5. m a t e 1 y 5 p e r c e n t o v e r the a v e r a g e c o s t of the C )
,
t i o n s D e e p F r e e z e r e 1 a t e d t o I G Y p r o g r ams . In £ i s c a 1 y e i r
1962, the budget of the Naval Support Force, Antarctica,,
was cut to $11,184,000. With the completion of the major
part of the post-IGY reconstruction, hov/ever, this level
of support allowed the National Science Foi 1 ion to in-
crease its grants fo ' rc.h to a total of
63"USARP [United States Antarctic Re: 1 ' ram]
Field Personnel, Summer 196 7-1968," An1 J a l o f





On June 1 4
a
1962, r Admii 1 Tyree, the coi land
of t ii e Naval Support Force, Antarctica, submitted a bi ',
estimate for fiscal year 19 64 calling for expend s o r
$85*9 million, to include a new icebreaker and sevi ral air-
craft. ' Chief of Naval Operations approved for planning
purposes a budget of $38 million and informed Admiral Tv
that the aircraft and icebreaker would be obtained through
other programs. In later budget reviews, this sum bee;
reduced to $25.8 million. On December 17, 1962, the Chief
of Naval Operations promulj : d the final di ci; ion of the
Secretary of Defense to establish a limit of $20 million
to the expenditures of Deep Pre:/:-.- 64, The Hour;-: Sub coi
mittee on Department of Defense Expenditi sub squently
rcco m m e n d a d a further r e d u c t i o n of $ r 5 m i 1 1 i o n i n t he I \ p
Freeze budget, and Adi i : ' Tyree' s final budgel estim;
'
for fir ral year 196 4 was $19.5 million. 65
This 1 i mi t to tli c budget of the Naval Slip port Force
has rem " d in existence up to the present (3.969), It
has proved subject to some adjv ' nt, however, and exps
6 4 F o r the record of e xp e n d i t \ i r e s i n c o
n
nee t i o n w i 1 1 \
United S, : ,' tic pro"; ms',~ see U e S., National Sci-
ence Foundatii ' i I Report (Ifashii on : United St;
Govern Printing Pice) foi the fiscal year in questio
° 5 U . S .
,
N avy , Co r , Uni1 d S1 : : 1 ;
Force, An ta i, Reporl of Op '• r D p Fi 64
(Wa shingt on
; 1964) , LT] . o i f h •: U , s . . ;
Force , / ti
,
I hingti D, C,




ditures for some fi< ci 1 years ha\ ached $20 million. ^°
Inasmuch as the amount of scientific research that can 1 -
conducted in the Antarctic depends roughly on thi 1< \re]
of logistic support afforded by the Navy, expend] by
the National Sci< Foundation, for Antarctic programs have
remained Le at approximately $8 million per year sin
1964. Both the Foundation and the Navy appear satisfied
with the current .level of Antarctic research activities,





The failure of thi congressmen n< ted s rlier to achieve
radical change in cither the organizational arrang i ts
for Ant £ rctic operations or the nature of current An tare
tic policy cpn be attributed to th« d< ; of success en-
joyed by those arrangement.'-- and that policy d the yc:
since the s i gn i n g c f 1 1 1 e An t a r c t i c Tr e a t y . Li
t
tie r e a 3
disagreement existed amonj thi majority of the members of
the executive and legislative branches oi the United States
Government with the following j . ats, expressed by the
Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization
hffi'jrs
f Harlan Cleveland, in 1965:
66 n .Dater, "Organizational Developments," p. 31.
Senate Public Works O.y:^ < ; ' Uni ted Sta
Operations in Antarctica, p. 12.










The An1 Lc Pro • working smoothly
Lei y . The re 1 at ion:
go I : th ] ' ofi :
;
. ; i b i 1 i t)
r ; the 1< I rce
: i fie pro in excellent hands,
rnationally, the Program work - ry lit
on al rivalry ; politics is at rei I bli mini-
When ' s finds a Govern) t activity thai
s as well as the Antarctic Program docs, it 5s
c not for reorganizing but for rejoicing. "°
An important factoi i n these successes has been tl
ability of th Les to the Antarctic '; y to roach
further agreement at meeting of con tion during 1
1960's, It had been stipulated in the Treaty that tl
first such meeting would be convened in Canberra within
two mo tl " ; Pt( the Treaty had entered into for< s.69 i n
the meantime , h ' evei
,
37 interim consul tat j :
were held in Washington among representatives of the sig-
natories. At these meetings, specific procedures were
developed to assist the fulfillment of the te: s of the
Treaty regarding scientific cooperation in general and the
7
exchange of data in ] lar. u All the recomi Nations
adopted by both the inl I th formal consultative
6S$t; of A: Ls1 Secretary of State for Interna
tional ganizal ion Affairs, April 3 2, 1965, mimeo., p. 12.
69 U. S., Department of State, "The Antarctic Treaty,"
Un "'
. t e s ] r e a t i e s and Oth Inl tic 3 Ag 1 s
OVashington : U S1 i Go van snt )' j
3 961) , Vo3 . 32, pt . 1, p. 798.
70 Department of State, Uni1 d States Policy, p, 33.
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meetings have received the subsequent, approval of the Con-
tracting IV, V. have < ed into force among then in
accordance vith Article 9 of the Treaty,
The delegates to the interim meeting of July 19, I960,
recommended to their respective governments that the Spe-
cial Com Antarctic Research, which had been formed
by the International Council of Scientific Unions in 1957,
be encouraged to continue to act as the international ad-
visory and coordinating body for Antarctic research pro-
7
1
grams. This enabled til': meetings of consultation under
the Antarctit Treaty to concern themselves primarily with
p o 1 i tic a 1 an d admin i s t r a t i v e m a 1 1 e r s . 1' o r e f .1 e c t its p er-
manence, SCAR ently ch j d its name from Spec.'-- ''
to Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research and extended
its arc;; of concern to include other than the geophysical
72
sciences* As a member of the ICSU, the National Academy
of Sciences represei ts the United States at the annual meet-
ings of SCAR and informs the National Science Foundation
of any SCAR recommendation: ertinent to United States Ant-
arctic program: < Like the resolutions of its predecessor,









ta on in ' - /' < 1 i c (He v ) : Ai j
Field Staff I ! u .'.} . pp. 8-9. .
'3h . ] Ltorial and Insular Aff; : , Subcomi ittee,




the Comite Special de 1'/ G phyisqui y \'. tionale,
recommendations ' by SC/ it ions
have no force oth r than as expressions of the wishes of
private scientifi di< i the govei ts concerned
decide to pu1 recomi iations into practic
The Fi: '. tic Treaty Consultative Meeting w;
held in C; ibi in July, 1961. The delej s agreed upon
16 recommend. ' ns, the majority of which were designed
to amplify the terms of the Treaty itself. For example,
where Article 5 of the Treaty had simply stated that each
Party .should inform the c s of all ii xpeditions,
stations, and military personnel and equip] snt in Antarc-
tica, Recomi d ion 6 of the First C Lve Meeting
proposed that, such inf< tion be exchanged before Nov:
bcr 30 each yeai and include such items as: (1) names,
types
,
numbers, descriptions, and armaments of ships, air-
craft arid, other vehicles introduced, (2) itineraries to
be followed by expeditions to, from, and within Antarctica,
(3) names ni:(\ ranks of military officers and profession;!
af filiatii of scientific personnel
,
(A ) content of sci en-
tific programs, and (5) pri ' le scientific equipment to

25 8
i i 7 4be used.
Other recoi Ions ] tained to the exchange of
scientific p rs< 1, the u: ( of the World Data Centers,
cooperation wit) national organis s inter*
in Antarctic • cl
,
of data on logistic
p r o b 1 e i .i s
,
the p r o t e c 1 ' o f o 1 j e c t s of h i s t o r i c i n t e r e s 1
,
and the e of "information on the application of nu-
clear equi] ai Lqi in the Treaty area.*' 75
Tw o o f t he r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , h o w ever, representee' a
movement toward agreement in entirely new areas--those of
postal sei and conservation. The provision of post a]
services in A tica had caused disputes on several oc-
casions in the past, du< to its r Ions hip to the effcc=
tivc administration deemed nee . successful ter-
ritorial claim. It was ret; ded at Canberra, however,
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'**Recom - i tions of the First Antarctic Treaty Coi
tative Meeting, July 10-24, 1963, in Depart! of Stat<
Uj» :< ted SI : Policy
, pp 32»36 .
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1. promote cooperation among expeditions in
the Treaty area in the collection and distribution
of mail for ex] lit ion l rs
;
2 f advise each other of opporl ies for
forwardi i) to and frc->. stations in the Treaty
area
;
3* consult together with a view to reaching
a g r e e i n 1 on f u r t
h
or p r a c t i c a 1 m e a s u r cs fo r i mp r o v
•
postal communications in the Treaty area.'"
The conservation of Antarctic resources has an obvious
relationship to the future economic exploitation of the
region > regarding which no agreement whatsoever was thought
possible at the Antarctic Treaty Conference . At the First.
Consultative M eting, however, the delegates recommended
that their governments "recognize the urgent need for mea-
sures to c< ve the living resources of the Treaty area"''
and consult on the establishment of specific measures of
conservation. The delegates further re ded thai ;' the
interim the nations issue general ruler, of conduct on the
lines recommended by SCAR at its meeting in Cambridge,
England, in August, J9C0.
SCAR had reci ded to the participating nations that
the indigenous plant and animal life of the Antarctic should
not be disturbed, destroyed, or injured except, for fo
specific purposes: (!) to conduct sci Lfic studies,
' (> Ucco: d tions of the First Antarctic Treaty Consul




77 1 bid., p. 34.
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(2) to obtain food Jo. and dogs, (3) to ol speci-
mens for zoologica] ;.'.' , and (4) to obtain "a. strict-
ly limited numbei of speci " for pri vat purposes ."
SCAR maintained that th above exceptions should be
permitted only under strict controls ai d if there were no
d a n g c r o f d e p ] 6 t i n g 1 o c a 1 s t o c k s a n d t h a t in no c a s c s h o u 1
d
exceptions (3) and (4) apply to fur seals. SCAR had also
recommended that the introduction of alis : i es should
be prohibited "except when rigidly controlled having ) . ;-ard
to their chai c/5 of survival, capacity of rep 'ion and
utilization by man."' Finally, SCAR had recomm nded that
variou ti vi ties potential ly <- to wildlife b
regul at ed. Thes e included the ope rati ; r . ' n aft and
other vehicles in close p] y to colonies of birds or
seals, the discharge of oil by ships, and alio •' to
run f re e
«
A) on:; with the other reci i 'ions o f the First Ant-
arctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, the interii m asi
of co e i terf d into f< oi Apr 5 1 30, 19 62, Tie
fi.nr-1 a j ent or i es of conservation had been
reached among the Parties by the time of the Second Meet-
' ° Re coi ' of the First Ant arct i c Treaty Consu]
t at i v e Meeting, July 10-24, 1961, in D of l 1 : ' •• .
Uni1 IS 1 I , p . 3 5 .
7 9 Ibid.
, pp . 34 «-35.
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ing, held in Buenos Ai in July, 1962; and t]
to that mi • recommended that their governments cont.;
to con s ul t on the i
The Third and Fourth Consultative Meetings wer< held
in 1964 and 1966 in Brussels and Santiago respectively.
At the Brussel: . Lng , the del* signed the Agreed
Measures foe the Con: ' of Antarctic Flora and Fauna,
which contaii ed virtually the same rules as the interim
measures based on the recommendations of SCAR and made any
exc ep
t
ion to t h s m s ub i e c t to prior i s s u an c e of a p e r 1 1 i
t
by a participating nation. The Aj ! i in
no genera] restrictions regardii t life but prohibit
within the Treaty area "the killing, wi ' g, capturing,
O 1
or molesting of any native animal or native lord." Per-
mits allowing exceptions to this rule; were to be issued
only to pro vie'.: necessary food for men and do rc\r , for sti '. ,
80 Ik commei 1 : ons o f t h
su ) t a t i ve Meet j n g , Ji
"
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Second Antarctic Treaty Con
,
) 9 6 ?
,
i n De p r 1 1 m e n t. o f
p. 39.
s of the S e c o n d A t a r c t i c (
'
o force on January 11, 1963.
t< tica : Measures in F u '
jectives of the Antarctic
s .- dOt] T ' rnationa]
, pp. 99-103.
°^Agri I Me; : for the Conservation of ' ctic
Dorr and Fauna in "Report of the Third Antarctic Trea
Consultative Meeting, Brus: is, 1964," 1 Polar ' rd,




and for the collecting of specimens. Permits would also
be required for the import:- Lou of any nc • ous plant
or an i m •? 1 1 i f e 3 n d w ere to be g r a n t e d 1 ; 3 y for si e cl g e d o g s
,
other domestic animals, domestic pi: and laboratory
specimen:
,
In no case was a permit to be granted for the
importation of poultry. The /; 11 sures also accorded
special status to regions of partici '' biological impor-
tance* Within such 'Specially Protected Areas, 1 permits
would be necessary for the additional activities of collect-
ing plants and operating vehicles, '~
The /. 1 I sures for the Consei vat ion of Antarctic
Flora and Fauna represented a definite c sion by the
claimant nations. Not only were certain areas of their
claims placed in a special int status but also
the r i g h t 1 per m 5 1 a c t i v i
t
i e s p r h i b i t e d b y t h e A g 1 e e
d
Measures, both in these areas and throughout Antarctica
generally, had been granted, to all participants. The sev-
ere i g n r i g h t to e n g a
g
r i n s u c h 1 i c e n s 5. n g a c t a v i t i c s had been
j e a 1 o u s 1 y g u a r d e d b y t he c ] a i 1 a n t s i n t h e p a s t ai 1 d , 1 i k
e
the provision of post,'-? services, had <.. d disputes on
more than one occasion. In the United States, permits to
engage in activities prohibited by the Agreed 1 ures are
8 2 Ag r e e d .K I e a s u r e s i n "Re p r t of the T
h
i r d An t ar ct i
c
Treaty Consultative Meeting," pp. 459-460.

issued to i rchers by the Na1 '• 1 S< Lence Foui ion
in accordance with estal iished by the
Antarctic Policy Group. °*
The Antarctic Treaty has also fulfilled its purpose
of maintaining a climi iducive to international cooper-
ation in the field, tl period since 1960, the
United Si:;-;!:;.' ha! been invol^ d , ' < time or another in
programs of personnel e nge with each of the eleven oth-
er Contracting Parties. In addition, participants in United
States Antarctic activities have included scientists fro
such non-signatory nations as Austria, Brazil, Canada,
Denmark j the Gc. Federal public, Italy, Lebanon, Mid
Switzerland, During the 1967-1968 season, for example,
Am e r i c a n s c i e n t. i s t s s e r v e d e i 1 h e r w i th the e xp e d j t i o i i .c ' o r
at the Antarctic stations of Japan, Australia, Argei '" a,
the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. At the same
time, s c i e n t i s t s f r o m B e 1 g i urn , C h i 3 e , N
o
i . fay, So u t h A f r i e a
,
the Soviet Union, and the Gen an Federal Republic were par-
ticipating in Antarctic programs under the aus] : - s of the
United States ,. 8 ^
The partici] nations have rlso engaged in various
83 T« 0. Jones, "A Review of the 1967-1968 Summer S<
son," Antj j, 1 ] States , Vol, 3 (July-
August, ' ] 968)
,
pp. 79- 80 .,
84,1 International Exchanges, 1967-1968," A
n
] o





joint research programs. In progress : : th<
\
nt til
is one of th( most significant of these, the Internationa]
Weddell Sea Oceanographic Expedition (IWSOE). Inaugurati
in 19 6 7 and scheduled for completion in 19 69, the IWSOE
involves the United States icebreaker ; Ler and the Ar-
gentine icebreaker San Martin in studies of the physical
and biological charad is tics of the icebound central and
western readies of th< Weddell Sea, Except for a small
amount of data obtained by pre-World War 1 ( :< rman and Brit-
ish expeditions, the region has remained unl up to this
time. 85
Official United S Ob rers have cone1 ; ted two
tours of 3 ion in the Antarctic since the entry of the
Treat)' in t o force. The f i r s t , d u r i n g t h e 1 9 6 ?> - 1 9 6 4 An tare-
tic summer, involved a tot a 3 of 10 Antarctic statii
1 o n g i n g t o A r g e n t i n a , Chile, F r an c e , N e w 7 e d , the So-
viet Union, and the United Kingdom, With regard to th
scope of the inspection, the observers reported:
All buildings and facilities with a few minor
exceptions were inspected at each station visited.
Equipment and scientific instn ...:<•' s were exami
in sufficient detail to ascertain their u: e and in-
tended purpose. Conversations were held with sta-
85Robert L, Dale, "International I'm'-'"]] Sea 0<
( iphic Expeditio 196 8 ," An" tic Jou of tl i !
Sta1 s, Vol. 3 (Jvly
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tion 1 ' arid key p : to ascertain the
natui ( " is and a c t i v i t i es i d e
r
to vi
, thai eacl Lc statii - w s b In;
used fo. peaceful pses. J
The United S pec tion team fi : no evidence
that Antarctica was i : Ytg utilized for other than peaceful
purposes and concludi ! "the ; of the station:
visited were beii g co: 1 '< d in consonance with the AntarC'
tic Treaty." 87
During the 3 966-196 7 sei , United States observers
conducted a second round of inspections, involving An'
tic stations of / g , Australia, France, Japan, Soutl
Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. Also
inspected at this time was the Danish ship Thali D in
the process of unloading supplies and equipment at Austra-
lia's Wilkes Station while under charter to French and Aus<
tralian expeditions, Again the observers rted:
There was no evid nee to i ;. ' any viola-
tion of either the pre oi the spirit of the
An t a :>. c 1 5. c T r e a t y . A 1 3 t h i n f o r m z t 1 o n o b t a i n e d a t
these stations indicates .' is being used
solely for peaceful purposes. 88
8 6 R e p o r t of United S
1
1 t e s b s e r v e r s on Inspection o
f
Ant.'. Lc Stations, 1963-64 Austra3 T v Season, in De-
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Tho United S1 appears to have been Ful in
achieving the go t it had S< ght through the Antarc-
tic Conference of 195! Antarctica remains demilitari




t h i n d r a n c
e
t h r o u g h o u t t h e i e g i o n . In 1 9 6 9
,
political tensions over
Antarctic clai theii lowest level since the orig-
inal British Letters Patent of 1908, and the claimants them-
selves appeal to have softened their positions in the face
of the great successes of the Treaty and it; programs of
multinational r< ch and scientific data exchange. /•
a result, the nati olved in the Meetings of Consul-
tation are fin lii 'elves able to reach agreement on
an ever increasing number of coop ; 1 i ures,
The Uiiited States remains committed to the policies
which resulted in the Antarctic 1 ai -'; the state of
affairs that currently exists in Antarctica, end this coin-
mi tmen t was re-affirmed on May 30, 1965, by Pi '' nt
Lyndon B« John so: :
Or ob j ecti ve hi An t. a ret i ca can b i si ari
in four very s :! i e s t: a t ents , We stand b e h .'
the Ant
a
C t ? ',' ty r-u1 will do everyt h i n g i n o u r
power to ure th at the Ant on will 1
a p] a ce o f p r: -<<:'• rat! i a pi a ce o
f
ho sti I •
i n V . i .1 r
.
: 1 r i e s ; we stro: g 1 y fa i n t e r -
hat ion a
]
. on i : ion g the n a t ions \ h i ch i
active in / i ' c a ; \ port, w i i cry re-
sou s c i ;' c research in Ant arc!"
,
fui t.her
explo. .' on 1 ch
'
o i : i c a
,
th deA lop
Kent of new hod s oft port an d lo g i s t i c
:
that vest re n
,
and th i ' :: on i r •
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plant and anima] life there. nally, we earnesl
ly hope that t\< great projects of peaceful co-
operation in Antarctica will yield res< es which
every nation n and every nation isc.89
S^Remarks Following a Mc with Members of tl : ' Ant-
arctic Policy Group, May 20, 1965, in Lyn-
d R. Joh!;?ov 10 65, Vol, 1, p. 5 64,

C0NC1 ; '
Agencies of ' ! : : ( ; o - . n: ' : been
aged in uni ' i
,
'
i on th ' - • ic Ci
nent for a period of 15 ; . Prio] to the cruise of the
icebreaki I ' h >, such involv< had b
limited e sep Lods, each of only two years
duration. Ever if th Lties of private United States
Antarctic i ; - included, the presenl p< riod of
continuous oper. I is has already surpassed in length thi
total duration of all such op- rations on the part of tl e
United States in th p
The sporadic nati of United States ir. vo< it in
the Antarctic prior to th« Int< rnati : ] G ophy; ica] V
can be traced to a lack of direct and di; interests
in the region, Unliki the nations more actively involved
during the first half of the t\ ti I century, the United
States was neith • )graphically near to Antarctica nt
significantly engaged ii Antarctic fishing or whaling.
The United States was concerned with protecting the rights
it possessed in Antarctic* primarily in ordej to b« in a
p o s i. t i o n t o s h a r e i n a ny fu t u r e d i s c o v e r i e s o f v a 1 u < , a n d
this concern, in itself, failed to provide sufficient in
centive for the expc r di \ ures necessary to the continued
maintenance of a U Lted S ates presence.
A more imi liati i .
:
da: are:" ' - he




1930's, o.nd t j i o application of these ad ca
by men such as Admin ' By -d. The dei ! ' : bility
of sustaj ' in the Antarctic c ' military
strategists to b gin to consider the pi LI I role of the
region in future : onflicts, Antarctic? was, and re
it. a i n s
,
of in i n i m a 1 s t ] . . i c i m p o r t a n c e , ho \ i : v e r , d u e bo t h
to its geogr; lion and to the immense costs that
would be involved in the establishment of military bases
on the continent. Defense ministries of all nations have
consistently preferred to allocate their funds to less cost-
ly projects in regions of greater interest. Conversely,
if any nation had been willing to undertake the militari-
zation of the ' i c , the sh< i r exi e of the ] egion
coup! ed with the lacl< of suitable landing beaches would
have made its forces extremely difficult to di Lodge. More-
v e r
,
t h e exi s t e n c e of hostile a i r c. i ' : o r m i s s :; J r - b a s e s i n
the Antarctic could have posed a sir. : 'leant threat to el lies
of the United States in the Southern Hemisphere . The
U n i t e d S t a 1 \ s G o v - n t t h e re To r e felt c o n s t r a i n e d to res-
pond to demonstrations of in1 srest in Antarctica by potei
tially hostile powers, such as Japai ; id Germany in th
1 a t e 19 30' s a n d t h s S o v i e t U n i o n in 19 5 0. None of t h
-
-•Walter G. Sullivan, "Ant; : ca ii a Two-Power World,"
Forei '
,
Vol. 36 (October, 1957), p. 163,
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thy material] : ; d, hoi Jap j and Sovi
both continent until
the IGY, and N ; ' many fai] d folli i i its one ex-
pedition, As a con; ' United St -was not pre-
sented with incentives for p tent Antarctic operations.
An in' in Antarctic ] < began to do vol op
among Ams ican scic ; ' ts, however, as a result o£ th« work
of the Byrd Expeditions of 1928 and 1933; but until the IGY
had dramatically demonstr; ted the value of that research,
the United St a - G< rnment was not incli I t< gra I it
permanent support. In any event, all ft ' -1 : to
sovereignty over Antarctic territory had 1 d by
nations 'friendly' to the United States, and none of the
nations evej offered a significant tl to t] ;tiviti
of American scientists. The presence of Unit States ex-
peditions in regions cl aim d by tl e s : nations was oft
the cause of diplomatic protest?, but non« c f the claimai I
was disposed to use harsh asures.
The non-existence of direct ir for permanent
United States involv ' in the An1 ctic \ a s especially
apparent during the period from 3939 to 1941, According
to the report submitt d by the State Department in January,
19 39, official < d protect in j .'
in Antarctica was j u by four factors-: (1) the fe
ibility of polar aviation, (2) American interests in t
strategic and economic implications of An1 ; ' ! tl
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measures being taken by several nations rd cementing
their pot or c and (4) recent indications of i
in the Antarctic on tl pa t of Japan and Germany,
It is doubtful th the existence of th . bove factors
alone would ! led tl cutive branch to promote an of-
ficial expedition to the Antarctic or Congress to appropri-
ate the n< ' d: . Tl, . am« f<ictors were present
on many oc< ' both before and after 1939, ;nd the United
States never responded to them with an official Antarctic
expedition. It would therefore appear that the real fac-
tors behind the 19 39 expedition we tl interest of Presi-
dent Roosevelt in the Antarctic and the action taken by
Germa:
.
I yond its simple manifestation of interest. I]
d e e d
,
o n c e the d i r e c t G c r m a n t h r e a t h a d re c s d e d , t h c c o n »
tinned existence of the factors mentioned by the State De-
partment were not seen by Congress to jv-'.ify the permanence
of the United States Antarctic Service, particularly during
a tine of rapidly increasing govern: ta] expenditures for
other purposes
«
The next period of official United States operatio
in the Antarctic consisted of the two expeditions which were
planned and conducted by the Navy in 1946 ; ' 1947 end fi-
2 Acting Seer of State Sumner Welles to I ' ! ent
Franklin 1), Roc , File No. 80 0. OK / tic/12 9/
January 6, 1939, U. S. National Archives, Dept. of State.
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nanced rrovA the I ' s normal operal : This involve
ment had not been preci 1 by An ': interests p
so but rathe] by the ('• i to test military equi] nt in
a polar region where activities would be less likely to
cause an incr . of 1 ions with the Soviet Union. As
had occurred earlier in the d le, Antarctic operatic
were again tei ted for reasons of economy and internal
politics despite the belief held by Ad ' ] Byrd and others
that the napping operations envis for Operation High-
jump II could have established pr I Lnant American rights
over virtually the entire continent.
The lack of direct, pen nt incentives affected not
o n 1 y t h e o p e rational in t of the Unit e d S t a t e s i
n
Antarctica prior to the International Geophysical Year,
but the political and diplomatic in vol' nt as well.
State Department concern with Antarctic affairs existed
on temporary bases only, precipitated in each case by the
occurrence of events externally to its own policy-mal
machinery. Such events included: (!) acts by claimant
nations which appeared to threaten United States rights or
access to An t a r c t i ca
,
( 2 ) m a n i fe s t a t i o n s of in t e re s t i
n
the Antarctic by notions potentially hostile to the United
States, (?>) 3 d for diplomatic an its relating to
the conduct of pri .' erican expeditions, (4) <
al pr( for action in del of American rights in
the Antarctic, and (5) conflict! among othei nations o\
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Antarctic questions, which threatened Ful > p« reus-
sions to other inte i United State*
.
State Departmenl officials were . '. d the respo
sibility for dealing with the matter at hand on an ad hoc
basis and were invariably forced to delay any action until
a study could bi compl (ted on the na1 of the interests,
if any, pos d by the United States in the matter.
With the nonexistence of any permanent organ within the
State Depai ti n1 or el; here in the government to maintain
a continuing concern with developments in Antarctica and
their relation to American in1 :.
,
each external evi
resulted in the creation of new ad hoc arr; t: and
th e commi s si on oi w studi e s
.
All planning for the implemenl of thes< studj
was limited to the duration of the specific pi
had generated the interest in the first place. In the c
ly 1940' s, for example, the State Departments active con-
cern with the Antarctic terminated once the direct Germs
threat had receded and the Antarctic Service had ceased
ope r a t i o n s « .1 n 3. 9 50, wh e n Am e r i c an i n t e r e s t s 5 n t h e An t •
arctic again appe red to be threatened by a potentially
hostile nation, th i D pari en1 accordingly fo\-.r.o. itself
u n a b 1 c t o t a k e d efinitive a c t i on
.
Similarly, the efforts of 194 8 toward obtaining a so-
lution to A I tic political prob , and Lcularly
the:
: probl s related to the Anglo- '
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claims <''' cej ;ed once the tripai ;•;
merit, had ap] ed to promise a lessening of cur
i
That no solutio] I ' in fad been obtaii ' di covered
in 1952 and ) 95>3 , wl en force was used in the Antarctic by
both the Argentines and th B : : L: ' This situation could
easily have -d< d into open warfare in succeeding
years had it not. been for the o-ccu: i c e of a fortuitioui
event--the International Geophysical Year, which had not
been devised as an instrument of United States policy but
had been initiated by private membe: i : the scientific
communi t >
.
The successes of both the IGY and the Antarctic Treaty
have had the < of obscuring the defici tl it ex-
isted in Unit e d S t ; t e s An t a r c i t c p o 1 i c y p r i o r t o the la t
e
1950's. Inasmuch as the Treaty, with its provisions for
free access and nonmi 1 i tari zat ion
,
provides the best pos-
sible arrangement fo r t h e An t a r c t i c f r o m the s t a lp o i n
t
of Unit s d S t a t e s i 1 1 1 e r e s t s , t h e n a t u re of a J I p r e v i o u
s
United S 1 a 1 e r* An t ar c
t
i c po 1 i c i e s a n d a c t i vi t J e s see ms j us
tified in retrospect. Such would be the case, however,
only if these policies and activities had been consciously
and consistently designed with such an outcome as the Trea-
ty in mind--which they mosl d ''. : i itely were not. Periods
i n wh i ch i n t e r n a t i o n a 1 a r r a n g e m e n t s w ere promo t e d alter-
n
a
' e d both wi th peril ' of p.
_
rati on f o r thi as < rti on




The advanl of an international solution were rec-
ognized by the !' Gov* rnment in 3 ['59 and, indeed,
1))' State Dep« G a ] : r Boggs as early as 1930. Re-
lated to the lack of ' ' , direct interests in tl
An t a r c t i c , h w e ve r , w as t h e reluctance of t h e U n i t e d S t a
1
•
to face possible harmful repercussions to other relations
with the claimant nations by applying the pre:- s nee;
sary to gain their acceptance to a system of international
controls. L; as 1957, Secretary of State Dulles' re-
q u i r e m e n t 1 1 1 a t a s 1 u t i on to An t a r c t i c p r h ] e 1 a s b e net s u c
h
as to jeopardize United States relations in other ; in-
dicated that the United States was no more willing to apply
pressure to the claimants than it had been on previous oc-
casions, Fortunately, the same factors thai had assured
a continued United States interest caused the claimants to
become more amenable to international controls.
On the other hand, a possible fo assertion of a
United States claim to Antarctic territory never offered
either a realistic solution to the problems of the region
or the manner in which United States goals con. Id best 1
achieved. As previously stated, the sector in which the
United Stales possesses the stroi
(
r
I ; for a cl;
comprises the least accessible and least desirable an
of the continent. To have included clai to regions which
had been formerly claimed by other nations would have in-
volved tional controversies doubt] ssly mor< si rioi
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than those feared by thi United State: through an insista]
upon internationalization. Without pn di nt rights over
the entire region, the Uni A St; tes would have been forced,
in any case, to relinquish its claim to tl e right of free
access to all parts of the Antarctic, All of this would
have been distinctly less advantageous to United States
interests thr.n en i tional arrang ment guaranteeing
both the nonmilitarization of the region and the right of
free access for peaceful purposes. Finally, the assertion
of a United States territorial claim would have provide d
no solution to the dispute over the Palmer Peninsula.
If the claimant nations heel con 1 i n ued to persist in
their adamant opposition to international i . gements,
however, the protection of the interests of the United
States in future scientific, economic, or strategic develop-
ments in the Antarctic would have demanded the assertion
of American claims to as much territory as possible. Prior
to 19 5 9, the r e fo r e , t h e U n i t e d St a t e s G o v e n t s h o u 1
d
have been more consistently concerned with steps toward
strengthening American rights in the Antarctic. Such activ-
ity would have been of :; - mense importance in affording legal
rights to a greater expanse of more valuable territory if
the attainment of international controls had proved impos-
sible in the past or if the present ar should
disintegrate in the future. Even more importantly, the
simple fact of the United States 1 in a position to
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assert an extensi\ in Antarctic. \
] ! ily valuable as a b a r g a i n i 1 1 1 b o t h 3 n
earlier attempts at Lonal control: and in i u -
ture situations in which the continued existence of such
control ! I tl : d ,
While t ! ".' Antarctic Treat; in force, however,
national rights re frozen at their status in 1959 ai d
the United States continues to pcf significant bases
for claims only in th< le.-r:'-. d able region of the Antarc-
tic Continent. If the economic or s1 gic v; lue of the
An tarctic should becomi greatl) inci ' ; i 1 h i fu ture
and if the international arn j its under the Treaty
should then disi ate, the United States would ] .
rights to Antarctic terri'
.
ly on the basis of its
activities during the International Geophysical Year, when
the o t. h e r n : t i o n s i n t e : e s t e d i n t li e A n t a r c t i c w e ] e a 1 s o
engaged in extensive Antarctic program;
,
and its sporadic
history of Antarctic operatioi s prioi t< 3 '35 '.
.
Moreover, the lack of a consistent, comprehensive Ant =
arctic poli cy, of peri a for its fori i 1 i
tion and conduct , and of continuous activity toward achi ev-
ing its goals in the Antarctic pri t( 1954 could veil
have resulted in serious dai g« to United States j s ts
.
The key factors in the forti avoidance of such a result
app( ar to be th : of the Anglo-/ ' Chilean
claims dispul whicl had nei resolved no i I

278
led to serious conflict by the timi oi the IGY, and the
occ ' the IGY itself.
If the Lati -era. cans and the British had been able
to achiev< a p< ttlem nl of their dispute, the
result would probably have been recognized by the other
Antarctic clai Kith the elimination of active claims
controve , the principal impetus behind the United
States proposals of L948 would have been removed along with
one of the incentives for a maintenance of an active, inter-
est in the region by the United States Government during
the late 1940' s. If the scientific coi nunity had then not
developed plans for an IGY, by the til e d< re lop ts in
the Antarctic again provided the United S with direct
incentives for involvement, the claii s, if not already
p o s s e s s i n g s u f f i c
i
1 1 1 b ; s e s f
o
r t heir c 1 ai ms , mi j h t w ell
have perfected their rights to the poinl where they could
b e s u c c e s s fu 1 1 y d e f e n d e d u n d e r i n t e r n a t i o n a ] 1 a w . In such
a case, the United States would have been faced with the
less t h a n p 1 e a s i r g a ] t e rn a t i v e s of ; : c c e p t i n g c o n f i n e
m
i n t
within the unclaimed sector, a region over which it had
acquired rights becaiu of its challenge to explorers rati
than its value to th rati. on, becoming involved in continu
ing controversies with the claimants, or oi the cli
ants by fore i .
Conversely, if tensions over the Palme: P« linsula hi I
not been 1< 3d by the IGY, th< use cf force in th:
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pi on could easily have become increasingly more coi ce,
resulting in damagi o to the future pro
the nonmiliti Lzation of P tarctics but also to important
defense 1 alliances of the United S is.
It therefore appears that the I Lted States wa; able
to obtain the fulfillment of its goals in the Antarctic
in 1959 mori througl a fortuitous : • 1 of events than through
deliberate of policy. Afi U. feasibility of
sustained Antarctic opi had been d I rated in
the 1930's, the United States Governmei should have acted
on a continuing basis with an eye to the future of the Ant-
arctic and the role of the U S1 ii hi 1 futu
rather than havin; •' Lted its activiti to the solution
of current problems. The failure to do so is m; d< pan
larly inexcusable by the fad that the United States Gi
ment had demonstrated since 1938 a consistent awareness of
the scientific importance of the / rctic, the probable
future economic value of the region, and the threat tl
hostile ! ilitary bases in the Antarctic could pose to tl
nations of the W rn Heron pi . ,
The continuing concern with the A ctic thai ha:
been demonstrated by the U IS "es Government sii
19S9 appears to be due to the exist. • of two factors thai
had not been present be f eve, The first such factor \-rv. the
drr Lc demonstration by the IGY that Antarctic i ch




particularly when condu d rative ar
with other nation: , Secondly, the regie gain b
site of operation: -, by a nation considered potentially hos-
tile to the United Si ; and ar- opposed to Germany in
19 39, the Soviet Uj.: ; c:: has shown no intentions of withdraw-
in;-. It will I bered that the House C. rce Commit-
tee stated in ', . n y i^^i that scii ti fie cons id tions
were adequate in the lis.: as justification for the con-
tinuance of United States operations in the Antarctic but
that the Soviet presence made such action impe: >.
Since that time, statements made by various officials of
the United States C"e nt have indicated that the impor-
tance assigned to each of the tv:o facto s varies between
i nd i v i d u a 1 s a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,
Tli e United States Government has never made a fori ]
decision to support a permanent Ant< : >- > :i c effort. In its
report on the IGY, the House Commerce Committee recommended
only that the United States activities in the Antarctic
should "continue for another year.' Since the signing
of the Antarctic Treaty, however, the permanence of the
^U . S
. ,
( f ess, House of Representatives, Commit.
6n~~Trf1 I Fo Lgn Coi in sree , Ii ' % (
cal V ear, Th ' tic and Ant; ' I i 2nd i
House 1: pt. No, ] 3 8, S*erl ; . , ; 072 ('"'. : Unr' '
States G - t Printing , 1 9 f 8)
,
pp. 44-45.
4 Ibj d .
,
p . A 5 .
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United S effort in. Antarctica has beer p ui ' I
both the legislative and i tiv I I i of the United
States Gov. it. The long-range planning conducted by
the Navy and. the National Science Found a1 icsts to
this presu does the lack of congressional objec-
tion to the e involved.
With this sei ;ly pc, nt, but left-handed, com-
mitment to Ai tarctic operations, the United States Govern-
ment was led to ere at i arrange for the consideration
of Antarctic policy on a continuing basis. These arrange-
ments, first the Antarctic Working Group of the Operations
Coordinating Board and later the Ant- tic Policy Group,
have been highly successful in coordinating United States
An t a r c t i c a c t i v :'• t i e s a n d p r o m o
t
i n g the m a i n t e n an c e of a
political situation in ,' ctica favorable to United States
i n t e i* c s t s
.
The centralization of responsibility for all activities
relating to I h e An t a r c t i c i n a n i n d
«
p e n d e n t e y e c u t i v e c om -
mission i Id serve little useful purpose and would perhaps
be detrimental to United States interests. At present,
and for the foreseeable future, "it is difficult to co
c e i v c of tec h r 3 o g i c a ] a < t i v i t i e s w h i c h un i q u e 1 y r e Oj u i r e
to be conducted in the Antarctic and could not r.ore easily






ts„"" With scientific r h Lning tl tan-
gible incentive for Antarctic 01 i tions, it is logical
that the K: .1 Science Foundation should continue to
exercise its p ve] of control. As: : , Lng the res-
ponsibility 1
<
h s 1 e 1 y on the b as i s f th c g e o
-
graph] in w] Lch il is 10 be conducted would tend
to result in duplicated and wasted c ' Fo: ts in addition to
diminishing the direct rewards obtainable from that research
Present United States Antarctic research progr can
be divided into two categories: exploratory sci o and
basic scienc< The forme t i s cc'-ic- ed witl expandinj an's
knowledge of Antarctica itself and includes such studies
as tl c< d ted by the Interior De\ it in Ant arc t Lc
mincralo; ) This type of research v 11 I i ts 3 E f ir-
ly easily to centralization 1 lei an Antarctic coi mi s si en
.
The latter ca1 y, however, comprises research in fields
i n v o 1 v i n g glob a 1 p a 1 1 e r 1 1 s , a n d sue h d a t a o b t a i n e d in the
Antarctic has little value unless compared with similar
•>U. S«, Co: 1 r< ss, House of Represeni ' . os, Committee
on Interio : 1 Insular Af Lrs, Subcoi ' on Tei Ltor-





( !' 1 196 3
Operations , 88th Cong., 2n . ; • :
T9( , ' fal No. 2 9 (V: ' n: United States Gov ent
"Pr in ting Offi 1964), p. 15. Testii y c : Dr. Laurence
M c Gould, Ch< Lrman, Committee on !'&'; Research, Nation;' 1
Acad;: my of Sciences .
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ob1 d in oth< ; hie areas. This was t!:
rose a r ch of p r i n c i p a 1 c o i ; c • • 3 J i d u r i n g the I G Y and 5 s t hat
which offers th ; . atest and most ii 1 i p ctical r
wards. Such research is best controlled, and its data most
conveni ly ( sntraliz< d, with rej 1 to scientific disci~
pline, rs is pre tly the case with Antarctic research
conduct . d by such ' as the Commerce Department's
Weather Bureau and Coast and Geodetic Survey zwd the Army's
Cold Regions Research and Enginei ! t< y.
With the National Science Foundation's conti nuingly
satisfactory of its ro] c] ' ouse for the
existence and location of all data rel; ting to the
tic, further centralization of Antarctic dats appears un-
warranted. The failures of previous ex] ditions to proc:
scientific data once collected have been virtually elimin-
ated, due in part to the fact that unuvy the IGY and the
Antarctic Treaty such dr.'ir must be rrvmred and compiled
for transmission to the World Data C rs.
The Foundation has received criticism for its lack
of ab i 3 ? t y t o c o o r d i n a t c a 1 1 U n i t e d S t a t e s An. t a r c t i c re -
search, in thai any organization could conduct research
in the Antarctic if it utilized p: e fund:; and provided
"House Te: ' ial and In lar Affairs Subcommittf
Hear in; on D Fres I
!
i ] 5 8-59.
T y oTTr.'AT P. Crary, Ch'j ! Ls1 Of fice of




for its ov;n logistic : t. Such an eventuality has
not occu . ' since th< IGY; but. there ap] to be no
justification for 5 hibitin] any organization not relyi
on go\ - . tal sup] conductii search anywhere
in the Antarctic it wis] • it refrains from act-
ing in < ry to the t of international agree
ments 5 .5.1 fore i r ?] ion, even if its research should
happen to duplicate work in progress under go snta]
auspi ccs
.
Long- range planning and co< din ion of Antarctic re-
arch programs cj be noticing el: ' rfect, due
primarily to the effect thai data obtain* d in on:, year 1
upon re rch conducted the next. Impn it: in this re-
gard have been effect d since the IGY, however. Now that
support for Antarctic rese; cl to be pe tly
forthcoming and operations in / rctica have become easi<
an d 1 e .c. s t i m e - c< 1 i n g , s c i e n t ?. s t i. h a v e b e c m e mo r e i n t e r «*
estcd in long-range projects. In addition, with increased
c x p e r i e n c e i 1 1 Ai 1 1 a r c t i c e p e r a t ions, both the F o u n d a t i on
and the Navy have reached r greater understanding of
^U, S,
,
Congress, House of R entativi O tee
on Interior and Affairs, S\\^c-_. 1 '1 .. ' -
ia] and Insular Affairs, H ' ( An1 ties Legi s 1
a
<
ti oi'- • ] 90 ] . 8 7 ! Cong, ls1 ses*s. , Ai 24-25 Li I
.
!
. 11 (W hingt on : Un ited S (
.
t Printinj
Office, 1962), p. 24, St of Repress ' Jol P.
Say lor of ! yl vani
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resources and c biliti r> of the other.
It is con< ' uvor, thi i n ind; mt execu-
tive agency could pJ id coordinate the entire sci< Lfic
program in An1 tic ' t to no rent advantage < It
is not con: ncy could assu te the
roles of the ot] <: • organs < tly d in the
Antarctic Policy G: ,. the D*. j ts of St.; : ( and D<
The hi s 1 c y of United States Antarcti* ] Li y would
indicate a major deficiency to lie in the failure of t 1
State Department to coi itself with the Antarctic on f
continuing basis up to tlu International Geophysical Year.
Thai history would also indicate that whal J poli
are devised with regard to the A ti rctic inevitably affect
1 h e r U n i t e d S t a t e s ] elation s w ith the nati " n
g
interests in the region. Rati i than ci Lng institution-
al arrangements that would tend to separate the cor Id ra-
tion of Ant j tic policy froi thai of other diplomatic con-
cerns, it would appear more fruitful for the State Depart-
ment to ret.
a
iii its present role as an active pari in
policy decisions by the Antarctic Policy Group.
The debate over th d I ility of Stale !>.;:.;
control versui tl at of indep* 1 agencies over activities
^Henry M, Da1 ur, "Organi; tional D lop] ts in th
United State: ' :
;
1954- 1965 ," / ct i
c






conducted primarily ii the international arena ha; not he.
confined to Antarctica aloni , In I960, Don K„ Price, Dean
of the G] ' " Li< Admin J : i n o f Ha
Un5 ml oi P: lent's Advisory Commission
on Cover;. tal Org< iiz< ion, wrote:
A « < <. prob I em -: s th e re
tary of ! e to those federal
e x c 1 1 ly i n t he :i n t e r n a t i o
n
the Int.; Lonal Cooperation
t h e United St; I n fo r m a t i o
n
has raged for years whether th
out of the Department of State
it both ways, «. « t One is no
out c f ! nt , and the
of organ i: of both remain
t h e y h c s e t i i s < i a s t o b e :
ance of the Se< tary of Stai
i ng h i m o f th i ops rt ' -' on a 1 bur
agement, or the political burd
ponsibility for them befor< th
m i 1 1 e e s ? 9
1 at ion c
encie
a 1 f i e I d
1 n i s t
ncy,
e y s h o u 1
t ch
•» i n j i
e s s e n t i
tin : ;
pour, i '
> wh i ]
























p e c i a 1 1 y
on an d
debate
i n o r
t r i e r 1
e i s i
rob ] '. i is
how c








A cr r ;: in point, which directly p lleled that of
Antarctica, occurred during the early i hs of the Kennedy
Ad m i n i s t r a t i o n . It i n v o 3 v e d 1 h e e s t a b 1
:"
I n t of a d i s a
i
ment agen cy :
The . , . question was the location of tin
new di sari agency. Kennedy's "superficial
preference," as he told Richard Neustadt, was to
put it in the Executive Oi of the President;
y Don K. Pri "Tl
.
and Our Unwritten C(
st i tu ' Th< of J !' K. Price , ed. (1
\ k : T] ; . . I960)
, p , 3 .
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nothing, hi t, would demonsi effective-
ly the new status andseriou oJ tl • America
Or. the cth I nd, as N adt persuasive
ly replied, taking d ' men t out of the State I
partm t would co 71 Diet with the policy of making
State the < of coordination in fi
fairs « 10• c «
By sul 'Antarctica' for 'disarmament' and
'an executive agency,' for 'the Executive Office of the
Presid< nt, ' t) . iments become exactly those in-
volved in the debate over Antarctica,
In the case of the disarmament agency, the recommen-
dations of Neustadt, a professor at. Columbia University,
were eventually approved by tlu President. The resulting
Arms Control and Disar Aj ncy was i d as a
separate unit within the State Department, with its director
acting "under the direction of the Secretary of State.'
In addition, the International Cooperation Administration,
which I) r « P r i c e h a d i n t 5 or c d a s b e i n g o u t s i d e t h e S t a t e
Department in 3 960, was soon to be absorbed by the newly-
created Agency for International Dev< lop i nt. This agency,
in turn, was also placed under the authority of the Sec.'
tary o f St 12
Arthur M, Schlesinger, Jr., A Thj ' D : Jol
F . Kei dy in tl H e (B< I ff,
1 ::
r
- ) ] . tTT-Wr.
ll U. S.j SJ al '••. Vol. 75 (1961), pp. 631-639
"Arms Control and"] \d of 3 961,"
12 Schlesinj r, A Tho I ! ys, pp, 592-593.

9 !/ i) i)
Wi th the possibili ' Lous inte rn a ti per-
c u s s i on s r
i
b ] Antarc t i c p r o g
r
;•
i s o E a n y n
r
tion and th< re qui ts fo dipl oi t i -
at ions und the Am tic T
,
it also appear: ui di sir-
able that the coi i. d tion of Antarctic policy be di\
fron th< ; . i I ionsibi li ties of the Dep; rtment of Stat
in tlit cor* duct oi fi ign relations. Moreover, under th o
present a rran ts the See y of State is relieved o ?
the two 1 d by Dr. Price , The o] s rational res
ponsibiliti.es have been vested in the Navy and the National
Science Foundation, and co Lo lal c< Lttees hi ap-
parently held the State Di nt responsib For only
those Antarctic matl . r ; re] atii to foreign re] •• 1 ': on< a
international 1 ; in ge al
.
In contrast to the cases of the other agenci s and
endeavors mentioned abo\ , however, it is in feasible, and
p e rh ap s i. mp o s s i b 1 e , t h a t t h •: S I a t e De ; N a r t m en t \ i s e com-
plete md undivided control over Antarctic policy and pro-
grn The Defense < ; ti ;'. is the only agency posse:
ing the personnel, equi] ', and experience necessary to
transform policy into concrete programs in the field, and
its c o r r e sp on d i i g ro 1 e i n An t a r c t i c a f f ; i r s i : s i mp 1 y t o o
immense for it not to be involved in the formulation of
policy. In; . only the Defense Department, and pri
• 11) of the Navy, is in a position t< d
termi can or i physi al or safely be ae co
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plishedinth< An i ( I " . - 1 1 i ' ' r
1 i n D, Roo: 1 edy to s 1 the Uefen:
and Navy D< ; ally subordinate roles in policy
decisions wen do ' to failure. Foi example, on May 29,
1940, some 11 mo the Interior I 1 h ad b
assi; i ol of the United States Antarctic Ser-
vice, Interior .' tary Harold L, Ickes sent the follow-











As the situation now stands, although th
: i: 1 has full Dnsibility for the ex
re of the appropriations, it I : • no autl
soever ove: the admi Lon of the pro














I v y c
. c t i c a 3 an a 1 y s i s it is r
<
led t
t of the Navy is vesl 3d with con
the adi li n i i ( i o f th e Uni t<
tii Service. » . *
1st. glyrecomme
~ r a ppropriat i f < r t he I ; : i t
«












Inasmuch as President Roosevelt had previi ly decided
that the Antarctic territory to be claimed by the Unit
States would be administ I b) the Interioi Dep; nt, he
replied on June 8 that the cl ' d by Sec.
* 3Sec etary of th Interior to Pi idei , May 29, 1940,
in Charles E' e Dewinj ai ' Laurs E, Kel: - pilers, "Re-
cords of th U 'ted S A: ctic Servic ." Preli
) • oft! Uni ted Stat Nati 1 .' ' :
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I eke:; "would not be di ] t time.. "*^
Sii Llarly, the Sta1 D nt found itself unable
to fully exercise th< i Lbility for overall coordina-
tion of ": rs in the early 1960's, even with
the assi e of its i ' tmental committee, This
situatio I t< th( c ation of the Antarctic Policy Groi
in 1965.
In sui 7, it would appear that the retention of the
present ar ments for the formulation and conduct of
United SI ' itarctic policies and p: i ; in the
best interests of the United Stat The roles of the
three agencies : en ted in the An1 tic Policy Gr<
are each vital and of a] ' t< ] y equ 3 import; ice to the
United St: s effort in Anti Lea, and it is neither ' .
ible nor particularly desirable that any one of these agen-
cies should exercise paramount control ovei that effort.
Moreover, the principal deficiencies of United States
Antarctic policy in the past ha\ >t been due to a 1< 1
of coordination among govern nt agencies onj tl ch isi
1 si 1 c< d tic had been esl bid I Indeed , the
activities of the United States Antarctic Service were co-
ordinated so successfully on the operational and diplomatic
*4 President to S
.
of th I terior, Ji : 8, 1940,
in Dewing and 1 Lsay, "Records of th United ! Ant< •
tic S




o ] s I Li i tl South Ai
c J. a i : tt s vie v e r m; There were prob ] I tw
the Antarctic Servici : id th scientific community; bi
these: hav beei eliminal ' b) the practice , establish
during the IGY and still in existence, of aff< the
scientisl voice in Antarctic af fa The
apex of succe; ifu] interd I : Lng occurred with
the consultatii I p: paration of pi Ltion papers prioi
to the multinational discussions of 1958-1959, At that
time, each agency \ ; ith in ' ts in the Antarctic was given,
in effect j a veto o\ x fori al pro] ] made or acc< ed
by the i 1 Lted St Although such an an
.
i t af
r L e 1 dy , t h i si cess of the A; t i c Con i nee of 195!
and the subseq ty cannot be deni d.
As long as multinational discus? ' on the Ant a : c
continue to be held on a regular basis and the United States
continues to possess direct incentives fc operations in
the region, it is to be expi d that the presei ' arrange-
ments, or ones similar to them, will remain in existence
to co id ' -. ' ; ' i E ' tic policy on a continu-
ing basis, top te United States intei sts in the region,
and to be in a position to react relatively quickly to un-
foreseen eventualities. Neither the p< man en t nati of
United Sta1 i ti Les in the Antarctic nor t!
Lstenceofthcsegovi iniental i
.
t s c an b e t al
fi | ited, h Dr. It will bi b I I n the I
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Stater- Antarctic Servi was thought to be a p tent or-
ganization j arly 3940 but was disbanded soon - Pter the
United St a1 had i Lons in the field, and it
is by no me ai ' i.ble that some fi i t need of
the Unit. ' to expend funds or deploy n
val force:: el: he could ] ad to a c tion of activity.
in the A ic t In such a case, it would be imperative
that the United Si break with past tradition and re1
the internal arrangements for the broad consideration of
An t a r c 1 i c p o 3 5 c y . The State De p a ] t me n t , i n particular,
i ail a conti ;:rest in al] political or
technological development Ffecting the United St; ]
tion in Antarctica~-regardless of fluctuations in the scal<
of United States operations on the continent itself* To
do otherwise would be to risk losing for all time the voi<
and the role that the United States now possesses in the
f u t u r e o f t lie; re g .1 o n t
With regard to the future of the Antarctic itself, the
success of the Antarctic Treaty : to preclude both a
return to the active rivalries that have e;: : ' in the
region in the pasl and any final division of the continent
into i tioi 1 sectc s , The Meetings of Consu] Ion have
demonstrated the will in; sj and tl ability of the partici
pating nations to 1 aj ent in new ai it is
probab le tl at ; ; . Ill be r< ached in oj
matte: such ; tl conduct of directly rej rativ activi

29 3
ties. In fact, o ctivity is all ' being conducted
in Antarctica, and no a] rnational disputes have
res u 1 1 e d , Th \~ is t o u r i s in
«
The first to ion to Antarctica was org;
by the Arg< Navy in 195i Thi; oon follot^ed by
a similar ton und'^y the auspices of the Chilean Navy.
In 1966, p.i
'
irise I involved through the
Lindblad Travel Agency of N i York, which o
,
" d a tour
of the Primer Peninsula region al ' a chartered Argentine
transport. This tour included \ Its to An1 Lc stations
occupied by the Unit< ates, the United Kingdom, and A]
gentina, and was no successful that it wai ted witl
i c:
the sai itin« m 1967. * Ii early 1968, the Lindblad
Agency spons o^u' two An ' : : tours al 1 i- vessel chai
tered from the Chilean Go ont. The it ii ies vi
year included visits to thi Falkland and South Shetland
Islands in addition to British, Chilean, and United States
IS
"Tourism in the An1 tic, 1967," The Polai Re<





6 A] 1 tourists havi been treated wi
hospitality e
v
< /where in the An t arctic, d . t h i i a c
t
that free access to the region had been < d by the An1
arctic Treaty to s c i >. : ts and official observers only,
F u t u r e agreement on the e : p 1 o i t a t i o n o f An t a r c t i c ]
sources could t a k e v a r i o u : fo l m s , r a n g i n g f r o m t h e m e r
e
e s t ab 1 i s h r.i e n t o f g u i d e 1 i n e s t o t h e fo rm a t i o n of multination
al stock comp Les.-*--' J i~ the activities concerned do not
offer vast profits and are not beyond the technological
capabilities of any of the nations involved in the region,
as in the present case of tourism, sue!) agreei con-
sist of nothing more that the tacit acceptance of an) i a-
t:ion's right to engaj in those activil ; In the c;
of remunerative activities involving highly sop] i s I Lcated
techno) o g y , t h e c 1 a i
m
ants w o u 1 d p r o b a b 1 y d e m a n d s o m e a r
-
r an g e m e n t w h e r e by profits a r e s h a r e d a m o n g. a 1 1 t h e n a t i o n s .
16 Jo
An t a r
1968)
1 a n d
,
. a r c t i
been
an d '





































" An t a re t i c P e n i nsul
of the United Sj I , Vo
i
4 , the Un i
1
t d S t a t e s , Aus
ted Ki ngdom agreed to us e
for the t-e-rri-t-or-y- whi-cli-









sput ed An tare tii Pine ' mes ," The Po
an i
0"* Higgins Land' respect!
a Tou rism in 196 8,''
1 . 3 (duly- August
,






/i ous ] }'
U n i t e d S t a t e s
. Common w e a 1th,
I
i
: s u ] a ' S 1 1 n
v .• 1 y , " Agreement
1
1 d , Vo ]
.
f I
-i p . 4 7 0-471,
l^Philip C. Jessup and Ho d J. Taul :: Id, Cc
fo: ' ! Sp ; It! ' ' Vi log) [Ne\ York : Col
I UnlversTtl i'3 j p -! ; •• !
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Argentin 1 ( le, in parti* r, have co tently feared
the results of any future c< pi I i\ 'on with the Great Powers
for exploitable Antarctic resoi ; and thi: • has bei
an impo: factor in their desire to exercise sovereignty
over ce rta i n * rs
.
Most i po to the prospect: of futu aj eement
in the Antarctic are. the position: of the United States and
the Soviet Union, As the nations with the greatest scien-
tific and technological capal Llities, both < be expected
to continue to support an its providing them with
free access to the entire regio In addition, as i ore
and more nations without prior bases for claims becomi ;
tive in the / ctic, th p Lbility of a retreat from
the present system of international c( ols becomes more
remote still, Since 1959, such ti< ! acceded to the
Antarctic Treaty at the rate of approximately one every
two years: Pol Mid on June 8, 1961, Czechoslovakia on June 14,
1962, Denmark on May 20, 1965, and the Netherlands on
1 8March 30, 1967. These four nations have so far limited
their Antarctic activities to participation in multination-
al programs and th Fore do ] o1 po: : ess voting rights at
th M of Consult at ioi , It is probable, however,
18,
'Antarctic Treaty 1959: Accessions," Thj Pol:
co d
,





that any development si, i cant, enough to threaten the
political stability of the region would lend these and Oili-
er n a t i o n s t o i n c r e a. s e t heir i . i t i s s to 3 e v els a f f o r cl i n g
them voices in the issu'
,
In the final an; lysis, the claimants can be expected
to be faced ii tl '. ' th the same two alternatives
that they possessed with ? • ] to the IGY and the Trea-
ty- -to defend by force the exercise of sovereign rights
within their sectors or attempt to obtain the most advan-
tageous compromise with those nations favoring internation-
al arrange menl
The tru< internationalization of / tarctica under
organ such as the United Nations is equally as imp rob ab
]
as a regime of separate nation;: 3 sectors. The Treaty sig-
natories hive consistently opposed participation in Antarc-
tic affairs on the p a '. t o f n a t i o n s no t a c t i v e 1 y i n v o 1 v e d
in the region and have expressly prohibited subsequent i I
he rents to the Treaty from participating in the Meetings
o f Con s v 1 1 a t 5. on un til i h e y d e m o n s t r a t e a n i n t e r e s t i n the
Antarctic "by conducting substantial scientific i arch
activity there, sue]; as the establishment of a scientific
station or tl < v spatch of a scientific expedition."*'
**U t s., Dep; nt of State, "The A I - rctic Treaty,"
Un ited S tati 1 ' and < ; tiona] Ag:
( 1. as }• in \ '. . : i s < ; Lee ,
1961) , Vol . 12, pt. 1, p< 798.
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The interest of the U ' d Nation; Lf in the Ant-
arctic has thu: Fai b m in In] 9 1 7
,
the T ] u stees h i
p
Co unci 1 recci o1 petition: : the Women ' s In-
1 ' nal League for ! nd Freedom of Geneva calling
for the establisl of Arctic and Antarctic trusteeships ,
The Council wi th< opinion, h( r, that the matt
was beyond its c and accordingly resolved to take
2no action.
N i n e y e a r s ) ; 1 e i , o n F e b ru a r y 2 ] s J 9 5 6 , J n d i a p r o p o s e d
t h a t t h e c; u e s t i o n o f a j rang m en t s g
u
i r an t e e i n g t h e p e a c e
-
ful use of Antarctic, be pl< c< d on the provisional agend
of the Eleventh General Assembly, Believing thi the Ant-
arctic possessed a stri
t
: gic, cl Lmatic, ' L :
portancc not. just to the nations histi lly active in
the region but to the entire world, the Indian Go\ nt
desired that agreement should be reached i •; all United
Nations members on the following items: (J) the utiliza-
t i on o f An l a r c t i c a s o ] e 3 y f o r ] • e a c e fu 3 p u rp o s e s , ( 2 ) t h e
non-utilization of Antarctica for any purpose causing an
increase- in world tensions, and (/>) the prohibition of
activities in Antarctic; that could be detrimental 1c verld
2^United Nations, Trust' ship Council, Of i. al R<







The ' prop I was subsequently withdrawn, due
primarily to Argei and Chilean objections, but was re-
newed on July 15, 1958, some 10 weeks after the United
State::: had sent the formal invitations to the Conference
on Antarctica. I 1 of the nature of whatever agree
ment might be reached among the 'interested' nations clone,
India reiterated its belief that th« action that it pro-
posed should only be taken by "the world community as a
22
whole." In view of the u pending co; nee, the opposi-
tion of the 'interested' nations was even heavier than it
had been in 1956; and Indi< withdrew its proposal for the
2 "5
second time. '
With the success of the Treaty in obti ining a reduc-
tion of tensions over the Antarctic and the fact that any
member of the United Nations may obtain a voice .i n Ant a
tic matters by expending the resources necessary to denoir
st rate its interest, no further at1 hav< been made
toward achieving a system of less»exclusive international
participation in the affairs of the regie The impetui
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^JessuD ai I Taul Id, Co ols, p. 174,
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for such an 5 ed to exist in - :
future on]\- if the Treat)' should be i led to r
the right of acci ' I 1 p; tici] should <
in activities, such i control, which threatt
direct < ' olved nations.
On the basis of all the abo> rations, it ap~
pears most probable that the political arrangements currei
ly existing in A tica will ain in exi ce for some
time, with the lev; ]: of Multinational control and coopera-
tion gradually being i t< as the participants achieve
agre t in new i The incr< admi tive tasks
acc(
,
tying this extension could lead, in turn, to either
the evolution of the Mi tings of Consultation into a per-
manent governing board or the ere at ion of a joii 1 ad !
administrati v< regii
,
perhaps simi] 'to that created b)
the United States and the United Kingdoi in 1939 for tl
24
administration of Canton and Enderbury Islands.
The above analysis has bee;, based, however, upon t
assumptions that cannot be taken for granted by the Unit d
^United States Secretary of State Hull to British /.
bass ado in W; hi Si aid ! rcdsay , April 6 , 1 9 39
,
ii U. S. , Depart of ! , "Conflii 1 .' ican \
British Claims to Various Islands i: the Pacifi n;
Agre .i iei t fo . the Joi .' Imini ion of C • and Ender-
bury Islands, Efj I by Excl of ] . ' il 6 , 19 39 ,'
Fo ' I ' s of tl Un ! 1 | i h i n g t on
:





States Governi The first as si ion is that a . ;
ditional natii ; ged in Antarctic operations
will either ad ' y to the Treaty or al in volun-
tarily from activitie: j »hibited by the Treaty. If a na-
tion should re fi to ' either a I should commence activi-
ties of a mil itary na1 s, it might we 1] beco ess ary
for the Tyv : t) i ", tories to follow suit if they fin
themselves unwilling to take action, either singly or joint
ly, against that nation; and it is doubtful that the re-
sulting militarization of / ctica would be conducive to
the continin d existence of cooperative international i
rangements. The second assu ption is thi Fu1 I Lo]
ments will nol cause Antarctica to becoi so economically
or stategically valuable th; I nations i Lgh1 find the coi
tinent, for the first time in its history, worth fighting
over. The continuing possibilit) that either assumptii
m i g h t b e p r o v e d i n v a ] i < ] i 1 1 t h e fu t u r e > 1 s k e s 5 1 p a r t i c. u 1 ? r -
ly imperative thct the United States retain an interest
in Antarctic matters unrelated to the existence or non-ex-
istence of incentives of r n immediate nature,
] n all I i k e 1 i 1 1 e o d , h o v.' ever, t h e i n i. e rn a t i on a 1 <? r r ; ] : g e
ments instituted ovei the Antarctic will continue to enjoy
the successes that they have enjoyed during the l?d0'; ;
- ' ; -'.'•'
: I-.--: ' ris e 1 discu
si on . on ths : ' 'i''ty of re o: all of these ai
i




Int.''' J i nus ; : t ] I :
cant provisions of th< tic Treaty did not seek to al-
ter the cu oJ the Contracting Poi but rather
to fori lesirab] aspects oft)
in the region. tly> the Treaty itself has little
direct re lev to ] ' >1 ms or areas where it is precise-
ly a cl in the quo that is desired, as in re-
gions which arc all '. the site c r military activity or
in p ro b 1 e n i s o £ d i r - t i n g e n e ra 1 , Mo r cover, t h e f a i 1 -
ure on the part of the Con ting P{ rties to achieve, even
up to the present (1969), < ment on the economic
ploit i of the Antarctic cau e< th« A ctic settle) ent
to be valueless as a precedent for regions where economic
activity is either an important factor at present or is
expected to b< so in the near future.
The region in vine:;' the i its ; hieved over
the Antarctic appear to be most directly applicable is out-
er spree, There, as in Die Antarctic, no indigenous popula-
tion is 1. to exist, militarization has not been attempted,
and scientific investigation is expected to remain the prin-
cipal activity for s< . ••. time , Fro; . the s tan dp Lnt of pos-
sible int< ' nt, however, the two r; f,ions
p o s s e s s i i n t d i f i e s .
Firstly, difi in tl ies involved in
• ond ' e r c in the two reg: i of a ( ru-
( political ' , There ; five principal
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hides utilized at present in tl ' tion of Ai
tica and in suppi Ai icebr I rs
and other vessel: ! for pol ervice, propeller-
driven airplanes, heli< ers, snow tractors, and dogsleds.
Even thou I all these vehi have some relevance to war-
fare, the technoloj involved in thei nufacture vv:u
operatic ' b le to all nations for a conside
able p e r i o d o f t i m e . L i 1 1 1 e o b j c c t i o n t h e r e fore ex i s t s to
their inspection by i ', • ' .vers or to the unlimited
exchange of data relating to their use. In contrast, tr3iis-=
port at ion in o S] ; : accomplish d throug] _:
of rockets si mil ar , and i i t identical,
to those involv< d in the ballistic, mis: Lie, one of the most
highly sophisti< in the ar: is of the major
powers. In the absenc< of either ; genera] political ? c i •
tlement or developments in weaponry which serve to eclip
the importance of rockets to the neti< ia] d< fense, it is
doubtful th« t aj nt can be reached t ; ai ; . . mts of
unlimited inspection ai d data exchanj for outer space in
g e n e r a J .
Secondly, an effective system to insure the nonmili-
tarization of outer space would ; quire the righl o '' inspec-
tion of mai ' :" centers, storage faciliti
;
and
iai t chin \ : ; and no ma j or p ha: y 1 i ' i1 elf
willing to g: to ' bi fvers the right oi i
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access to any ; nd all parts of its natii I rritory.
This right was not beli I to be necessary in the case of
Antarctica, where i nation would presumably require an ex-
tensive period of
|
ration in the field be fore it could
be in r position to po: ;,e a ' military threat. In c<
trast , i pon oi" destruction can be placed in outer
space in a ma ttei of mi tes
.
The above differences between the; two regions vrt re-
flected in a comparison between the Antarctic Treaty and
the 6 2 - n a t i o n Outer Sp a c i T r e a i: y o f ) 9 6 7 , b o t h o f w h i c
h
deal with the questions of noni ton, inspection,
data exchange, free access, ;;u ! the status of national
claims, It is inte to note that in c vhere si mi
1 ar co n d i t ions fo r a ; c n t d id: j n b o 1 1 i r e g 5 o n s
,
articles of the latter t aty w< e patterned after those
of the fi to the point of almost id ntical wording.
Tn its provisions regarding nonmilil L; Ion, the
Outer Space Treaty is much less co p I sive than the Ant
arctic Treaty, i) t; smuch as conditions si ilj to those i
n
the Antarctic existed only on celestial bodies and not i
outer s price itself. In the sense that the flight paths of
ballistic missiles involve r; period of n s i t th ough
spree, the rej ion had al y been the site of ex1 ive
25jioward J. Taubc Id, "A Treat) f< f
,
,:
International Conciliation, No, 53] (J; i y, 1961), n. 302
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w pons tes.ti ' tl of th e ; ' onal ' ' ' ' ' cul -
tics pi ; b) 1 th< direct connection between civilian ;
military roc] 1 tech: the i ility of a;
ment on system of inspection, the signatories
to the Outer S] '. aj do ly to th ral p
hibition of "nuclei w< apons or any otl j kinds of w
of mass d( structii ' In the case of celestial bodies,
hove v e ]
'
, n e i t h e r h a d m i • ' 1 i r y a c t i v i t i e s pi: v
:
;
< u s 1 y t a k e n
place nor was the inspection of national territory required
for a reasonable level of r ' y against possible viol,
tions of an agre< ent or ful] nonmilita i '' ; a d tl
provision in this err-- was word d ; ii ost 5 d ( y to
Article 1 of the / ; > : c Treaty:
The moon and othe] celestial bodies shall be
used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusive
ly for peaceful purpose:", Tj e e: tab lis! nt of
military bases, i nstallatic n s an d f r
t
i f i c a1 i c n :
,
the testing of any type c r weapt c : i d t ; . conduct
of mi li tary i rs on celestial 1 : ' shall
be f o i ! ; I n, The use of military personnel for
scientific re s e a r
c
h or f o r a 1
1 y __ 1 1 s e r p e a c e f u 1 p >
poses shall not b:- prohibited. 2
7
The right of inspection undei the Antarctic Treaty is





! inciple: Go ing the Activities oi
States ii 1 h( I | ' and Use of Out ei ' , Includ
ing th( Mo 1 and Oth ei Celestial Bodies,' I o i





Space Treaty is jv . The T aty si
merely that the Parti to "< insider on i b< :'; s o ?
equality any ., I
_, other s Partie: to the Tre;
to be afforded an oj to observe the flight of
space obj ts launchi thos* : :;,"^° Even facilities
on celestial i lies j to be op n to thi sentatives
of other si; ' o: ly "on a ! si reciprocity" and
O (1
"
; I advance notice of a pro j ected visit." -





tangible incentive for agreement on
rs re] to the Antarctic, also appear in the Outer
Space Treaty subji i to qualifier'. The si; tories
pre required to dissemin dat; on '; vi t i
z a
only "to the g : s 1 c x -v t feasibl( and ] 3 c "
"
In one respect, conditions in outer space were more
conducive to agreement than they had been i- ' .vet i.e.'*,
No claims to national sovereignty had been asserted over
o ut e r sp ace o r ce 1 es t
i
< 1 b o d 5 e s
,
a n d t h e s i gn a 1 o r i es to
the Outer Space Treaty were able to take significant ; :
•i ard elii : ting the possibility of future disputes cv
this issue. The righl o f fn recess to the region '.









granted to a 3 J natii ' h< ut qua 3 1 f i ( a ti on
,
and it w;
furth< It) 'on "is not subject to nation-
al appropris t ion by claim c
„ by i of c
cupation, or b;- any < - :: i "--*
Folic of the Antarctic experience, the
negotiators of the 0u1 .'pace Treaty did not je<
the entir< • • b) insisting upon un Lty in mat-
ters of a hi ) control ial nature. Like the Antarctic
Treaty, the ' e Treaty server! to formalize desir-
able aspects of the stal and thi quo in out-
er space was significantly less conducive to i nal
agreement in all respects .save that of national claims.
Develop; nts in the Antarctic since 1959 have indie;
however, that the reduction in political t
i
by limited aj can ret to facilil ' further agn
in th< future. In this rd, even though the specific
international arrangements existing in the Antarctic may
have little direct relevance to the prol li of other re-
gions, the symbolic value of the Antarctic settlement is
very great inde<
Twelve i \i1 ; i is of varying, and often conflicting, po-
litical philosophies have demonstrated in Antarctica that
a r c giLine of -i ial cooperation can be succi lly estab-









st rat ion lias already y ' tical result! in the
tablishmentofi simil;
, g] -1 . comprehensive, i
over 01 S] . Ill th .' tarctic Treaty wi
the fiy^' in a si Lon < cant Cold-War agr<
ments, w] ' included tl ; i ' Test Treaty
of 1963, the ter Space Treaty of 1967, and the Nuclear
Non-Prolii T •. . ty of 1968. Norn of these agreements
provided final solutions to the respective s involved,
but all repres I sij Lficant st< towi d those solu-
tions ; an d "it wi i tht coldest of a 3 J continents tl
there was the fir: 1 , ' ' w in th< « :• i •• , \ „32
3^u« S, , ( Se: • ' e, Ci ' ttee on Fo ' . Re] a
ti V ' tl Ant; cti c Treaty , 86th Cong ., 2nd
sess
. , T\ • Li t'vvj Govern-
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